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Abstract 
In Eighteenth-CentUlY Medical Discourse and Sensible Bodies: Sensibility and Seljhood 
in the Works of William Godwin, MaTY WollstonecraJt and MaTY Shelley, I examine how 
medical, philosophical and theological discourses on sensibility and on selfhood 
mutually informed one another in the historical moment of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries in England. The key to unraveling the complex notion of sensibility 
principally lies in the medical discourse that investigated the source of motion, 
knowledge, and moral feelings. I focus on the medical tracts which can be seen as 
discursive responses to Locke's epistemology. In addition, I read eighteenth-century 
philosophical texts and analysed some of the political debates on the French Revolution. 
The theory of associationism which is predicated on the study of nerves and 
sense-impressions throws some light on a particular aspect of sensibility which explores 
epistemological issues and character formation. I show how the nerve theory operated in 
gender specific ways, so exposing the gender bias of supposedly objective medical 
science. The specific writers I discuss, Godwin, Wollstoncraft and Shelley, all address 
the associationist theory directly. A close examination of their appropriation of medical 
language reveals that the image of the sensible body was a constant source of 
inspiration, and that their literary production was a continual process of re-figuring such 
a medicalised body. My project attempts to make sense of the equivocal position of 
Godwin and Wollstonecraft, who, while upholding rationalism, avow sensibility in their 
literary and non-literary works. The underlying contradictions between the 
IV 
associationism and the authOlity of the individual's mind run deep. Rather than 
illustrating feminine reticence in Shelley's Frankenstein as a cultural reflection of a 
"proper lady," I argue that her characterisation of the monster and of female characters 
must be read as complex articulations of her sentiments about the discourses on 
sensibility and the problem of human agency. 
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Introduction 
This thesis was prompted by a feeling that Mary Shelley's Frankenstein has not been 
fully discussed in the framework of the sensibility movement. The concept of sensibility 
has profound bearing upon the issues of selfhood and the rational mind, for sensibility, 
chiefly referring to the sensible body, addresses the epistemological and ontological 
questions regarding knowledge about one's identity formation. Considering that Shelley 
is the daughter of the rationalists William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, her 
epistemological confusion or her insecurity about herself has puzzled not only modem 
critics, but also the contemporary writers who knew her in person. She was often 
expected to be more "self-asserting" and "aggressive" than she really was. Robert Owen, 
a friend of Godwin, for example, was surprised to find her very different from his 
preconceptions.! Shelley's ambivalence about female self-assertion may be explained 
historically by the collision between what we call the "Romantic" model of originality 
and the "Victorian" model of feminine domesticity.2 However, in this thesis, rather than 
trying to assess her status as a "proper lady," I would like to show that the ambivalence 
about herself can be approached by adopting a more encompassing "paradigm of 
sensibility,,3 inscribed in the medical texts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
1 Betty T. Bennett, Lives of The Great Romantics: Mary Shelley vol. III (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 1999), p.127. 
2 Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman writer: Ideology as Style in the 
Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelly and Jane Austen (Chicago & London: 
Chicago University Press, 1984), p.116. 
3 My use of this term "paradigm" draws upon G.S.Rousseau's application of Kuhn's 
category to be used as a method of research. Its condition is to be "sufficiently 
unprecedented," but at the same time open-ended so that the "practitioners" can be left 
with problems which they can resolve. See G.S.Rousseau, "Nerves, Spirits, and 
Fibres:Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility" in Studies in the Eighteenth 
2 
centuries. 
The discussion of Shelley's sense of self will first and foremost require an 
extended reflection on how the "soul," the "rational mind" and the "female body" are 
represented in these medical treatises, for it was the development of medical sciences, 
the nerve theory in particular, that obscured the Cartesian dualism of body and mind. 
The word sensibility is significantly predicated upon Locke's theory of associationism 
elaborated in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). The "paradigmatic" 
sensibility, as G.S.Rousseau has argued, was inaugurated by Locke's sensationalist 
psychology. Not only were nerve (neurological) theorists engaged in the physiological 
investigation of somatic sensibility, but, like Locke, they addressed philosophical 
questions about the prime mover of the body. 
The medical concept of the sympathetic interaction between organs was 
extended to symbolise the communication of feelings in a social context. The concepts 
of sensibility in medical and philosophical discourses therefore are not mutually 
exclusive. Sensibility is a polysemous concept, and by this term a wide range of ideas 
were evoked in different discourses and genres. Furthermore, bodily sensibility or 
"sensitivity" has implications that are contradictory to each other. Delicate nerves not 
only signified a moral capacity to sympathise with another, but also suggested the 
nerves' incapacity to withstand excessive passions. This dualistic performance of the 
senses preoccupied the minds of eighteenth-century physicians, intellectuals and 
philosophers. 4 As John Mullan has dexterously shown in the last chapter of his 
Sentiment and Sociability, the cultural meaning of sensibility is tom between a morally 
Centuryvol.III (Camberra: Australian National University Press, 1976). 
4 G.S.Rousseau, "Science" in The Context of English Literature: The Eighteenth 
Century ed. Pat Rogers (London: Methuen, 1978), p.189. 
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privileged position and excessive or uncontrollable features. 5 In my reading, I perceive 
the latter trait as historically representing a degradation to the status equivalent to 
non-human or animal being. This distinction occupies a pivotal place in my argument, 
for the monster in Frankenstein embodies the cultural implications of the excessive or 
the irrational. The medical discourse revolved round the question of the moral and 
intellectual capacity of the nerves. Besides David Hartley, I select several other medical 
authors who investigated the nature of nerves and how they are linked to moral issues. 
The question of human agency was also brought forward through the 
discussion of matter and spirit. Materialist theory that explored the nature of the 
physical body was presented by many a medical expert, but for philosophical and 
literary authors it became an obstacle to forming rationalist views, or for theologians to 
justifying their immaterial system. In Chapter 1 I try to follow the development of these 
ideas in the medical writings of George Cheyne, Robert Whytt, David Hartley, William 
Cullen, John Brown, Erasmus Darwin, Julien Offray de La Mettre, William Lawrence 
and Francois-Joseph Gall, and in the philosophical writings of David Hume and Thomas 
Reid. 
The key to unraveling such complex and often convoluted ideas of sensibility 
III Shelley's Frankenstein lies in understanding not only the medical history or 
philosophical traditions, but also the legacy of her parents' philosophy. Although both 
Godwin and Wollstonecraft are more often than not associated with their rationalist 
philosophy, a closer examination reveals their ambivalence about the power of the mind. 
Their insistent rationalism hinges upon their belief in the power of the mind's rational 
5 John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth 
Century(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.16. 
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design against constantly accumulating bodily sensations. Yet they were both 
acquainted with the nerve theory whose imagery of the body questioned the ultimate 
source of knowledge. The most representative of all the medical tracts is David 
Hartley's Observations on Man (1749) which theorises the mechanism of the nerves 
that "vibrate" in response to "associations." Godwin's scepticism of such a mechanical 
theory is illustrated in his Enquily Concerning Political Justice (1793) which locates 
the source of self in the mind. In this associationist theory or what is generally called the 
theory of necessity, the mind is governed by laws of causation and hence one thought, 
action or event necessarily and logically leads to another. For Godwin, this does not 
mean that human beings are totally pre-programmed, and his goal was to resist and 
redirect the course of this theory so as to make the constant progress possible for the 
human race. However he explores human motivation and the cause of action only to 
find that they are ultimately inexplicable. Shelley inherits much of her epistemological 
problem from Godwin, who, while upholding rationalism, is confounded by the 
apparent contradiction in his theory of necessity. The characterisation of a man of 
feeling in Caleb Williams illustrates the difficulty in dividing the ideas of perception and 
reason, and in explicating complex human motivation. In Chapter 2 I explore Godwin's 
sentimentalism and show some of the rhetorical obstacles that he faced in the creation 
of a rational being in the text. 
In contemporary clinical practice, "habits" were less viewed as the basis for 
Hartleyan associationism than as involving a perverse fixation with pathological 
connotations. Unshakeable habits that are pursued with unnatural passion were no 
longer a harmless routine that enabled one to establish associations. They were 
suggestive of the dangerous addiction of the senses over which the mind has no control. 
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Margaret Homans characterises the solitary pursuit of Victor Frankenstein in abstract 
terms. She interprets his scientific creation as the "aggrandisement of masculine 
creativity" and the "circumvention of the matemal,,,6 which is thematically pertinent to 
a feminist discourse. Yet, if we are to historicise the figure of a male solitary pursuit in 
this period, it becomes clear that Shelley also denuounces the diseased body, for she 
characterises Victor as an addicted figure. In Chapter 3 I try to show that Godwin's 
creation of the alchemist in his St.Leon makes an interesting analogy with the scientist 
in Frankenstein. 
Passions had a pathological connotation, but in a specific context they were 
eulogised as a sign of genius. The art of sensibility, as Raymond Williams remarks, 
"became specialized during the course of the eighteenth century.,,7 The words such as 
"creative," "original" and "genius" were no longer considered as "characteristic 
disposition," but "exalted special ability" (ibid., 44). Following Dr Johnson's definition 
that sensibility is "[ q]uickness of sensation, quickness of perception, delicacy," 8 
Wollstonecraft affirms in her essay 'On Poetry,' that genius possesses "quick," "strong" 
and "exquisite" sensibility.9 She celebrates the "masculinization" of feminine gender 
traits in The Rights of Woman, but she does not reject female sensibility altogether. She 
strives to salvage female sensibility by severing it from its recurring connection with 
6 Margaret Homans, Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in 
Nineteenth-Century Womens Writing(Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 
1986), p.105. 
7 Raymond Williams, Culture and SocietY:Coleridge to Orwell (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1987), p.43. 
8 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman in The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft. eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 1989) 
vol.5, p.132. Hereafter cited as VRWwith page numbers in parentheses. 
9 Mary Wollstonecraft, "On Poetry" in The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft. eds. Janet 
Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 1989) vol.7, pp.7-9. Hereafter 
cited as OPwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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sensuality. While deriding the sensual body, she tries to exemplify the "naturalisation" 
or even "exaltation" of female sensibility in Mwy, A Fiction. However, as her equivocal 
response to Edmund Burke's sensationist aesthetic illustrates-which I intend to take up 
in this thesis-her views on the female body are greatly problematic for her. In Chapters 
4 and 5 I examine the representation of female genius which Wollstonecraft creates as a 
political gesture to rebuke her male adversaries, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Burke. 
As Chris Jones has argued, sensibility, when associated with a man of feeling, 
signifies effeminate "sentimentalism," but "radical sensibility" in a political usage is 
frequently understood as aspiration towards a better state of society, epitomising the 
movement towards the French Revolution. lo The ascendancy of republicanism and 
individualism among the radicals was strongly reflected in their critical view on the 
hierarchical organisation of the body-politic. In conservative rhetoric, however, the 
body-politic will not sustain its operation without the control of the head of state, 
meaning the monarch, for the actual body of state is incapable of self-management. The 
justification lies in the conservative belief that sensibility, when it is bound with 
radicalism, is represented by revolutionary men who are not men at all, but 
"monsters." II These varied assessments of revolutionary men served their own interests 
or even "needs" to defend their views. 12 Wollstonecraft strove to redefine the 
10 Chris Jones, "Radical Sensibility in the 1790s" in Reflections of Revolution: Images 
of Romanticism Ed. Alison Yarrington and Kelvin Everest (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 69. See also Gary Kelly's English Fiction of the Romntic Period 
1789-1830 (London: Longman, 1989), p.40. 
II Claudia Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 
1790s Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (Chicago & London: Chicago 
University Press, 1996), p.ll. 
12 According to Kathryn Sutherland, women writers, notably Wollstonecraft, were 
engaged in fashioning a discourse appropriate to their peculiar needs as women. See 
"Hannah More's Counter Revolutionary Feminism" in Revolution in Writing: British 
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accountable agency to restore the power to a rightful place, that is, to a large part of 
what makes up the body of nation. The key notions of "self-management" and 
empiricism are discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to Wollstonecraft's Historical and 
Moral View of the French Revolution. 
What runs deep through the whole debate on the metaphor of the body is the 
polemic of the imlmateriality of the life principle. Even in the political debate on the 
French Revolution, the question of whether the spiritual head or the material body of the 
state takes charge of the operation of the entire body-politic was the focal point in the 
Burke-Wollstonecraft debate. The materialist theory of Erasmus Darwin, Xavier Bichat 
and William Lawrence is crucial for understanding the profound resonances between 
Shelley's image of the monster in Frankenstein and the organic feature of the body 
represented by these medical writers. Their view that the organs themselves keep the 
vital powers in motion is represented in the figure of the monster. The organic theory is 
not only contrasted with the earlier mechanical theory of Hartley and Priestley, but also 
set against the immaterial system that perceived the spirit as the regulator of the body. 
Chapter 7 chiefly discusses the symbolic importance of the monster as that which 
cannot be predicted or controlled. 
In the process of secularisation, sensibility was increasingly alienated from the 
spiritual element of self to become part of the body. Shelley was indifferent to creating a 
female genius in her works, and her disavowal of an intellectually developed female 
character is also attributable to her failure to see the power of the mind over the body. 
The last chapter tries to understand the philosophical chasm between Wollstoncraft and 
Literary Responses to the French Revolution ed. Kelvin Everest (Milton Keynes and 
Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991), p.35. 
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Shelley with special reference to the question of gender. I believe that the materialist 
theory of Fran<;ois-Joseph Gall was influential in forming Shelley's views on gender 
difference. Gall's theory which integrates sensibility into the function of the brain 
augmented the authority of matter, reducing the status of the mind. In Gall's system, not 
only the intellectual capacity but also the moral feelings are explained by an organ, the 
brain. 
For many centuries it has been said, the brain is the organ of the soul; the 
meaning, however, of this expression was that the brain is the organ of the 
intellectual faculties, while, according to the ancient opinion, the feelings have 
been placed in the viscera of the abdomen and thorax. We consider the brain as 
the organ not only of the intellectual faculties, but also of the moral feelings. 13 
In a sense, Gall's materialism leaves little room for the development of sensibility, for 
moral character of an individual is more or less predetermined by the shape of his or her 
organs. To Shelley, a peculiar sensibility which is observable in men as well as typically 
feminine or maternal feelings could each be explained by Gall's phrenological theory, 
for gender traits, she believed, are attributable to sexual differences in the material 
mechanism. The absence of an empiricist dimension from her essentialist view, unlike 
her parents, may be understood in this context. Does lack or excess of certain material 
parts of the body ultimately justify the differences between men and women? Shelley's 
ontological inquiry suggests her critical position against Wollstoneraft's scheme to 
masculinise women's mind, but this does not mean that she is indifferent to her 
mother's commitment to female sensibility. Both perceive sensibility to be the powerful 
13 J.G.Spurzheim, Outlines of the Physiognomical System of Drs Gall and Spurzheim 
indicating the Dispositions and Manifestations of the Mind (London, 1815), p.84. 
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component of the female body, which explains and justifies women's place in the 
domestic arena. The works of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Shelley above all will not 
only serve as a fine example of the tide of the movement of sensibility, but also clarify 
the paradoxical nature of sensibility in a specific historical context where "passions" 
meant different things to different people. 
1 
Sensibility in the Eighteenth-Century 
Medical Context 
10 
To medical historians or literary critics of the contextual approach studying the concept 
of sensibility in the eighteenth century the term brings to mind associations with things 
that are sensory: the senses, sensation, the body, and the brain. The term "sensory" is by 
itself controversial, for it does not necessarily signify the organ of sensation. Samuel 
Clarke in the early eighteenth century, for example, rejected the materialist notion of the 
brain and sense organs "as the means by which the mind sees or perceives" the images 
on the brain, for God does not see all things by any organs. What makes this issue more 
contentious is that Clarke attributes perception to "presence" of some form of spirit 
rather than to the solid body. His position is not entirely that of a spiritualist, however, 
for he assigns the principle of life to living substances: "a living substance can only 
there perceive where it is present either to the things themselves ... or to the images of 
things.,,14 As John Yolton has pointed out, this principle that "Nothing can any more act, 
or be acted upon, where it is not present" is repeated throughout the century.15 It is the 
equivocalness of the word "presence" that baffled the eighteenth-century medical 
thinkers and philosophers in conceptualising the soul and its power of perception. The 
14 Samuel Clarke, A Collection of Papers, Which Passed between the Late Learned 
Mr.Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715 and 1716; Relating to the Principles of 
Natural Philosophy and Religion (London: J.Knapton, 1717), p.13. 
15 John W Yolton, PerceptualAcquantancefrom Descartes to Reid (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1984), p.74. 
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ultimate question for these thinkers may be: is the power of perception a sufficient 
qualification for assuming the role of the human agency? If so, where is the source of 
power located? 
Mid-eighteenth-century physicians agreed that vital reactibility, or in Hartley's 
term "vibration," was a revolutionary concept, a sort of "missing link" that would allow 
them to penetrate at last into the innermost workings of the human constitution. 16 If the 
Cartesian soul was considered to be present in the mind, the nerve theorists and 
empiricist philosophers of the eighteenth century have shifted the soul's locus to the 
nerve, which can be determined neither as material nor spiritual. It is as it were the 
"bridge which possessed attributes of both mind and body.,,17 
Hence, the eighteenth century saw the flourishing of research into the nervous 
system, for it was the key to the knowledge of the body-mind relationship. One of the 
most important early works that explores the nature of the nerves and their effect on 
sensibility is The English Malady (1733) by George Cheyne. He defines sensibility as 
"the Impulse, Motion or Action of Bodies, gently or violently impressing the 
Extremities or Sides of the Nerves, of the Skin, or other parts of the Body, which ... 
conveys Motion to the sentient Principle in the Brain.,,18 A crucial feature of these 
cumulative works is a move away from Cartesian dualism of the body and the soul to 
"the new dualism" or "monism" which centres on the nervous system. 19 In the early 
16 Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and 
Medicine of Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), p.106. 
17 Christopher Lawrence, "The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish 
Enlightenment" in Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture eds. Barry 
Barnes and Steven Shapin (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979), p.25. 
18 George Cheyne, The English Malady (1733) ed. Roy Porter, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p.71. Henceafter cited as EMin parentheses with page numbers. 
19 See G.S.Rousseau, "Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened 
England" in Eighteenth-Century StudiesvoL3 (1969), p.120. See also Christopher 
12 
nineteenth century, Rees' Cyclopaedia defines the nerves as organs which "have been 
considered ... as designed to establish a communication, for the purposes of sensation 
and volition, between the brain and the organs of our body,,,20 which shows that the 
fundamental idea about the operation of the nerves did not change from the eighteenth 
century to the early nineteenth century. 
These medical writers were curious about the intricate and dynamic processes 
of the nervous system. However, the object of their analysis was often invisible, for 
when the entire system is the unity in which body and soul communicate, the nervous 
diseases have an equivocal ground both real and illusory. They investigated the insides 
of the body, and very often had to draw conclusions about the function of these parts 
through imagining the cause and effect of their motions. As Foucault has argued, 
.... [ corporeal density] is also a moral density; the resistance of the organs to 
the disordered penetration of the spirits is perhaps one and the same thing as 
that strength of soul which keeps the thoughts and the desires in order .... The 
"interior body" ... was not the objective body available to the dull gaze of a 
neutralized observation; it was the site where a certain manner of imagining 
the body and of deciphering its internal movements combined with a certain 
manner of investing it with moral values.21 
The body is certainly the site of "deciphering" the "interior body" or perhaps human 
nature, consequently encompassing the moral aspect of the body. This gives symbolic 
values to what these medical men have written in their scientific documents on the 
Lawrence, (1979), p.24, 25. 
20 See Abraham Rees, The Cyclopaedia; or Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and 
Literature, 41 vols. (London, 1819) Page numbers not printed. 
21 See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization:A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason (London: Routledge, 1961), pp.148, 149. 
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issues about the nature of the vital force, how it produces motion, and the mechanistic 
aspects of the body. 
The brain as a sense organ incorporates the meaning of both "physical" in the 
anatomical sense and "mental" in the psychological sense. Sensibility should be treated 
as an issue not only of the purely material body, but also of the "higher" or intellectual 
mind, which could be "elevated" by the rational faculty or by passions. It also concerns 
the "deranged" or "dejected" mind caused by nervous diseases, which are also the 
concern of psychiatric and psychological studies. We are therefore dealing with various 
fields of study, and three of these practices in modem times are more or less segregated 
from one another.22 It is crucial that the subjects which I raise in this dissertation are 
discussed in a way that justifies and respects the interdisciplinary aspects of the 
eighteenth-century scientific endeavour. Philosophers in this era felt free to appropriate 
Newtonian physics as readily as the metaphysics of John Locke. Edward Reed, for 
example, has made a point that some prominent medical scientists are unfairly 
denominated as "physiologists" and not psychologists, despite the fact that they have 
made a substantial contribution to the discovery of certain truth about the human mind. 
He argues that scientists such as Luigi Galvani, Alessandro Volta and Erasmus Darwin 
are not just physiologists but "psychologists.,,23 One could choose to describe Galvani's 
discovery as that of the electrical basis of neural transmission if it is specifically a 
physiological phenomenon, but it can also be called research into the nature of vital and 
mental forces. Reed is right to say that the history of psychology should make contact 
with other areas of history, and the reverse is true with medical history. 
22 Edward S. Reed, From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of Psychology from Erasmus 
Darwin to William James (New Haven and London: Yale Unierity Press, 1997), p.x. 
23 ibid. 
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Eighteenth-century philosophers, for example, concentrate on the individual's 
subjective awareness of selfhood and this has a profound bearing upon contemporary 
nerve theory. An examination of the careers and writings of such diverse 
eighteenth-century intellectuals as Robert Whytt, David Hume, David Hartley, William 
Cullen, John Brown, Erasmus Darwin, Julien Offray de La Mettrie and William 
Lawrence would reveal that there were many routes to Enlightenment thought, each 
thinker choosing his or her own approach to the traditions of the past while adapting to 
the new intellectual movement. 
Whytt, an Edinburgh physician, who demonstrated the basic nerve mechanism 
of spinal reflexes in vertebrates, was one of the first to present a general picture of how 
the interior mechanism really works. Conceptually, the transition was made from 
spiritual soul to "sentient" soul by Whytt's experiments of the 1740s, though his 
controversy with Albrecht von Haller over the matter in the 1750s still shows his 
dismissal of absolute materialism. It was Whytt who discovered that sensory impulses 
are felt by a sentient principle that activates the other parts of the body into 
"sympathetic" motions. The workings of the mind are no longer explained wholly by 
the "soul": they are ultimately explained by a communication between the "sensible" 
impulses and other signals that are in charge of muscular movements. The sensory 
impulses of the nervous system are equally pivotal for the associationist philosophers, 
Hume, Hartley and Joseph Priestley. They perpetually asked the question, "Are the 
intellectual and moral capacities attributable to the principle of habits and custom which 
is the foundation of the mechanistic body, or the power of the free will?" This is 
ultimately a question of human agency, which was later explored by Godwin, 
Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley. 
15 
Sensible quality in a person also has social ramifications. It is sometimes 
associated with certain images peculiar to a specific class or sex. This is to imply that a 
disorder stems not entirely from natural factors, but also from the historical, social and 
cultural configurations of a distinctive way of living as a social elite or a fashionable 
woman of the eighteenth century. This way of thinking led physicians to assume more 
responsibility than just treating the patient. Drawing on the scientific thinking of cause 
and effect, physicians such as Cheyne, Brown, Darwin and Robert Jones tried to show 
how an ideal bodily state is maintained by keeping one's lifestyle under control. As 
Cheyne had stated, nervous disorders "are the Diseases of the Wealthy, the Voluptuous 
and the Lazy" (EM 158), and certain diseases can therefore be prevented by giving up 
typically tenacious and addictive habits practised by certain groups of people. This 
educationist approach was not just observed in Britain but also in the Continent. 
S.A.Tissot, for instance, made a certain generalisation about the type of people who are 
more vulnerable to these habits and consequently to various ailments that affect the 
nerves. 
Since sensibility is one of those immensely problematic labels, inherently 
unstable in meaning, I will not endeavour to cover the whole cultural phenomenon that 
is related to the term, nor meticulously describe what is generally called the Cult of 
Sensibility. Rather my focus is on specific aspects of the medical discourse which I have 
already outlined above, and the several controversial tropes of the body which fed into 
the imagination of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley. One quickly discovers in 
their books the steady recurrence of various crucial concerns, often directly related to 
the significance of sensibility. First, I would like to examine the way in which the soul 
was gradually decentred and also internalised to become part of the body, thereby 
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destabilising the notion of the self. This discussion leads to the second section about the 
mechanistic image of the body. As a consequence the potency of the "rational soul" was 
weakened, leaving the locus of the moral agent highly obscure. Lastly, I will discuss the 
problem of the binary of the immaterial spirit and the material body. 
1. Decentred Self 
To study the progress by which the sensibility of the body became a major conceptual 
metaphor in the works of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley, I will begin by 
discussing the function of the vital force, or in a more vague term, the soul while asking 
the following questions: (1) What connection could possibly exsist between the material 
body and the spiritual faculties? (2) How does this relate to the problem of 
self-representation? Because the point of most contention for many eighteenth-century 
physiologists was the definition of the soul and its function, it is natural that they took 
particular interest in the seat of the soul. George Cheyne and Robert Whytt use words 
such as "sentient and intelligent soul" and "sentient soul" respectively but these words 
do not necessarily signify spiritual faculties that operate independently of the workings 
of the body. Both try to explain the operation of the soul in relation to the ruling 
mechanism of the nerves, making little reference to the rational soul or the 
consciousness of the mind that either controls or negotiates with the mechanism. 
Instead of employing the Cartesian "rational soul" alone, Cheyne has it merge 
with what he calls the "sentient and intelligent principle" (EM 88). His usage of the two 
opposing words, "sentient" and "intelligent," deserves a close analysis in that he uses 
them interchangeably or in a compound. An account of the immediacy of nervous 
response which is not censored by a conscious agent is best illustrated by his notion of 
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"Vibrations" (EM 89). Nerves, it is said, tenninate at the "Temple of sensorium" (EM 
88) of the "Soul" (EM 4), and are placed in the brain. The brain, furthennore, is 
compared to an Organ-Room in which the soul like a "Musician" (EM 71) plays the 
organ, a musical instrument. Interestingly the chords of the organ are the metaphor for 
"Nerves": "Keys, which, being struck on or touch'd, convey the Sound and Hannony" 
(EM 5). Cheyne employs the metaphor of music or hannony in characterising the 
powers of the "whole" nervous systems. Newton's vocabulary of "Aethereal 
vibrations,,24 is converted into the vibrations of nerves which are plucked or played like 
a musical instrument (EM 88). These "Vibrations," Cheyne argues, are "propagated 
through their Lengths by a subtile, spirituous, and infinitely elastick Fluid, which is the 
Medium of the Intelligent Principle" (EM 89). 
Cheyne's metaphor of a musician and the organ presents a whole different 
picture from the Cartesian metaphor of a pilot in his ship.25 First, an obvious point has 
to be made that these two do not simply present a parallel. How one relates to a musical 
instrument is clearly different from hislher relation with a vessel. Music itself has an 
evocation of something more than making the object move. The metaphor of music 
associates the soul with the emotive or non-rational faculty, whereas the Cartesian soul 
implied rationality or consciousness. Cheyne's trope of the "Musician," we could say, 
obscures the existence of consciousness or will. 
He also projects his image of the body as a machine or what he calls the 
"organical Machin [sic]" (EM 68). This is analogous to Descartes's metaphor of a clock 
24 Isaac Newton, "Hipothesis of Light" from Quaestiones quaedam philosophicae" in A 
Norton Critical Edition: Newton Ed. Bernard Cohen and Richard S. Westfall (New York 
and London: W.W.Norton& Company, 1995), p.24. 
25 Rene Desartes, Discourse on Method an The Meditations (1637) trans. and ed. F.E. 
Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p.159. 
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"made up of wheels and counterweights" or a machine "so built and composed of bones, 
nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin" in Discourse on Method and the Meditations 
(1637)?6 Cheyne similarly highlights the mechanical properties of the body solids, 
which maintain the flow of the "Liquors and Fluids" conveying blood, air, the "nutritive 
Juices" (EMU) and other fluids: "the Human Body is a Machin [sic] of an infinite 
Number and Variety of different Channels and Pipes, filled with various and different 
Liquors and Fluids" (EM 4). In addition to keeping the "Tubes" and pipes from clogging, 
the healthy state of the nerves is vital. Cheyne characterises the motion of the "sentient 
and intelligent Principle" through the nerves as "Self-motive" (EM 92). However this 
seems to cause ambivalence, for, like the word "voluntary," the meaning alternates 
depending on where the agent is placed. If it is the sentient principle moving 
everywhere throughout the body that is self-active and not the rational mind, the 
operation can be characterised as wholly reflexive rather than rational. 
This preoccupation with the nervous system came to dominate the Edinburgh 
physiology led by people like Whytt, William Cullen and John Brown. This provided a 
theoretical framework for later prominent physicians such as Erasmus Darwin and 
William Lawrence. Whytt in his medical treatises does not place the ultimate soul in the 
brain, but figuratively dissolves it to all the sensible organs. Although Whytt, in his 
Physiological Essays (1745), attacks Albrecht von Haller's theory that irritability is an 
innate property of "glutinous,,27 animal bodies, he holds the same premise that the mind 
?8 has no absolute power over the body.- Haller argues, 
26 Rene Descartes, (1968), pp.162, 163. 
27 Albrecht von Haller, First Lines of Physiology 1786 edition (New York & London: 
Johnson Reprint Corp., 1966), p.226. Hereafter cited as FL with page numbers in 
parentheses. 
28 Haller was a student of Boerhaave of Leyden who was the leading authority on the 
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... it is evidently a false position, that all the motions of the body arise from 
the mind, without which the body would be an immoveable unactive mass: for 
the force of muscular contraction, by any kind of stimulus, to which the 
motion of the heart, intestines, and perhaps all the other motions in the human 
body are obedient, does not require the presence ofthe mind." (FL 48, 49) 
This depiction is in direct opposition to Descartes' notion of the self. In like manner, 
Whytt postulates that the agent ("Soul") which "perceives" or "feels" (PE 188) the 
stimulus, resides in the "intestine" as well as in any other organ of the body (PE 144, 
168). A muscle reaction, therefore, becomes "unconscious perception" for Whytt. 29 
What is most original about Whytt's rhetoric is that he remaps the topography 
of the sensory faculties by comparing them to various musical instruments constituting 
an orchestra. 
It will be unfair to object here, that we ascribe the intelligent powers of the 
mind to the bodily organs: for as the best musician cannot make a flute give 
the sound of a violin, nor a harpsicord that of a French hom, nor without these 
several instruments produce their sounds and notes at all; in like manner, the 
soul, in the present state can only exercise its rational powers in the brain; it 
can only taste in the tongue, smell in the nose, see in the eyes, hear in the ears, 
and feel hunger in the stomach.3o 
hydrodynamic principle of the body. He was most renowned for the theory of irritability 
and had much influence on the Edinburgh medical school. 
29 R.K.French, Robert l1i71yt~. the SouL and Medicine (London: The Wellcome Institute 
of the History of Medicine, 1969), p.71. 
30 Whytt, Robert. Physiological Essays containing IAn Inquiry into the Causes which 
promote the Circulation of the Fluids in the very Small Vessels of Animals, 
II Observa tions on the Sensibility and Irritability of the Parts of Men and other 
Animals, occasioned by Dr Haller's late Treatises on these Subjects (Edinburgh: 
Hamilton, Balfour and Neill, 1745), pp.l71, 172. Hereafter cited as PEin parentheses 
with page numbers. 
20 
This idea that a sensory faculty which he calls "the soul" could be in the brain as well as 
in the tongue, the nose, the eyes or the ears was revolutionary. Whytt's metaphor is akin 
to Cheyne's musical metaphor, except that the latter considered that there is a sole cause 
of motion. Whytt considers that the soul is as equally present in the extremities of the 
nerves as in the brain, and his conceptual soul became effectually decentered throughout 
the body (PE 170). This is not to say that he gives power to matter. Whytt is suggesting 
that irritable parts are endued with the sentient soul that binds the mind and body. The 
soul in the nerves, as it were, is the agent of perception. He believes that the "sympathy" 
or "consent between various parts of the body,,3l through the affections of the brain 
presupposes that irritability is a power of the "sentient soul." 
William Cullen's physiological system provides a particularly illuminating 
perspective from which we can observe how late eighteenth-century medical discourse 
relied on earlier medical theories. He incorporates Cheyne's notion of vibration when he 
explains that "the animal system is a tremulous oscillatory mass of matter." That "these 
are the manifest result of mechanical tension and oscillation" is also reminiscent of 
Hartley's mechanistic rhetoric which will be discussed in more depth in the following 
section.32 Cullen's theory of the nervous system particularly has much resonance with 
that of Whytt in that he uses the idea of "sympathy" (CL 9): "In one case, the term 
sympathy may properly be applied; when, upon an impression being made, any set of 
nerves may be put in action, not in consequence of the sensorium itself being affected, 
but some particular nerves (CL 27). Whytt's idea that there are many sources of action, 
31 Robert Whytt, Observations on the Nature" causes, and cure of those Disorders 
which have been commonly called Nervous" Hypochondriac, or Hysteric Second Edition 
(Edinburgh, 1765), p.v. Hereafter cited as ONwith page numbers in parentheses. 
32 William Cullen, Clinical Lectures, Delivered At Edingburgh in the year 1765-6 
(London, 1797), pp.18,19. Hereafter cited as CLwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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and that the cause of action is not the "sensorium" is here reiterated. 
The thoughts and principles of David Burne and Thomas Reid also have their 
roots in nerve theory. The dispersal of "souls" is strongly reflected in their philosophy. 
The nature of "perception" is inherently connected with the problem of human agency 
and self-representation. That ideas are sensory impressions of bodily states became a 
premise for Burne's philosophy, and the question about the sources and the strength of 
personal identity raised in A Treatise on Human Nature was closely connected with his 
belief that mental states can be accounted for by the associations made by the nervous 
system. Burne defines the self as "that connected succession of perceptions,,33 or "a 
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (HN 252). 
For a sceptic like Burne, the law of mechanism or associationism led to a 
dead-end over which no independent agency has the control. On the basis that the idea 
of self or substance is never as simple as a table or chimney, he explains, "I cannot 
perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can 1 ever perceive any 
thing but the perceptions" (HN 634). When he turns his attention to the notion of 
"personal identity" in his appendix of A Treatise of Human Nature, he finds himself 
"invol'd in such a labyrinth": "I must confess, 1 neither know how to correct my former 
opinions, nor how to render them consistent" (HN 633). The major difference between 
Burne and Reid is that the latter does not hesitate to proceed into the winding paths of 
the "labyrinth" that constitutes the self: "if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and 
secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done" (InquilY 15). Reid is no less 
33 David Hume, A 'I}eatise of Human Nature ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1951), p.277. Hereafter cited as HNwith page numbers in 
parentheses. 
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conscious of the intricacy or uncertainty of the existence of the self than Hume is, but he 
dares articulate that he is resolved to take his own existence and the existence of other 
things upon trust. 34 
For Hume, it was a "bundle" of different perceptions which brings about 
confusion in delineating one clear idea of the self. This is reminiscent of Haller's 
ontological argument which complicates the meaning of "perception." According to 
Haller, when we perceive, "five very different beings are joined together: the body 
which we perceive; the affection of the organ of the sensory by that body; the affection 
of the brain arising from the percussion of that sensory; the change produced in the 
mind; and lastly, the mind's consciousness and perception of the sensation" (FL 33). 
The mind no longer has the prerogative of perceiving. As we have observed, this 
tendency to decentre human agency was typified by Whytt's representation of self or the 
"soul." 
2. The Mechanistic Image of the Body 
The "sympathetic" movement of the inner soul is a phenomenon that appears to 
elucidate the body-mind relationship, but in actuality complicates the locus of the soul. 
The nervous system as a kind of passage for transmitting cortical impressions becomes 
"mechanistic" in that the self is the product of various forces, impressions and ideas 
from outside. Reid objects to this model of the human being which operates like a 
self-propelling machine. Physiologists and some philosophers tried to show that sensory 
and therefore unintentional states cause the perceptual and subsequently mental states, 
34 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense 
1764. ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p.24. 
Hereafter cited as Inquiry with page numbers in parentheses. 
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whereas Reid observes that these physical stimuli cannot be sufficient cause of mental 
states. Reid believes that human belief or experience cannot simply be reduced to matter, 
motion or vibration. Whichever side they were on, the proponents of the mechanistic or 
anti-mechanistic systems of the body, were actively engaged in trying to understand the 
nature of the moral and intellectual capacities ofthe nerves. 
In his Observations on Man (1749)/5 Hartley develops a mechanistic theory 
of the body, applying Newtonian science to his theory of vibration. He states that 
vibration "agitate[s] the small particles of the medullary substance of the sensory nerves 
with synchronous vibrations, in the same manner as the vibrations of the air in sounds 
agitate many regular bodies with corresponding vibrations or tremblings.,,36 He tries to 
explain the internal actions of swallowing, breathing, or coughing which he calls 
"automatic motions" as well as the sensory and mental actions by the system of 
vibrations: "if the doctrine of association be founded in, and deducible from, that of 
vibrations . . . , then all the sensations, ideas, and motions, of all animals, will be 
conducted according to the vibrations of the small medullary particles." (OM i 109). 
However, he admits that this kind of "mechanical system" (OM i 508) of the nerves 
"takes away philosophical free-will" and "overturn[s] all the arguments which are 
usually brought for the immateriality of the soul from the subtlety of the internal senses, 
and of the rational facuity" (OM i 511, 512). Like Whytt, Hartley believes that "the 
sensibility of each part [of the body] does depend, in great measure, on the number, 
structure, and disposition of the nervous papillae, which are the immediate organ in the 
35 Observations on Man was still current in the late eighteenth century and 
promUlgated amongst Romantic writers, including the members of the Godwin family, 
and had particularly influenced the philosophical thinking of William Godwin. 
36 David Hartley, Observations on Man 1749, 1791 (Poole & Washington D.C.: 
Woodstock Books, 1998), p.22. Hereafter vol. 1 will be cited as OMi and vol.2 as OMii 
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senses of feeling, taste, and smell ... " (OM i 43). Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that 
Hartley regards the "structure" of the nerves as most important, whereas Whytt 
presupposes the existence of an entity called the "sentient principle" in the nerve which 
can be defined neither as material nor spiritual. 
Many intellectuals in the eighteenth century in one way or another used John 
Locke's philosophical ideas particularly in asking the epistemological question on the 
sources of self. Erasmus Darwin, an enlightened thinker and a well known physician, 
also follows this materialist tradition?7 He believes that "nothing can come into the 
intellect but through the senses.,,38 This idea resonates with the Lockean notion of 
knowledge being derived from the sense organs. In The Temple of Nature (1803), he 
expresses the image of the process through which the sensitive nerves eventually 
determine the mental condition. When sensation "permeates" the brain, his poem reads, 
"quick Volitions rise" from pain and pleasure. This "point[s] the inquiring eyes; / With 
Reason's light bewilder'd Man direct, / And right and wrong with balance nice detect." 
Lastly "Associations spring, / Thoughts join to thoughts, to motions motions cling." For 
Darwin, therefore, this chain reaction which he calls the "long trains of catenation" is 
itself the controlling factor. 39 It is not to be interrupted by a spiritual soul. The 
in parentheses with page numbers. 
37 Erasmus Darwin was the core member of the Lunar Society of Birmingham, which 
is often seen as "the main intellectual powerhouse of the Industrial Revolution in 
England." See Desmond King-Hele's Erasmus Darwin: A Life of Unequalled 
Achievement (London: Giles de la Mare Publishers, 1999), p.ix. Jenny Uglow has 
described him as "enormously gifted and enormously fat." See Jenny Uglow's Lunar 
Men: Five Friends VJi710se Curiosity Changed the World (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2002), p.xiv. 
38 Erasmus Darwin, The Letters of Erasmus Darwin ed. Desmond King-Hele 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.243. 
39 Erasmus Darwin, The Temple of Nature (Menston, Yorkshire and London: Scholar 
Press, 1973), pp.24, 25. Canto I, 11269-281. Hereafter cited as TNwith page numbers 
and line numbers in parentheses. 
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succeSSIOn of these motions produces both reason ("Reason's light") and moral 
judgement ("right and wrong"). 
La Mettrie,40 a French physician, had worked through the philosophical 
tradition and also found Locke's materialism congenial to his thinking, for he too 
explores the development of the senses in his medical treatise.41 In a sense his aim was 
to lend substance to Locke's epistemology by providing physiological evidence, though 
his treatise provides evidence of a closer anatomical or physiological correlation 
between mental states and physiological processes than Locke allows. The metaphor of 
the machine as the human body precedes his famous Man a Machine (1749t2 as we 
have already seen in the language of Descartes and Cheyne. La Mettrie's version of the 
"machine," however, denies the Cartesian dualism of the body and the soul. The body, 
he states, 
... winds itself up, a living picture of perpetual motion. Food maintains what 
is aroused by fever. Without it, the soul languishes, becomes furious and dies 
dejected. It is like a candle whose light flares up just as it is going out.43 
40 La Mettrie, was also influenced by and a student of Boerhaave like Haller. La 
Mettrie's annotated translation of Boerhaave caused havoc between La Mettrie and 
Haller. The latter charged the former for plagiarism. 
41 Although Locke's receptions varies both in England and France, Locke's Essayis 
said to have raised a furore in England about its deistic and materialistic implications. 
In France Locke was widely understood as a materialist. See John Yolton's Thinking 
Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press, 1983). John Yolton has pointed to several other factors which help 
explain this particular aspect of Locke's philosophical legacy in France in his 'French 
Materialist Disciples of Locke,' Journal of the History of Philosophy 25, no.! (J an.1987), 
pp.83-104. 
42 Man a Machine was first published as L'Homme machine anonymously by Elie 
Luzac in Leyden, towards the end of 1747, but dated 1748. An English translation was 
published as Man a Machine in London by W Owen in 1749, and reprinted in 1750 
giving the author as La Mettrie. 
43 Julien Offray De La Mettrie, Machine Man and Other Writings trans. Ann Thomson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.7. Hereafter cited as .M.Mwith page 
numbers in parentheses. 
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The soul and the body are interdependent in La Mettrie's model. He maintains that the 
connection between the body and the soul is so close that they form a single entity 
which must be material and extended. While the nature of the soul was generally 
debatable at the time, he was convinced of the material nature of the sensitive soul. The 
material intake of food and drink is directly connected to the "soul," which leaves no 
room for anything occult, such as the immortal soul or spirit. He then continues, 
But if you feed the body, pour into its pipes vigorous sugars and strong liquors, 
then the soul becomes as generous as they are and arms itself with proud 
courage, and the soldier who would have fled if given water becomes 
ferocious and gaily runs to his death to the sound of drums (ibid.).44 
Here the soul is given a personality that is "generous," which is almost saying that the 
nerves are the ultimate agent. 
Opium's effect on sleep is a demonstrative case for La Mettrie. He shows that 
the state of the body needs to be in harmony with that of the soul in order that both can 
experience a peaceful sleep. "As the blood's movement is calmed, a sweet feeling of 
peace and calm spreads throughout the machine," but when "the circulation is too 
rapid," he maintains, "the soul cannot sleep." Opium, according to La Mettrie, can 
inebriate or cause lethargy, as does wine, depending on the dose. He celebrates the 
power of material substances, such as opium, stating that it "even changes the will; it 
forces the soul, which wanted to stay awake and enjoy itself, to go to bed despite itself." 
(MM7).45 
44 His reference to "courage" and "the sound of drum" exemplifies his experience as a 
doctor to the soldiers of the French Guards. 
45 It is interesting that Hartley gives a similar explanation for the effect of opium, 
though he gives a microscopic view of it. The opiate particles, he says, "excite 
vibrations of the same kind in all the parts of the body, after they are taken into the 
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The importance of this materialist reworking of Lockean epistemology is 
reflected in his idea that human behaviour could be more accurately discussed as 
motivated by the appetites and instincts man shares with animals. Do animals have the 
same senses as man; are they therefore in the same rank with man in moral and 
intellectual qualities? These two interrelated issues were both controversial in that the 
soul's exposure to material influences, both external and internal, meant that the human 
soul which was supposed to be nobler would be in danger of mixing with the "inferior" 
species. La Mettrie uses the word "machine" as a significant link of human to animals. 
He presents the system of education simply in terms of the mechanism of association. 
Once again, the musical metaphor is employed to illustrate how man came to acquire 
knowledge and refine language skills. As a "violin string or a harpsichord key vibrates" 
and gives out a sound, La Mettrie explains, so "the strings of the brain, struck by rays of 
sound, are stimulated to give out or repeat the words which touch them" (MM 14). As 
he states, it "all comes down to sounds, or words, which are transmitted from one 
person's mouth, through another's ear and into his brain, which receives at the same 
time through his eyes the shape of the bodies for which the words are the arbitrary 
signs" (MM 13). Thus, he tries to demonstrate that animals which he calls "machines ... 
were made like us to think and to feel nature's promptings" (MM 19). That these words 
and the figures are closely linked in the brain is depicted as a form of "training," and if 
animals were perfectly trained, just like human beings are, La Mettrie believed that they 
would be able to learn a language. 
In his philosophical treatise Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Reid takes 
blood, and circulate with it." These vibrations from the brain and spinal marrow 
agitate the limbs and other parts so much as to render them "unfit for receiving 
sensation and motion" (OMi 50). 
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issue with his predecessors who compare the system of the human mind to a machine. 
He explores the nature of the human faculties, the system of the mind, the laws of our 
constitution and the various phenomena of human nature. Though he makes use of the 
Lockean terminology of "sensation," he refutes Locke's opinion that "all our simple 
ideas are got, either by Sensation or by Reflection-that is, by our external senses, or by 
consciousness of the operations of our own minds, ,,46 for he did not believe that the 
idea of power could be derived from these two sources only. To demonstrate the extent 
of human power in his own terms, he "invent [ s]" new principles of action; mechanical, 
animal and rational (APM 545). This does not mean that he is entirely oblivious of the 
influence of the nerves on the mechanical movement of the body. For him the 
mechanical principle operates in collaboration with the other two principles. 
A man knows that he must swallow his food before it can nourish him .... All 
the requisite motions of nerves and muscles immediately take place in their 
proper order, without his knowing or willing anything about them .... This is 
the case, in some degree, in every voluntary motion of our body .... I know 
nothing, I think nothing, either of nerves or muscles, when I stretch out my 
arm: yet this nervous influence, and this contraction of the muscles, uncalled 
by me, immediately produce the effect which I willed. (APM 547) 
This is what Hartley has called "automatic motion," but Reid has named it "instinct." 
Reid's other mechanical principle of human action, "habit," is defined as "A facility of 
doing a thing, acquired by having done it frequently" (APM 550). This part is clearly an 
echo from Hartley's associationism. By "mechanical" eighteenth-century thinkers seem 
46 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid.. 
D.D. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart and Co., 1896), p.518. Henceafter cited as APM 
with page numbers in parentheses. 
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to have generally meant "automatic" or "habitual" with a predictable correlation or an 
implicit determinism. 
Reid, in contrast to Hartley's associationist theory, -sets two stages in man's 
cognitive development. In the first part of life, he says, "we have many enjoyments of 
various kinds; but very similar to those of brute-animals." This stage relies mostly on 
"the exercise of our senses and powers of motion, the gratification of our appetites, and 
the exertions of our kind affections" (A PM 580). In the second stage, he says, "we have 
the conception of what is good or ill for us upon the whole" and "are led ... to seek the 
good and avoid the ill"(APM 581). He maintains that there is a special "talent" in man 
called "Reason," a principle by which "our belief and opinions ought to be regulated." 
He adds that this principle indicates a sound mind which is "distinguished from [that of] 
brutes, idiots, and infants" (APM 579). This, he argues, should be a "leading and 
governing principle, to which all our animal principles are subordinate, and to which 
they ought to be subject" (APM 580). It is by now clear that there were chiefly two 
approaches to the soul. While Reid attempted to establish a distinction between man and 
animal by ascribing to special quality in man, La Mettrie and Hartley tried to level this 
offby offering a great many physical factors that would help explain human behaviour. 
3. The Dynamism of Passions 
By medicalising the soul or rather mechanising it, medical theorists such as David 
Hartley, Erasmus Darwin and La Mettrie show how the mind progresses with the body, 
thereby softening the dualism as it were. The soul for La Mettrie represents the totality 
of an individual's feelings or sense experience, for various sensations are carried to 
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what he calls the "sensitive soul.,,47 According to La Mettrie, "[w]e need only to have 
eyes to see the necessary influence of age on reason" because the soul "follows the 
body's progression, as it does that of education" (MM 8). However, the closer the 
metaphysical position of the mind and body become tied in one extension, the more 
ambiguous the causality theme becomes. Moreover, the sympathetic nerves meant that 
the body is always in a state of flux, for changes are affected by the dynamism of 
passions. On the one hand, the powerful notion that the passions take over the body and 
eventually the mind permeated medical, philosophical and literary writings, which 
signifies that both the body and the mind are passive when they are controlled by the 
passions. On the other hand, the nerves have much more than a passive mechanism, in 
that sensibility is a capacity to mediate between the mind and the surrounding universe. 
It plays a formative role not only in determining an individual's type of intelligence, but 
also in developing moral and intellectual capacities. There are three major issues I 
would like to take up here: (1) What is the relationship between sensibility and 
intelligence? (2) Were nervous diseases considered to be gender-specific? (3) How do 
passions affect moral development? 
What does "acute," "quick" or "delicate" sensibility signify? 
Eighteenth-century medical theorists share more or less the same lexicon in describing 
feelings, perception and passions. Cheyne divides "Mankind, into Quick Thinkers, Slow 
Thinkers, and No Thinkers" (EM 182), commending the quick reaction of the nerves. 
Whytt observes that the state of feelings, whether they are "quick" or "dull, slow, and 
difficult to be roused," depends on the material constitution of the persons (ON 113). 
47 Julien Offray de La Mettrie. 'J}eatise on the Soul. In Machine Man and Other 
vViitings trans. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.57. 
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This was also Cheyne's argument: "there is a certain Tone, Consistence, Firmness, and a 
detennin'd Degree of Elasticity and Tension ofthe Nerves or Fibres ... necessary to the 
perfect Perfonnance of the Animal Functions" (EM 66). The whole debate on the 
finnness of the nerves seems to demonstrate that the soul or intelligence follows the 
progression of the body solids as La Mettrie would have argued. For this reason, it 
seems contradictory when these physiologists characterise the nerves as "weak," for 
weakness in the nerves has a certain pathological resonance; as Cheyne articulates "Soft 
and yielding, loose and flabby Flesh and Muscles are sure Symptoms of weak and 
relaxed nerves or fibres" (EM 102). Whytt similarly argues that a "delicate or easily 
irritable nervous system" is more liable to various ailments "from causes affecting either 
the body or mind" ( ON 115). 
For Cheyne, however, weak nerves were a marker of intellectual activity. In 
other words, the state of the nerves could be natural and also produced by diseases or a 
particular manner of living. This is to suggest that the weak nerves are the cause of 
intelligence and the effect of straining them too much. According to Cheyne, 
Persons of slender and weak Nerves are generally of the first Class: the 
Activity, Mobility, and Delicacy or their intellectual Organs make them so, and 
thereby weakens and relaxes the Material Organs of the intellectual 
Faculties .... (EM 182). 
"Delicacy" connotes the sophistication that is required for intellectual pursuits. Words 
such as "weak" and "delicate" therefore project a complex idea. While they suggest the 
status of the intellectuals who possess unequal sensibility, they bear the stigma of 
physical degeneration. Richard Blackmore's description of "Hypochondriacal Persons" 
is reminiscent of Cheyne's depiction of scholars. Blackmore characterises a 
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hypochondriac, a person with a nervous disorder, as "endowed with a great Share of 
Understanding and Judgement, with strong and clear Reason, a quick Apprehension and 
Vivacity of Fancy and Imagination, even above other Men.,,48 Delicate sensibility had a 
positive meaning in describing the excellence of the mind, juxtaposing rational capacity 
with imagination. 
Both Godwin and Wollstonecraft held an equivocal position about the origin of 
self-whether "sensibility," which was the "manie of the day,,,49 could be the potent 
force of human action. Wollstonecraft attempted to make a persuasive case for women 
who are capable of exercising reason over their bodily desire, but had to face two 
philosophical impasses. First, as we have already seen above, the boundary between 
reason and sensibility was increasingly blurred in terms of how they operate inside the 
entity called "self." Second, the adjective "weak," when applied to the features of the 
female sex, did not necessarily connote the same intellectual sophistication as suggested 
by Cheyne. It simply meant that women were more passive or vulnerable to violent 
passions and disorders. The nervous disorders for many eighteenth-century 
physiologists were gender-specific. Whytt, for instance, states that, "[w]omen, in whom 
the nervous system is generally more moveable than in men, are more subject to 
nervous complaints, and have them in a higher degree" (ON 118). As Roy Porter asserts, 
healthy nerves in eighteenth-century medical discourse were considered as masculine 
attributes because they were strong, hard and resilient, while weak nerves were soft, 
48 Richard Blackmore, A ']}eatise of the Spleen and Vapours (London, 1725), p.24. 
Quoted in John Mullan's Sentiment and Socialbility: The Language of Feeling in the 
Eighteenth Century(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.205, 206. 
49 Mary Wollstonecraft. Vindication of the Rights of Men (1791) in The Works of Mary 
WollstonecraftvoL5 (London: William Pickering, 1989), p. 8. Hereafter cited as VRM 
with page numbers in parentheses. 
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languid, passive and "feminine.,,50 
When Cullen introduced two genera of nervous disorders, hypochondriacal and 
hysterical affections, he could not avoid associating hysterical affections with what was 
generally temled "feminine." His intention is to avoid gender-specific categories, as he 
insists that these two are "not to be distinguished by the difference of sex they are found 
in ... but by a particular concourse of symptoms" (CL 38, 39). However in his 
description, he falls back on quintessential gender types. Hypochondriasis which, he 
says, prevails in the melancholic temperament is more frequently observed in men (CL 
45). Persons of melancholic constitution are said to be "capable of most attention" and 
are liable to an "intense application of the mind, not to literature only, but to any 
business or employment" (CL 52, 53). This is perhaps a refinement of Cheyne's 
"English malady." Cullen crystallises the cause and effect relationship of the nervous 
disorder which is associated with sedentary intellectual life. There are no feminine traits 
such as "weakness" or "delicacy" in hypochondriac disease. 
A more feminine nervous disorder is separately classed as hysteria. This is said 
to be generally observable in persons who are vulnerable to "[s]udden passions of the 
mind" (CL 42), and is observable in the body that undergoes various changes or 
"[v]icissitudes." This disease, he says, is "more frequently found in women than men" 
(CL 43). When he describes the type of people who are vulnerable to hysteria, he uses 
certain features that could be associated with women: it "chiefly prevails in sanguine 
constitutions, of a smooth thin skin, where the contents of the arteries are easily seen, 
and the complexion is consequently florid, of a somewhat lax habit, but full and 
50 Roy Porter, Introduction to George Cheyne's English Malady (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p.xli. 
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plethoric, with hair commonly pale or reddish, and generally soft and lank (eL 43). 
While safeguarding himself from an accusation of gender bias, he is giving certain ideas 
about women. They are lax, changeable, and more susceptible to passions. 
La Mettrie similarly characterises the soul of "the fair sex" as "based on 
passion rather than reason," for it follows the delicacy of the temperament. In men, on 
the contrary, brains and nerves are said to have "the firmness of all solids, the mind, like 
the features, is more lively." Furthermore, he argues that education, which women lack, 
reinforces this tendency (MM 8). The implication is that the practice of intense thinking 
to which intellectuals or scholars are devoted can be dangerous to the health of women, 
because it overstimulates their brain. Intense mental stimulation can exhaust the fibres 
of the brain, just as immoderate physical exertion wears out the fibres in the muscles, 
and women who lack the firmness of the nervous fibres will not bear this mental 
exertion. 
Both Cullen and his pupil J olm Brown register the disturbing effects of the 
passions. The excess (or defect) of passions was considered to be damaging to the 
whole nervous system. The originally weak or delicate frame of the body or its solids 
will be worn out by the powerful movement of the animal spirits, which may in due 
course exhaust themselves. According to Cullen, when passions or "violent emotions of 
the active kind, such as joy and anger" act strongly, and immediately, on the energy of 
the brain, "the blood is impelled into the vessels of the head with violence, and in a 
larger quantity.,,51 He warns that "[a]ll strong impressions" which excite any emotion or 
passion of the mind are to be most carefully guarded against (FL iii 348, 349). Cullen 
51 William Cullen, First Lines of the Practice of Physic 4th edition. voL III (Edinburgh, 
1784), pp.321,322. Hereafter cited as FL iii with page numbers in parentheses. 
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emphasises the significance of strengthening the solid part of the body in order to 
sustain the perfect nervous organisation. He believes that exercise "strengthens[s] the 
inherent power of the solid or moving fibres"(FL iii 354). Cullen emphasises the 
significance of strengthening the solid part of the body in order to sustain the perfect 
nervous organisation. He believes that exercise "strengthens [ s] the inherent power of the 
solid or moving fibres"(FL iii 354). This materialistic idea was incorporated into 
Darwin's Zoonomia (1794, 1796). Darwin says that there are diseases "produced by the 
susceptibiliy of the constitution to motions causable by these sensations being too dull 
or too vivid" and this susceptibility of the system to sensitive motions is for him 
"sensibility. ,,52 
Thomas Beddoes, in his biographical Preface to John Brown's The Elements of 
Medicine, rightly hints at the paradox of the passions, where "the application of these 
powers [of passions], though it brings forth life, ... wastes the excitability or matter of 
life," and just as "the air blown into the fire brings forth more flame, but wastes the fuel 
or matter of fire."53 This is a very apt description of Brown's argument, for he 
maintains that the doctrine of heat and cold is exactly applicable to the passions: "The 
subject of the passions admits of the same reasoning in every respect as that of heat.,,54 
Passions were naturally likened to "fire," and the key to the removal of diseases, for 
Brown, was adjusting the heat, or "excitability," produced by the external and internal 
stimulants. Brown adopted this term to express the "disposition to action," which 
52 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or The La ws of Organic Life Part I 1794, Part II & III 
1796. (New York, A.M.S. Press, 1974), p.59. Hereafter cited as Zoonomia i and 
Zoonomia ii respectively with page numbers in parentheses. 
53 See "A Biographical Preface by Thomas Beddoes" in The Elements of Medicine. Two 
volumes. John Brown. (London: J.Johnson, 1795), p.cxxxi. 
54 John Brown, The Elements ofMedicinevoLI (London: J.Johnson, 1795), p.13. 
Hereafter cited as Elements with page numbers in parentheses. 
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replaced the terms such as irritability and sensibility (Elements Part I 11). Too much or 
too little passion was regarded as harmful to health. The middle range between high 
heat which Brown calls "ardor" and cold is considered to be ideal, or what he calls 
"moderate" or "agreeable" temperature (Elements Pari II 9). He advises that one 
"should keep his mind in gentle action, observe moderation in his passions, and court 
agreeable objects of sense" (Elements Part II 17). 
It is interesting to observe that Hume specifically makes a distinction between 
the violent type of passions and "calm passions." Passions and compassion were 
problematic words, for thinkers in different fields, both medical and philosophical, used 
these labels variably. Passions, for Cheyne, have a positive meaning, for they facilitate 
the motion of the solids, as any action and motion nourish and increase the power of 
contraction, a "Spring" and "Elasticity" in animal solids (EM 178). Passions, he 
believed, have a "wonderful effect" on "the Pulse, Circulation, Perspiration, and 
Secretions, and the other Animal Function, in Nervous Cases especially" (EM 68). For 
Hume, however, passions are both benign and malignant. What he calls "direct 
passions" or "desire" are characterised as those which "arise from a natural impulse and 
instinct which is perfectly unaccountable, e.g. desire of punishment to enemies and 
happiness to friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites" (HN 439). Calm 
passions, he explains, are those which have "become a settled principle of action" but 
should not be "confounded with reason" (HN 417). This latter type of passion also 
signifies "general appetite to good and aversion to evil," which suggests that the moral 
order, as Hume states, "depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions" 
(HN 532). In other words, the impulsive urge to practise good deeds is considered to be 
prompted by passions in the same manner as experiencing hunger. 
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This immediately conjures up La Mettrie's effort to take away the distinction 
between man and animals in assessing moral capacity. He argues that animals possess 
souls resembling those of human beings, which "feel repugnance at the sight of a fellow 
creature being tom to pieces" (MM 18, 19). Though a degree of sentimentalism is 
injected into his assessment, this view about the moral capacity of an animal to feel was 
shared by some important philosophers in the eighteenth century, such as Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau in France and William Smellie55 in Britain. Celebrating the state of nature as 
the soil for strengthening the "force of natural pity," Rousseau has argued that "pity 
becomes all the more intense as the perceiving animal identifies itself more intimately 
with the suffering animaL,,56 
This sharply contrasts with Reid's argument that the moral foundation is 
established in the second stage of life after the rational capacity is acquired. 
Sensibility's edifying powers such as inspiring moral virtues and love, Hume believed, 
could explain why human beings are naturally benevolent. For him, therefore, 
sensibility has a profound bearing upon moral development. That moral foundation is 
already there from birth has a strong resemblance to "mechanistic" thinking. What 
Hume has called calm passions are, in Hartley's terminology, "Good-will, or 
Benevolence." Hartley defines it as "that pleasing Affection which engages us to 
promote the Welfare of others to the best of our Power" (OM i 473). Godwin also 
believes that man's natural disposition is benevolent,57 and this may well be explained 
55 See William Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History (Edinburgh, 1790). 
Hereafter cited as Natural History with page numbers in parentheses. 
56 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality trans. Maurice Cranston 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), pp.100,10L Hereafter cited as Discourse with 
page numbers in parentheses. 
57 Benevolentism was taught in educational institutions and popularized in literature. 
See Chris Jones's Radical Sensibility. (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p.8. 
38 
by this associationist approach that moral good has its source in natural sentiment. 
Although there is a degree of scepticism about "instinct" or "inbred sentiment" in 
Wollstonecraft's writing which reminds us of Reid's rationalist argument, in her fictions 
(particularly in Mmy) she too endorses "warmth" of sensibility as a sign of 
benevolence. 
In the nineteenth century, many more medical treatises and their criticisms 
emerged which scrutinised the workings of the mind from a physiological point of view, 
the culmination of which was Charles Bell's Idea of a New Anatomy of the Brain 
(1811).58 The shift from the nerve to the brain structure therefore took place in the early 
nineteenth century. By the time Percy Bysshe Shelley and Mary Shelley were pursuing 
their writing career, some literature had appeared which denigrated such a biomedical 
stance attributing philosophical or even moral capacity to bodily "organs." Headlong 
Hall (1816) by Thomas Peacock, a friend of the Shelleys, parodied the trend by making 
Mr Cranium, a phrenologist, say "A man in whom the organ of benevolence is not 
developed, cannot be benevolent.,,59 This clearly shows how widely prevalent this 
notion of the "organs" was in Shelley's time. The rationalist theory of Wollstonecraft 
and Godwin was predicated upon the enlightenment belief in the power of education. 
Wollstonecraft in particular wanted to reject the uniqueness of the individual organism, 
for what made women's liberation possible for her was their ability to improve both in 
mind and body. A belief that negates the power of education, and assigns man's moral 
58 I will not explicate the work, but merely mention that various historians of medicine 
such as Ludmilla Jordanova and Karl Figlio have acknowledged the importance of his 
work as showing an insight into the nature of brain structure and function, the 
relationship between the psychological and the physiological, and the nervous system. 
See Ludmilla Jordanova's "The Art and Science of Seeing in Medicine: Physiognomy 
1780-1820" in Medicine and the Five Senses eds. W.F.Bynum and Roy Porter. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
39 
and intellectual capacity to "organs" would have been a reprehensible idea to her. 
Francois-Joseph Gall and Johann Gaspar Spurzheim also made a direct link 
between the "organs" and moral goodness or intelligence in man, which has a certain 
echo from La Mettrie's theory. Like La Mettrie, Gall and Spurzheim apply this 
materialist theory of the human mind to animals, as the latter states, "The mild and 
good-natured animals, then, have the place of their forehead corresponding to the organ 
of goodness in man elevated and prominent, while the ill-natured present a hollow.,,6o 
They rej ect the notion that education is a cause of the faculties of the mind. Spurzheim 
argues that the extreme view which applies the Lockean theory that "the minds not only 
of men but also of animals are born without determinate faculties-indifferent-as 
tabula rasa or blank paper" is unacceptable (Outlines 265). His rationale behind this is 
that, "if education could produce faculties, why have instructors not yet found the 
means of conferring understanding judgment and good qualities in general? Why are we 
not all men of genius!" (Outlines 269). According to their system, organs or "faculties" 
rather than the process of education explain certain propensities of human beings. 
Whytt and Cullen vaguely associate strong hysterical fits or passion with 
women, but Gall and Spurzheim argue that they are directly attributable to the 
"cerebellum." Spurzheim, for instance, records a case of a widow who was subject to 
very strong hysterical fits. Being physician to this woman, as Spurzheim writes, Gall 
considered this "passion" as relating to the development of the cerebellum (Outlines 
106). Going over numerous organs that cause peculiar propensities of the human mind 
59 See Thomas Peacock. Headlong Hall <Wordsworth Classics), p.25. 
60 J.G.Spurzheim, M.D. Outlines of the Physiognomical System or Drs. Galls and 
Spurzheim: indica ting the Dispositions and Manifesta tions of the Mind <London: 
Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1815), p.161. Hereafter cited as Outlines with page 
numbers in parenetheses. 
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such as "amativeness," "philoprogenitiveness," "destructiveness," "individuality" and 
"wit," Spurzheim draws a conclusion that "as it is really possible to demonstrate the 
respective organs of the propensities, sentiments and intellectual faculties, it is 
impossible to deny that their manifestations depend on the organization" (Outlines 259). 
4. Materialism and Immaterialism 
The body functions as the sign of various functions: the body as a moral and intellectual 
agent, the body as the source of passions, the body as the mechanism which registers 
various impressions (or stimuli) and so forth. The question however remains as to the 
ultimate cause of a life-force. As I have discussed, the whole dispute between Whytt and 
Haller led us to question whether "irritability," the organ's specific motion, is 
characteristic of matter, or of a life-force. 61 While Haller "thinks irritability an innate 
property of muscular fibres," contending that it "does not depend upon the nerves and 
has no connexion with sensibility" (PE 148), Whytt believes that matter itself is 
incapable of sensation or thought. Hartley's theory follows Haller's materialism, which 
is unlike Whytt's in that it argues for the "efficiency of corporeal causes upon the 
medullary substance." Hartley states, 
... it seems to me, that the powers of generating ideas, and raising them by 
association, must also arise from corporeal causes, and consequently admit of 
an explication from the subtle influences of the small parts of matter upon 
each other, as soon as these are sufficiently understood, which is farther 
evinced from the manifest influences of material causes upon our ideas and 
associations, taken notice of under the second proposition. (OM i 72) 
61 R.K.French, (1969), p.70. 
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This companson between Hartley and Whytt shows that the former is closer to 
Haller's materialism which endows the activating power to matter.62 However it is 
curious to observe that Hartley's causality principle also splits into two. On the one 
hand he assigns the soul to matter (OM i 34), and on the other attributes the cause of this 
mechanical impulse or pressure to "the immediate agency of the Deity" (OM ii 20). It 
was perhaps this uncertainty that made the image of self not just decentred but also 
unstable and insecure. 
Not only did this way of thinking make the locus of accountability impossible 
to determine, it also provoked the theological discourse. The mechanical philosophy 
that had arisen in the early eighteenth century, Lester King declares, seemed too close to 
materialism for those with religious beliefs, which drew natural philosophers' attention 
to religious issues: "Matter in motion could very well explain the material world, but 
what about the world of spirit, the realm of the immaterial?,,63 In response to this 
general inquiry, what seems to be happening in the medical documents published in the 
eighteenth century is that "spirit had been brought back into physics and into 
h . I 64 P yslO ogy. 
George Cheyne's religious commitment also came into direct conflict with his 
own scientific study of the human body. He tried to reconcile his religious inclination 
with his mechanical ideas by retaining the source of celestial motion. Materialistic 
though his nerve theory seems, the agent of communication was left ambiguous by his 
62 Haller's religious piety did not allow the "soul" to be as material as that of La 
Mettrie, so the former still attached a sacred meaning to it. 
63 Lester King, "George Cheyne, Mirror of Eighteenth Century Medicine" in Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine 48 (1974), p.519. 
64 Roy Porter, "The Eighteenth Century" in The Western Medical Tradition 800 Be to 
AD 1800 Eds. L.r. Conrad, M. Neve, V. Nutton, R. Porter, and A. Wear (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.358. 
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notion of the "animal spirits" that are neither spiritual nor substantial. What actuated 
and governed the operations of such a mechanism, Cheyne maintains, were "spiritual 
Substances" (EM 94). He rejects the idea that the "animal spirits" are the fluids existing 
in "our System" (EM 81) meaning the "material System of Fluids" (EM 85) such as 
light or water, and he further suggests that there are "some other more aetherial and 
subtil Fluid[ s]" (EM 85) that may be "Intermediates between pure, immaterial Spirit and 
gross Matter" and "Cement between the human Soul and Body" (EM 87). Hence there 
seems to be eclecticism between materialism and religious belief to some extent in 
Cheyne's description of the body. Ultimately he argues that the power to "produce 
Elasticity and Attraction, or allow Particles of Matter" is "impress'd with these 
Qualities in their Creation immediately by the supreme Being" (English Malady 86). He 
retains his religious belief in the existence of an external agent by calling it the "sentient 
Principle" (EM 88) or "Free-willing Principle" (EM 91). In his Philosophic Principles 
of Religion (1705), he underlines the importance of the "First Cause of all things,,65 as 
"an original impress" which was "impressed on matter by the Creator of the world" (PP 
41), thereby stressing the passivity of matter. 
This controversy seems to have no end. In the late eighteenth century, the soul 
was commonly understood as an immaterial and immortal substance. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (1771) for example states 
That the soul is an immaterial substance appears from hence, that its primary 
operations of willing and thinking have not only no connection with the known 
properties of body, but seem plainly inconsistent with some of its most 
65 George Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal'd, Part I. 
2nd ed. (London: Strahan, 1715), p.44. Hereafter cited as PPwith page numbers in 
parentheses. 
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essential qualities.66 
It was assumed that the soul, being an immaterial agent, does not depend on the body 
for its existence, and therefore it "must exist after the dissolution of the body, unless 
annihilated by the same power which gave it a being at first.,,67 
Religious controversy over the im/materiality of the soul may be best 
illustrated by Priestley's philosophical work Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirits 
(1777) published by Joseph Johnson. He rejects Andrew Baxter's dualistic idea that the 
soul is superadded to the material body. The Unitarians, of whom Priestley was one of 
the leaders, saw themselves as "rational dissenters" who had stripped away superstitious 
accretions and left only the essentials.68 While Cheyne reverts back to the notion of the 
immaterial power, Priestley's rigorous materialism does not leave any room for this 
dualism. It is based on the idea that the matter and power are compatible, for the power 
of attraction or repulsion is necessary to its very being. Priestley inveighs against the 
supposition that there are "two distinct kinds of substance in human nature, ... matter 
and spirit, or mind.,,69 For him, the solidity of matter is merely superficial, for it is the 
power of "mutual attraction" (Disquisitions 5) that ensures the existence even of an 
atom: "Take away the power, therefore, and the solidity of the atom intirely disappears. 
In short, it is then no longer matter" (Disquisitions 6). 
Darwin, who frequently exchanged ideas with Priestley, shared the same 
premise. He is also critical of some philosophers who "have divided all created beings 
66 Encyclopaedia Britannica,· or a Dictionary of Arts and Sciences vol. 3 (Edinburgh: 
Bell and Macfarquha, 1771), p.618. 
67 ibid. 
68 William St Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a Family. 
(London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989), p.34. 
69 Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit. (London: Joseph 
Johnson, 1777), p.xxxvii. Hereafter cited as Disquisitions with page numbers in 
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into material [which obeys the mechanic laws of action and reaction; but which can 
begin no motion of itself] and immaterial [the cause of all motion, and is either termed 
the power of gravity, of specific attraction, or the spirit of animation] (Zoonomia i 
108-109). This is expressive of his scepticism towards spiritualism. He argues that "the 
spirit of animation at the time it communicates or receives motion from solid bodies," 
must itself possess the same property, namely solidity, if it were to influence or to be 
influenced (Zoonomia i 115). Focusing on the intricate internal movement which could 
be observed during the dissection of the corpse was characteristic of early 
nineteenth-century medical theory. However, Darwin could be considered as half way 
towards that stage, for he still draws on the method of "analogy" by which he compares 
organic contractibility to the power of attraction or electricity.70 Darwin had two 
primary textual antecedents, not just medical but scientific. By consulting available 
signs from natural sciences such as astronomy, geology and physics, while keeping in 
mind the resonating pattern of natural phenomena, he could sketch a picture of the 
body's internal order and balance. 
Darwin's theory of contractibility is reminiscent of Haller's theory of muscular 
contraction and the irritable fibres of the body, but Darwin's medical approach owes 
most to John Brown's theory or "Brunonianism,,,71 as he explains in his medical 
treatise: 
The coincidence of some parts of [Zoonomia] with correspondent deductions in 
parentheses. 
70 Both Darwin and Cullen are said to have used electricity to cure nervous diseases. 
Cullen, for example, states that "[ellectricity ... is certainly one of the most powerful 
stimulants that can be employed to act upon the nervous system of animals" (FL iii 
191). 
71 WF.Bynum and Roy Porter, Brunonianism in Britain and Europe (London: 
Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1988). 
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the Brunonian Elemanta Medicina, a work (with some exceptions) of great 
genius, must be considered as confirmations of the truth of the theory, as they 
were probably arrived at by different trains of reasoning (Zoonmia i 75). 
His medical vocabulary thus heavily relies on John Brown's notion of "excitability," 
which is elaborated in his chapter "Of Stimulus and Exertion." The notion of 
"excitability" was common knowledge for eighteenth-century medical men, and was 
considered as a vital concept for understanding the nature of life. Without this idea, 
Galvanism, reanimating bodily parts with electrical stimulus, was perhaps difficult to 
accept. 
Following the earlier medical thinkers, Brown unites physical and mental 
motion into the movement of the nerves, as he argues, "the exciting powers will 
immediately rouse into exertion any of the functions that distinguish living animal 
systems; or, in other words, produce sense, motion, thought or passion" (Elements Part I 
36). Calling these exciting powers "the true cause of life" (Elements Part I 14), he thus 
equates the cause of emotions and ideas with life spirits. As Thomas Morrison, Member 
of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, has said in his Examination into the 
principles of what is commonly called the Brunonian system (1806), "I shall therefore 
wish the words Excitability, Vital Principle of Life to be considered synonimous 
[sic]."n As the saying goes "the more a spark is blown, the brighter it bums, and the 
sooner it is spent." Excitability is exhausted by any passion or perturbation, and such a 
state of body suggests a certain vulnerability. Darwin also equates that which gives new 
life with "ethereal fires" (TN Canto II, p.44, 1.13). Xavier Bichat, a French physician, 
72 Thomas Morrison, An examination into the principles of what is commonly called 
the Brunonian System (London: Highley, 1806), pp.14,15. 
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presupposes that the "vital powers" are divided into two orders, animal and organic, and 
if either of them is extinguished by age or excess of stimuli, both will cease to 
function. 73 So long as the ethereal fire is not extinguished, Brunonians tended to 
believe that life continued. Wollstonecraft was also concerned about the question, what 
gives materials life and heat: she asks herself whether it is "fluids" or "a liquid fire" that 
is the cause of life (VRW 185). But it is Mary Shelley, in her formidable work, 
Frankenstein, who directly treats the issue of life. 
Brown had designated life not only as a principle, but as the varying effect of 
stimuli on that principle. In terms of life energy, excitability affects one's physical 
condition. If "expenditure" of the spirit of animation is too great or too little, 
consequently rendering the sensorial power "above or beneath the natural quantity," it 
becomes a disease, and when the spirit is used up, living fibres no longer contract. 
Darwin had also put forward Burunonian ideas in verse. 
How short the span of LIFE! Some hours possess'd, 
Warm but to cool, and active but to rest!-
The age-worn fibres goaded to contract, 
By repetition palsied, cease to act; 
When Time's cold hands the languid senses seize, 
Chill the dull nerves, the lingering currents freeze; 
Organic matter, umec1aim'd by Life, 
Reverts to elements by chemic strife. (TN Canto II, pp.43, 44, 11.1-8) 
73 Xavier Bichat, Physiological Researches Upon Life and Death trans. Tobias Watkins 
(Philadelphia: Smith & Maxwell, 1809), p.13l. Hereafter cited as PRwith page 
numbers in parentheses. Like Haller, his theory pivots on the notion of organic 
contractibility as the general character of all the living parts, which "belong[s] to the 
organ, and is inherent in it," therefore has an emphasis on the ever-changing organic 
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Thus the organic matter and chemical workings are nicely harmonised in his theory. In 
his medical treatise, he argues that when the sensorial power or the spirit is withdrawn 
as in death, "[the bodies] possess no power of motion at all" (Zoonomia i 72). Yet death 
is no terminal for Darwin, for the organic matter, "unreclaimed" by life or the "spirits," 
transmutes back to chemical elements. The spirits become something more than an 
agent that is part of matter, for they can be conveniently extracted or put back into the 
body like electricity. The life principle for Darwin is therefore still "analogous" to 
things that can be explained by the scientific laws of nature. Darwin's critical comments 
on Christianity are difficult to fathom, for he tends to evade a serious discussion on 
religion and the role of God in the creation of life. However his belief in the divine 
creation of Nature is not totally denied. Darwin's annotation in The Temple of Nature 
affirms the existence of the Deity, as "THE FIRST CAUSE" and calls "Young Nature" 
the "child of God" (TN Canto I, p.19, 11.223-226). He is "ready to allow, that the powers 
of gravity, specific attraction, electricity, magnetism, and even the spirit of animation, 
may consist of matter of a finer kind, and to believe; with St.Paul and Malbranch, that 
the ultimate cause only of all motion is immaterial, that is God" (Zoonomia i 115). 
William Lawrence's materialism is illuminating when it is compared to 
Darwin's hesitation or ambivalence in defining the "powers" of life. Lawrence 
forthrightly rejects equating the life principle to the operation of physical sciences. 
Now, although certain parts of the animal economy obey the laws of 
mechanics, and others admit of illustration by the aid of chemistry, and thus far 
the living processes come within the domain of the physical sciences, the main 
springs of the animal functions, the original moving forces, cannot be 
movement (PR 166). 
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explained on these grounds. The powers of sensation and contraction, and the 
properties of the capillary vessels, belong peculiarly and exclusively to living 
organic textures: they are eminently vital, and form the distinguishing 
character ofliving beings.74 
While Darwin still largely relies on scientific analogies which are elaborated further in 
his verse writings, Lawrence considers organic beings as possessing properties which 
cannot be fully explained by the laws of mechanics or chemisty.75 Generally speaking, 
the vital theory of Darwin, Bichat and Lawrence is based on the activities and 
contractibility of nervous and muscular fibers, thereby fore grounding the organic nature 
of the body. Lawrence describes the intricacy of the operations of organic bodies in the 
following passage: 
[the ablest geometricians] acknowledge that the springs of the animal frame are 
too numerous, too intricate, and too imperfectly known, to be submitted, with 
any prospect of advantage, to calculation; that, in such complicated operations, 
experience is our only safe guide, and inductions from numerous facts the only 
sure support of our reasonings. (Lectures 72, 3) 
This part of his theory is of great interest to us in that he uses the word "spring" and in a 
plural form. It is highly debatable whether the word designates the spring which 
74 William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man. 
(London: Callow, 1819), p.78. Hereafter cited as Lectures with page numbers in 
parentheses. 
75 John Gregory also maintains that the phenomena ofthe world are not all explicable 
in terms of attracting and repelling powers of ultimate particles. He states that "in the 
vegetable and animal kingdom there are evident indications of powers of a different 
nature from those of unorganized bodies." He concludes that certain effects produced 
cannot be explained by the "laws of matter." See John Gregory's Lectures on the Duties 
and Qualifications of a Physician 1770. Quoted by Philip C. Titterbush, Overtures to 
Biology: the Speculations of Eighteenth-Century Naturalists (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1964), p.187. 
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signifies a metal part that has a springy motion, or the source of water which figures the 
life principle. But this word is perhaps evocative of both, for the meaning of machinery 
parts is a relic of the mechanistic approach, and when it represents the "source," this 
passage will suggest the multiple sources of action, reverberating with Whytt's musical 
metaphor. However, Lawrence, like Darwin, uses the term "spirit" to describe this life 
principle, indirectly suggesting a supernatural quality that cannot be explained by 
SCIence. 
The immaterial system seems to have been still predominant in Mary Shelley's 
time. In 1814, a commentator in the Monthly Magazine talks of John Hunter's life 
principle in the following manner. 
I proceed to inquire into Mr Hunter's opinion, that irritability is the effect of 
some subtle, mobile, invisible substance, superadded to the evident structure of 
muscles, or other forms of vegetable and animal matter as magnetism is to iron, 
and as electricity is to various substances with which it may be connected.76 
The commentator is indirectly critiquing the materialist stance of granting "irritability" 
the status of agency. He is favourable towards Hunter's notion that invisible substance is 
"superadded" to the body, and believes "most persons do think" that "in magnetic and 
electric motions, a subtile invisible substance, of a very quickly and powerfully mobile 
nature, puts in motion other bodies which are evident to the senses, and are of a nature 
more gross and inert" (ibid). 
John Abernethy and Hunter's theory of vitalism is extensively elaborated in 
The Quarterly Review (1820),77 and its commentator censures William Lawrence's 
76 Monthly Magazine Vol.XXXVIII. (1814), p.50. 
77 See Appendix C, "The Quarterly Review" vol. XXII (1820) in Frankenstein. The 1818 
Text. Ed. Marilyn Butler (Oxford and New York Oxford UP, 1993), pp.231-251. 
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materialism by also referring to Mr Rennell who states "an immaterial and immortal 
soul is added to the living principle which he possesses in common with other 
animals.,,78 Therefore, as Marilyn Butler has noted, Abernethy, Lawrence's former tutor, 
who inherited the powerfully theological culture of Edinburgh collided with Lawrence 
on the subject of materialism. While Abernethy had faithfully followed the teaching of 
John Hunter and his well-known "life-principle,,,79 Lawrence was sceptical of his 
immaterial system just as Priestley had rejected Baxter's. Lawrence's medical thinking 
is particularly relevant to my study, for he was an acquaintance of Mary Shelley, a 
physician of Percy treating his "continual irritation" in August 1815.80 
I have tried to follow the development in eighteenth-century medical discourse, and 
the recurrent philosophical themes of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley which 
seem to weigh heavily in their works. These three writers were deeply concerned with 
the issues of the life principle, moral development and how one's talent is determined. 
The central question is whether the well-functioning mind starts with actual material 
that is set before birth, or whether it is subject to a good deal of further modification 
under the influence of climate, education, temperament and sex. I also wanted to show 
that rationalism is not merely a political concern, but is the object of philosophical and 
medical inquiry. In the following chapters, I will use medical ideas to explain some 
aspects of the writings of the Godwin circle. These will include Godwin's irresoluteness 
in regard to rationalism, Wollstonecraft's attempt to overcome the sex barrier, and Mary 
78 See Appendix C, Marilyn Butler (1993), p.238. 
79 See Johne Abernethy, An Enquiry into the Probability and Rationality of Mr 
Hunter's 'Theory of Life' (London: Longman, etc., 1814), p.48. Hereafter cited as Mr 
Hunter's Theorywith page numbers in parentheses. 
80 Hugh J. Luke, Jr., "Sir William Lawrence: Physician to Shelley and Mary" in Papers 
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Shelley's manifest materialism. My aim, of course, is not just to show whether Shelley 
was a materialist, but also to demonstrate the complexity of scientific, medical, religious 
and moral discourses within which she was writing her novel, and to find a crucial link 
with her parents' works. 
on English Language and Literaturevol.L (1965), p.141. 
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2 
'The Chain of the Body' 
in William Godwin's Caleb Williams 
Sound reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated must always be victorious 
over error. Sound reasoning and truth are capable of being so communicated: Truth is 
omnipotent. The vices and moral weakness of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, 
or in other words susceptible of perpetual improvement." (P J 140) 
As is observable from reading both Political Justice (1793)81 and Caleb Williams 
(1794), Godwin is preoccupied with political and moral questions through which he 
explores the nature of justice and truth. Godwin gives truth the epithets of "omnipotent" 
and "immutable" (P J 117), but on the other hand "truth" also depends on the addresser's 
ability to procure a secure conduit or means of "communication." He upholds the 
human capacity to reason, and vindicates it as the condition for successful 
communication: " ... if the communicator be sufficiently master of his subject, and if 
the truth be altogether on his side, he must ultimately succeed in his undertaking .... 
Man is a rational being .... It is absurd therefore to say that sound reasoning and truth 
81 William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern 
Morals and Happiness Third Edition ed.Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
books, 1976). Hereafter cited as PJwith page numbers. The first edition came out in 
1793 and had been hastily delivered for publication. Godwin then made a number of 
changes in the second (1796) and third (1798) editions to render the text more "unified 
and coherent." (See Isaac Kramnick A Note of the Text of Political Justicep.57). All the 
quotations are from the third edition text unless stated specifically as PJi. PJi stands 
for An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) ed.Mark Philp (London: William 
Pickering, 1993). 
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cannot be communicated by one man to another" (PJ 141). 
Straightforward though this may seem, Godwin's rationalism is problematic, 
particularly when we try to assess the various editions of Political Justice and the earlier 
and later novels. Many critics believe that his rationalistic ideas are somewhat modified 
in the second and third editions or in his later writings. It is said that in the first edition 
of Political Justice Godwin's anarchism or his scepticism concerning the governing 
body of the state is "premissed on the belief that reason can become the sole 
determinant of human action," 82 whereas in the second edition he gives more 
importance to the role of feeling and sentiment. 83 Can we draw a distinction between 
the first and the second editions of 1793 and 1796, and does the change takes place 
before he reads David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) in 1795.84 Pamela 
Clemit traces Godwin's emphasis on sympathy and feeling back to Caleb Williams,85 
his first serious novel, stating that its denouement indicates that Godwin had already 
recognised the inadequacy of his faith in human reason. 86 Clemit's point is a valid one, 
because the novel deals with the problem of truth-claims and whether truth is 
"communicable" or not, and it also explores the epistemological question of how this 
can be realised. One of the crucial metaphors of Godwin in alluding to such 
communication is that of a "chain" which inevitably trails the motive and intention of 
82 Pamela Clemit, St.Leon (1799) (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1994), p.xiv. 
83 Isaac Kramnick, A Note on the text of Political Justice (1976), p.57. 
84 Paul Hamilton makes a special note of Godwin's reading of Hume's Treatise in 1795 
which feeds into Godwin's tendency of "reinstat[ing] 'feeling' as the prime mover of 
human action, and reserves the purely rational act as at best an ideal or limiting case." 
See Paul Hamilton, 'Coleridge and Godwin in the 1790s'in The Coleridge Connection: 
Essays for Thomas McFarland ed. R.Gravil and M.Lefebure (London: Macmillan, 1990), 
p.44. 
85 William Godwin, Caleb Williams (1794) ed. David McCacken (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982). Hereafter cited as CWwith page numbers in parentheses. 
86 See Pamela Clemit (1994), p.xiv. 
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one's action. He therefore endorses moral conduct based on "virtuous" motives, but at 
the same time, drawing upon the philosophy of Shaftesbury and Hume, he underscores 
the role of "feeling" in "self-love and benevolence" (P J 377). 
Godwin's own justification of his inconsistency is given in the Preface to his 
second novel, St.Leon (1799). He notices the difference, for example, between this 
novel in which there are "the affections and charities of private life" everywhere and 
"the Enquiry concerning Political Justice [in which] they seemed to be treated with no 
great degree of indulgence and favour." 87 To defend himself against a possible 
accusation of admitting that he has changed his mind, he writes: 
... all I think it necessary to say on the present occasion is, that, for more 
than four years, I have been anxious for opportunity and leisure to modify 
some of the earlier chapters of that work [Political Justice] in conformity to 
the sentiments inculcated in this.88 
Hence as Godwin claims, though in retrospect, we may suspect he had intended to insert 
his "sentiments" concerning domestic affections in his Political Justice at a much earlier 
phase, possibly during or after his composition of Caleb Williams. 
It is more clearly articulated in the later editions of Political Justice that 
Godwin's rationalist views underwent a visible change after reading Hume. The 
Humean rejection of the confrontation between reason and passion89 reverberates in 
87 See William Godwin St. Leon (1799) (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1994), 
pp.XXXllI, XXXIV. 
88 ibid. 
89 David Hume defines the term passion as "an original existence, or, ... modification 
of existence" or a human being's original state (HN 415). He calls into question the 
"suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion," so suggesting the fallacy of the 
philosophy that believes in "the blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness" of passion 
(HN 413). Shaftesbury's optimistic notion of innate goodness is implicit in Hume's 
notion of passion in that Hume suggests that what he calls "calm passions or desires" 
are either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence 
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Godwin's evasion of the paradigm opposition of reason and passion: "passion is so far 
from incompatible with reason that it is inseparable from it" (P J 136, 137).90 
Sensibility and passion are a key to understanding Godwin's truth-claims, because his 
theory is based on the rational operation of the mind which cannot do without the 
faculty of sensation (P J 145), as he writes, "the human mind, so far as we are 
acquainted with it, is nothing else but a faculty of perception" (P J 146). Thus he gives a 
due weight to human sensibility. 
In this chapter I will discuss Godwin's seemingly ambivalent notion of reason 
by investigating the impact that eighteenth-century nerve theory and Hartley's 
associationism had on his mode of thought, which notably accounts for his 
indeterminate rationalism. By closely reading his Political Justice and Caleb Williams, I 
will attempt to show how Godwin's works took on the changing symbolism of the body 
in the eighteenth century, and I will analyse Godwin's intellectual system which exalts a 
certain kind of passion and sensibility that can co-exist with his rationalism.91 
1. Passion and the Body 
The Oxford English Dictiollmy defines "passion" as "an affection of the mind; any kind 
and resentment [towards evil acts], the love of life, and kindness to children; or the 
general appetite to good, and aversion to evil ... " (HN 417). 
90 This citation is from the chapter on 'Voluntary Actions of Men Originate in their 
Opinion' of the third edition, and this chapter is not part of the first edition, and from 
this, we may speculate that much of his discussion on the interdependent relation 
between reason and passion was developed after reading Hume. 
91 Burton Ralph Pollin argues that this is observed in both his novels and Political 
Justice, as he writes, "It is not true ... that his novels represents a break with the 
rationalism of Political Justice; there is no real irreconcilability between the 
intellecualism of his system an the sentimentalism of his fiction" (p.220). Pollin notes, 
as Clemit does, that after the publication of Caleb Williams and his marriage, with his 
increased stress upon feeling, Godwin inclines more and more to the current practices 
of his day in using the language and the character type of sensibility (p.221). 
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of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, 
commanding, or overpowering emotion",92 suggesting a meaning which represents an 
operation that is both passive and active, involuntary and voluntary, which in fact 
embodies the Godwinian oxymoron. There are two underlying strands of discourse in 
the eighteenth century which significantly explain the ambivalent features of the 
definition. The first is a particular medical discourse which treated the nerve system as 
the principal mechanism of the body. The second is the philosophical argument which 
vindicates the innate benevolence or moral goodness of the human being. 
One of the most salient features of eighteenth-century medical science which in 
great part accounts for Godwinian passion is a move away from the Cartesian dualism 
of the body and mind as I have outlined in the introductory chapter. 93 In medical 
discourse the conceptual "soul" which had previously been endowed with a more 
spiritual and divine quality began to take on the role of involuntary operations of the 
body, as we saw in the first chapter. In other words, the word "soul" was losing its 
ground in "head" or "mind" and was increasingly liquidated and dispersed in various 
solid parts of the body like organs or fibres, and consequently became more materiaL In 
the eighteenth century, the figurative body came to epitomize the site of accumulative 
impressions, making sensibility or passions stand for the instantaneous bodily as well as 
92 The entries for the term passions (plural form) include Shakespeare's Henry VI 
(1591), and Mrs.Radcliffe's The Romance of the Forest (1791). 
93 G.S.Rousseau, (1969), p.120. See also Christopher Lawrence, (1979), pp.24-5. 
Dorinda Outram studies French medical science of the eighteenth-century and finds 
that the prevailing idea about the functional integrity of the bodily organism can be 
considered a "movement away from the last vestiges of Cartesian dualism." See The 
Body and the French Revolution: Se~ Class and PoEtical Culture. (New Haven & 
London: Yale UP, 1989), p.49. There are confusion between the words, the "soul" and 
the "mind," because the conceptual soul was more and more becoming associated with 
the nervous system which is embedded in matter or the body mechanism, which leaves 
the mind to carry out rational or conscious operations of the brain. 
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emotional responses of an individual to external influences. In the sensationalist 
psychology of Cheyne, Whytt, Cullen and Brown, the body by implication is not only 
free to perceive or feel the impressions of both the external world and the internal 
affections, but also left susceptible and vulnerable to them, and this is where the 
paradox arises. The close tie between the faculty of reason and that of sensation is 
everywhere observed in Godwin's Political Justice. Despite his privileging of reason 
over sensation, his philosophical problem remains unresolved as his statement 
illustrates: "Though mind be a real and proper antecedent, it is in no case a first 
cause"(P J 376). 
The physicality of the soul undermines the claims to rationality or the 
conscious will. When human action is instantaneous or immediate, leaving the natural 
state of the body to act with minimum intervention of the mind, the locus or the agency 
of moral judgement becomes obscure. The moral ramifications of the "instantaneous 
impulse" or sensibility frequently involved the question of whether the human being is 
innately selfish or benevolent. The question here is whether the prime mover of human 
action is reason or sensation. Godwin seems to have been concerned with this issue 
before he wrote Caleb Williams (P J i 190).94 To consider the moral judgement which 
the bodily impulses make is equivalent to asking 'what status is given to the "natural" 
state of body or what Shaftesbury calls "Nature"?95 Depending upon the status of 
94 Already in the first edition of Political Justice he takes issue with "the advocates of 
self-love" who characterise human action in terms of one's selfish considerations. He 
presents a case in which an infant experiences for the first time the benevolent emotion 
towards his nurse who has broken her leg. He asks whether it is possible for anyone to 
conceive that the child "in the instantaneous impulse of sympathy" is guided by selfish 
considerations such as the inconvenience on his part of doing without her. His answer 
is clearly in the negative, taking "the pleasures of benevolence" (PJi 190) as a matter 
of fact, because for him, "if self love be the only principle of action, there can be no such 
thing as virtue" (PJi 193). 
95 Shaftesbury believed in man's "natural" social sentiments which fostered mutual 
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Nature or the body, that is whether human beings are innately benevolent or 
self-interested, the affection of the mind or passion is assessed differently. 
David Hume's notion of "calm passion," distinguishing it from the commonly 
understood notion of passion(s)-meaning "a violent and sensible emotion causing 
disorder in the temper" (HN 437), bears the positive features of benevolence and the 
love of life. Godwin's endorsement of "purified" passion seems to share the same 
characteristic. The sensitivity to the word "passion" manifests these philosophers' 
challenge to the existing peIjorative connotation. When this use of the word is set over 
against that in medical discourse, it seems at once clear that Godwin, like Hume, 
interrogates the nature of the body which is potentially incorrigible: 'Does the body 
"chain" or "is chained by" the mind, through the mechanism of nerves or what Whytt 
has termed the sympathetic chord that "vibrates?'" 
In the same vein Godwin's treatment of the term "sensibility" is pivotal in that 
his interest in human sensibility exemplifies two contradictory operations: one evokes a 
vulnerable position, but the other signifies a positive feature of human capacity to 
accumulate knowledge. Sensibility, or the inlet of knowledge through the senses, is 
inseparable from his enlightenment approach to knowledge. There is a strong trace of 
the Lockean rejection of the innate principles of knowledge in his writings,96 and this, 
together with Hartley's doctrine of association, gives ample reason for Godwin to study 
the accumulative impressions or impulses received in the mind, and hence for him to 
affections and sympathy amongst each other. He subverts the meaning of "natural" by 
professing that the affections and care towards others and the involvement in society 
are natural, thereby naturalising the human preference for the social state over a 
desolate and wild state of nature: "society must be ... natural to him." See 
Characteristics or Men: Manner, Opinions: Times ed. John M. Robertson vo1.2. 
<Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963), p.83. Hereafter cited as Characteristics with page 
numbers in parentheses. 
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encourage the diffusion of education and a concern for external influences. 
There is an example from Godwin's Caleb Williams in the Oxford English 
Dictiol1my under the word "sensibility." This is taken from Mr.Falkland's speech in 
his murder trial, where he shows his strong regard for honour and reputation: "My life 
has been spent in the keenest and most unintermitted sensibility to reputation" (CW 101). 
Its reference is under the denotation of "Quickness and acuteness of apprehension or 
feeling; the quality of being easily and strongly affected by emotional influences; 
sensitiveness" (5.a., OED).97 The quotation is not only semantically pertinent but 
contextually suited in that the Godwinian attack on the culture of sentimentalism98 is 
here most acutely observed.99 Mr. Falkland's posture is suggestive of that of a man of 
feeling, whose acute sensitivity to a series of impressions from the external world 
potentially renders him vulnerable. Godwin's preoccupation with the portraiture of the 
sensitive man may partially be explained by his interest in the human mind and its 
96 According to Godwin, "All human knowledge is the result of perception" (PJ33S). 
97 Besides this definition, Oxford English Dictionary offers others such as the "Power 
or faculty of feeling, capacity of sensation and emotion as distinguished from cognition 
and will" (lob.) "Mental perception, awareness of something (3). "Emotional 
consciousness; glad or sorrowful, grateful or resentful recognition of a person's conduct, 
or of a fact or a condition of things" (4.a.). 
98 Chris Jones, in his incisive essay, categorises Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft as 
the writers of radical Sensibility, whose stance, he maintains, is "principally 
distinguished by their criticism of conservative Sensibility." Conservative sensibility, he 
says, ''leads to the affirmations of Burke that all our feelings are formed by the 
habitual associations of the status quo," and the susceptibility of a typical man of 
feeling, Harley, can only cause him to wear himself out reacting against a world, and 
cannot change it. See Chris Jones, (1993), pp.72-76. 
99 G.A.Starr, while acknowledging a subversive potential in of the feeling or sensibility 
of an individual to renounce the customary rules of conduct and belief, points out the 
conservatism of sentimental literature such as Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling, 
Sterne's Sentimental Journey, Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther, and Berinardin 
de Saint-Pierre's Paul and Virginia. In them, he argues, the fate of the sentimental 
characters become "an emblem of the ultimate stability and inescapability of the status 
quo." See 'Sentimental Novels of the Later Eighteenth Century' in The Columbia 
History of the British Novel ed.John Richetti (New York Columbia UP, 1994), pp.193, 
194. 
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relation with nerves. 
David Hartley's Observations on Man, which greatly influenced Godwin's 
theory of man's perfectibility, helped generalise the nerve theory by extending the issue 
from Newtonian vibration to a concern for ethics and religion. Just as Richardson's 
delineation of his sentimental characters is informed by his reading of Cheyne's The 
English Malady, so Godwin's similarly sensitive heroes could not have been sustained 
without Hartley's famous treatise.1°o Godwin's belief in a more robust and strenuous 
mind is incompatible with the ideal of these heroes, and our investigation into his 
theoretical framework elaborated in Political Justice and its application in Caleb 
Williams will enable us better to document his equivocal imagery of the operation of the 
mind and the metaphor of the chain. 
2. Sensibility and Political Justice 
Although effectively applying the sensationalist psychology of Locke, Cheyne, Whytt, 
Cullen, Brown and Hartley, Godwin carefully chooses language so as to weave together 
the current medical debate and the controversial moral issues. This allows him to 
analyse the metaphysical body in a manner that fuses together the causes of bodily 
motions and of benevolence. Godwin replaces some medical with more familiar 
terminology. He preferred to use more abstract word like "thought" instead of "sentient 
soul" or "involuntary agent ofthe nerves." The word "thought" is employed to mean an 
100 Hartley's treatise was widely read amongst contemporary intellectuals such as 
William Hazlitt, James Mill, J.S.Mill and Joseph Priestly. James Mill, J.S.Mill's father, 
admired the book, and strongly recommended his son to read it, and J.S. Mill read 
Hartley's Observations in 1822. The influence of Hartley upon the philosopher-scientist 
Joseph Priestley is well attested by the fact that in 1775 Priestley brought out a 
condensed version of the Observations entitled Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, 
on the Principle of the Associa tion of Ideas,· with Essays Rela ting to the Subject of It 
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impersonal agent that orgamses involuntary motions of the animal system, namely 
without volition or design (P J 363). Thought is one operative part of "mind" and the 
other is a second thought, which Godwin calls "consciousness" (P J 364). The 
confrontation between the conscious part of the mind and the involuntary motion of 
thought is no mere repetition of the Cartesian opposition between soul and body, but is 
carefully rationalised by Godwin's application of the necessity theory. From it, he 
derives the following discussions which are all interrelated: of truth and delusion, 
inquisitive rational thinking and prejudice, knowledge and error or habit (P J 275), 
free-will and necessity, active and passive powers of the human mind, and voluntary 
and involuntary actions. 
Political Justice draws heavily on the metaphors of a chain. The metaphor of 
the chain, which was by this time almost a clich€:\ is a prerequisite in the exposing of the 
"involutions of motive." Whether a motive, especially a moral one, is voluntary or not, 
that is, based on a free self-determinism, is a problem Godwin explores in Political 
Justice, and one that was treated as an enigma by the association theorists like Hartley. 
Hartley could neither attribute the cause of impulse or pressure to nothing but the 
immediate agency of the Deity,101 nor assign "an infinitesimal elementary Body" or 
particle to be "intermediate between the Soul and gross Body" (OM i 34). He accounts 
for "Changes" by referring to "our Sensations, ideas, and Motions," which "may 
(J.Johnson, London, 1775). 
101 Hartley writes, "Now that some Powers of Attraction or Repulsion, or rather both at 
different Distances, reside in the small Particles of the medullary Substance, can 
scarce by doubted after so many Instances and Evidenes, as Sir Isaac Newton has 
produced, of attractive and repulsive Powers in the small Particles of various Bodies, 
Optics, Query 31. Meaning, as he does, by Attraction and Repulsion, a mere 
mathematical Tendency to approach and recede, be the Cause what it will, Impulse, 
Pressure, an unknown one, or no physical Cause at all, but the immediate Agency of 
the Deity" (OMi 20). 
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correspond to the Changes made in the medullary Substance, only so far as these 
correspond to the Changes made in the elementary Body" (ibid.). This seems inherently 
paradoxical, and we are to find no way out from the circle: "Where does our sensation 
arise from?" 
Thought, Godwin says, is "an essential link in the chain" (ibid.) that holds the 
whole internal history of the human mind on the principle of association. Every external 
action that the body takes, he says, was chosen by a volition which again is preceded by 
another volition and so on, and any quest for the first self-determination that allows 
freedom for the mind is in vain. Godwin's critical attitude towards wholly arbitrary or 
free self-determinism 102 is based on the theory of association, which necessarily 
deconstructs the binary between the mind and body. This has an origin in the Hartleyan 
theory of vibration. 103 Since vibrations are caused by certain external or internal 
impacts or impressions, they are by nature passive and hence may be appropriately 
figures as chains. The nervous or generic reaction of vibration can hardly be called a 
"voluntary action" which Godwin claims must be "the true essence of a motive" (P J 
379). The chain of necessity which Godwin frequently alludes to is in most cases 
passive and lacks an active agency: "Mind is a real principle, an indispensable link in 
the great chain of the universe; but not, as has sometimes been supposed, a principle of 
that paramount description as to supersede all necessities, and be itself subject to no 
102 In the chapter 'Of Free Will and Necessity,' Godwin asserts that "[a]U the acts, 
except the first, were necessary, and followed each other as inevitably as the links of a 
chain," but maintains that however much you trace back the chain, "that act, which 
gives the character offreedom to the whole, can never be discovered" (PJ347). 
103 Godwin's reference to the vibration theory is made in Political Justice. "The sense of 
feeling is diffused over every part of my body, I feel the different substances that 
support me, the pen I guide, various affections and petty irregularities in different 
parts of my frame, nay, the very air that environs me. But all these impressions are 
absolutely simultaneous, and I can have only one perception at once" (PJ371). 
63 
laws and methods of operation" (P J 352). 
The Aeolian (Eolian) harp is another important metaphor. 104 From a 
conservative viewpoint, chains in the revolutionary discourse were favourably 
perceived as a restraint on passions. Burke's chain of the passions, as the counterpart to 
Godwin's chain of the mind, alludes to a controlling device of untamable destructive 
passions that in 1789 had temporarily escaped from prison in the caverns of the mind.105 
It was therefore pertinent that Burke, in defending traditional government, had written 
approvingly of the 'fetters on the passions', but St Clair cogently points out that in 
Godwin's Political Justice it is not emotion which government has chained but insight 
into the truth.106 The Aeolian harp, consisting of a simple oblong frame, loosely strung 
with strings, which emitted musical sounds when placed in a breeze, has relevance to 
the nervous theory of vibration, for the eighteenth-century sensationalist psychologists 
like Cheyne or Whytt greatly relied on the metaphor of the musical instrument, whether 
it be the organ or string instruments. 
In this light it is interesting to observe Godwin's allusion to man's constitution 
against the wind: 
If anyone should choose to imagine that this idea of virtue is strained too high, 
yet all must allow that no man can be entitled to our confidence who trembles at 
evelY wind, who can endure no adversity, and whose very existence is linked to 
the artificial character he sustains." (P J 413, italics mine) 
104 The Aeolian harp was more often used as a metaphor for the imagination for 
Romantic poets. 
105 Burton Ralph Pollin explains that Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France 
acquired a new popularity, as the Reign of Terror appeared to justify the worst fears of 
the men of good will and good estate. See Education and Enlightenment in the Works 
of William Godwin (New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1962), p.20. 
106 William St. Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a Family 
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Godwin is clearly denouncing the idea of the excessive sensitivity of a person to every 
bodily impression. However, the fundamental paradox of sensibility and its "quickness 
of apprehension" results in leaving the subject susceptible to the wind of the world, 
while simultaneously enabling him or her to gain knowledge. The very same sensitivity 
that makes one tremble at every wind, Godwin himself notes, is also the cause of 
remarkable improvement in human understanding. 107 If all knowledge is the result of 
perception (P J 338), that is, if all knowledge originates from external influences, how 
can one tell the truth from other possibly deceptive influences? 
The epistemological problem on which David Hume had stumbled may be 
comparable to this case. He asks himself: 
"Can I be sure that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth? 
and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune should at last 
guide me on her foot steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasoning, 
I can give no reason why I should assent to it, and feel nothing but a strong 
propensity to consider objects strongly in that view under which they appear to 
me" (HN 265). 
Hume's helplessness is expressed through his awe at the sublime immensity of "that 
boundless ocean." Lost in "forlorn solitude," he feels himself weak, disordered and 
unable to mingle and unite in society, and for this reason he gives himself the 
appellation of "monster" (ibid.). This powerful image of himself as an outcast or 
(London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989), pp.89,90. 
107 The extract relevant to this statement is in Political Justice. "We are, by various 
causes, excluded from a minute observation of the progress of the infant mind, and 
therefore do not readily conceive by how imperceptible advances it arrives at a 
quickness of apprehension, relative to the simplest sentences. But we more easily 
remark its subsequent improvement, and perceive how long it is, before it can 
apprehend a discourse of considerable length, or a sentence of great abstraction" (PJ 
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"monster" and his self-reproach represent the impregnable and all too plastic mind that 
cannot thrust aside the remaining objects that prevent reason from arriving at "truth." 
This inability to confront the "boundless ocean" and process a rational selection of truth 
is most prominently stated in his famous passage: "Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them" (HN 415).108 
In contrast, the rationalist Godwin 109 dreamed of the world of the 
Houyhnhnms where law and government would be unnecessary.110 He resorts to reason 
and justice to extricate himself from the chain of association. With a tone of optimism in 
Political Justice, he unfolds a positive theory of human motivation. His distinction 
between direct and indirect motives allows him to affirm the existence of voluntary 
action, as he explains that the direct motive is "present to the mind of the agent at the 
time of his determination" (PJ 383). When he encourages the reader to acquire 
knowledge, the reader is to approach it with such an active or direct motive that one 
detaches oneself from the established habit of thinking or involuntary action. Godwin is 
never sceptical of knowledge and the human capacity to reach truth, and this he claims 
358). Italics added. 
108 Burton Ralph Pollin does not deny Hume's rationalist position completely. He 
writes, "Hume has still left the door open for the supremacy of reason, in that the 
initial perception of the value of the object, preceding the desire itself, can be deemed 
an intellectual or rational process." See Burton Pollin (1962), p.42. Pollin's assessment 
of Hume is fair because Hume does note the counterforce of reason which could 
contradict the initial passion: "'Tis possible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd 
by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the 
disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent" 
(HN415). 
109 Chris Jones admits some inconsistencies, but Godwin together with Wollstonecraft 
is classified in the same framework of radical Sensibility who took issue with the 
sentimental feelings ofthe conservative Sensibility. See Jones (1993), p.76. 
110 Robert Kieley The Roman tic Novel in England (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1972), p.85. 
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is communicated to the human mind through the "inlet of the senses": "if we acquire 
knowledge, we must open our eyes, and contemplate the universe" (PJ 413), and rise 
independently out of these feelings to think rationally. For Godwin, truth does not reside 
in such a frail character that is never capable of developing "fortitude," the strength 
which enables one to "grow[s] out of a sense of our difficulty of this independence" 
(ibid.). 
When Coleridge told Godwin that Coleridge was a "creature of mere Impact," 
at the same time suggesting that he lacked the "self-directing Principle," acknowledging 
his weakness in resisting external pressures and impulses, Godwin must have felt the 
need for Coleridge to change, or at least to build strength. III Weak and easily 
impressed as he was, Coleridge, using his bird-images, portrayed himself as a 
"self-caged" starling without motion and action, and therefore characterised himself as 
indolent. 112 Such self-containment as was directly associated with sensibility is 
reminiscent of Rousseau's or Yorick's aspiration to pastoral retreat and their 
self-alienation from society and commerce. This alienation, however, entails an element 
of pathos, as G.A.Starr maintains, and can be regarded as a cathartic reinforcement of 
the existing scheme of things rather than a challenge to it. II3 
The revelation of truth, for Godwin, is possible through communication, but 
whether the communication should be through reasoning or through an outpouring of 
affections that directly appeal to the addressee is left obscure. In Caleb Williams there 
remains a certain degree of ambivalence as to whether Godwin is or isn't registering the 
111 Richard Holmes believes that Coleridge's formidable self-indictment does not 
entirely escape the paradox of self-celebration, because Coleridge would rather explore 
and exploit his weaknesses than change them. See Coleridge: Early Visions. (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), p.315. 
112 Richard Holmes (1989), p.314. 
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influence of the feelings on what he means by reason and truth. Here we can detect the 
influence of Hume. Falkland's sensibility especially to his own crime is closely bound 
up with his interaction with Caleb's curic:.ls and sensitive mind. The relationship 
between sensibility and the truth-claims results in an epistemological questions of what 
is true, and an ethical problem of who is benevolent. In reading his Caleb Williams, my 
primary question must include, first, what is sensibility for Godwin, second, what is its 
relation to truth, human motive and knowledge, and, lastly, what do the MS ending and 
published ending signify in relation to these two questions? 
3. Falkland's Sensibility 
The novel form, Godwin writes, enabled him to do "the thing in which my imagination 
revelled the most freely ... the analysis of the private and internal operations of the 
mind, employing my metaphysical dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare the 
involutions of motive, and recording the gradually accumulating impulses."114 Godwin 
did not approve of revolution but was a supporter of "a gradual, but uninterrupted 
change" (P J 251) through reformation, which is a direct consequence of the 
improvement of the human mind. Human motive, for Godwin, was an essential 
component of political justice and what he perceived as truth. Originally titled Things as 
They are, or The Adventures of Caleb Williams, the novel can be called a political fable 
in which the question of change or progress is explored.115 The problem of human 
agency is treated within the fictional framework. Being a political campaigner against 
113 G.A.Starr, (1994), p.194. 
114 This line is quoted in William St Clair, (1989), p.119. 
115 George Sherburn writes that Caleb Williams is the only novel which 'deals with 
contemporary problems-with the bad state of "things as they are.'" St. Leon, for 
example, is a fantasy based on the superstitions and manners of the early Renaissance. 
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aristocratic society, Godwin shows the diverse social contexts which reveal the unjust 
imposition of despotic powers. 
Godwin's confessional style of narrative permits the narrator to deliver this 
truth, behind the curtain as it were. Godwin followed Thomas Paine in alluding to or 
parodying the veiled theatrical stage of aristocracy, behind which the truth is hidden. 
Paine compares "contemptible" monarchy to "something kept behind a curtain, about 
which there is a great deal of bustle and fuss, and a wonderful air of seeming 
solemnity," and Paine's drama is unquestionably a comedy whereby you "burst into 
laughter" when, by any accident, the curtain happens to be open.1l6 Godwin takes the 
political situation more sternly, and turns the comedy into "tragedy" (CW 79). The 
narrative of Caleb invites the reader to see not only the state of an outcast, but also his 
state of mind and his motives. The stage is set for his fate and not for that of Falkland, 
Emily or the Hawkinses. He "lift[s] the curtain"(ibid.) only when a narrative concerning 
his fate is to be disclosed, and not at the beginning of the novel. 
Caleb Williams, the hero and the narrator of the novel, is a man of common 
upbringing and with no important family name. The only thing he holds, his essential 
quality in the Godwinian sense, is his inquisitive mind: "I [Caleb] was not born indeed 
to the possession of hereditary wealth; but 1 had a better inheritance, an enterprising 
mind, an inquisitive spirit, a liberal ambition"( CW 255). Falkland, however, is a landed 
aristocrat, of considerable fame, fortune and name; he becomes the patron of Caleb after 
the latter's parents die. Within the novel, another narrative of Mr.Collins about the 
earlier history of Falkland is included. The first part of the novel is more or less based 
See "Godwin's Later Novels" in Studies in Romanticism. vol. I. No.2. 1962, p.65. 
116 Thomas Paine. The Rights of Man ed. Eric Foner (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1985), p.182. Hereafter cited as Rights of Man with page numbers in parentheses. 
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on Falkland's confrontation with Tyrrel, and through Mr.Collins's narrative, Caleb as 
well as the reader is acquainted with Falkland's "previous character" (CW 11). The 
narrative is gradually retrieved by Caleb's curiosity to know the truth. 
Tyrrel is depicted as a self-centred squire, whose general manner was "noisy 
and obstreperous, inattentive to others; and obstinate and unyielding, from an incapacity 
to conceive those finer feelings" (CW 47). The assessment of the character made by Mr 
Clare, with a relatively objective view, therefore seems to hold true. He characterises 
Tyrrel as boisterous, rugged and unfeeling (CW35). His vices (CW37) which are rooted 
in his insensibility are comparable to a typical villainous figure such as the "unfeeling" 
villain, Montoni, in The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794).117 On the other hand, sensitive 
Falkland had the reputation of having dignity and good humour, and perpetually paying 
attention to the happiness of others with his delicacy of sentiment. Mr.Clare's warning 
against Falkland's sensibility resonates with St.Aubert's warning to Emily of the 
dangers of sensibility, and is also premonitory: "you are too passionate, too acutely 
sensible of injury" (CW 35). There is evidently a moral divide between a man of feeling 
and one of unfeeling. Godwin's sentimental belief in benevolence as the strong source 
of pleasure is derived not just from the sentimentalist school of Shaftsbury or Hume, but 
from Hartley, who perceived moral good as arising from the instinctive pleasure of 
contributing to the welfare of others. Sentimental virtue derives from an outpouring of 
117 The virtuous St.Aubert expotulates Emily about the importance of feeling while 
warning against the dangers of Sensibility. He says, "you see, my dear, that though I 
would guard you against the dangers of sensibility, I am not an advocate for apathy. At 
your age I should have said that is a vice more hateful that all the errors of sensibility, 
and I say so still." See Ann Radcliffe The Mysteries of Udolpho ed.Bonamy Dobree 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1970), p.SO. Hereafter cited as MUwith page 
numbers in parentheses. 
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sympathy aroused by a particular spectacle118 that impresses the sensitive subject. At 
least the "previous Mr.Falkland" and Emily can be characterised as a morally superior 
and benevolent subject of sensibility. 
The relationship between the tyranical Tyrrel and the victimised Emily may be 
seen as prefiguring the later relationship between Falkland and Caleb in that despotic 
Tyrrel and Falkland manipulate the power of wealth and the law. The antagonistic 
relation between the two squires, Falkland and Tyrrel, produces a political tension 
openly in public, whereas the aggressive revenge or unjustifiable "defense" of Falkland 
against Caleb Williams, is scrupulously disguised and hidden from the community of 
people, because the former's social position allows him to do so. Godwin sets this secret 
between them as "truth," which is not fully and justly revealed before the public until 
the novel's conclusion. As Tysdahl asserts, '''the social criticism embedded in the story 
is coherent" in ternlS of class: power rests with landowners who only too easily find that 
might is right.' 119 
Emily with "an uncommon degree of sensibility" (CW 39) is reminiscent of 
Emily St.Aubert in Udolpho, but her character is more that of a typical Gothic heroine 
than of a benevolent and virtuous leader, being confined, though not in a medieval 
castle, in Tyrrel Place and deceived into a trap contrived by Tyrrel and the impetuous 
wooer Grimes. Tyrrel's infernal scheme against his own cousin has no other motive 
except his feeling of envy and jealousy against Falkland's virtuous disposition and fame. 
Tyrrel's revenge against Falkland was directed towards Emily, and occurred through the 
legal action of prosecuting her for failing to pay him a debt. This triggered her illness 
118 Janet Todd, Sensibility:An Introduction (London and New York: Methuen, 1986), 
p.140. 
119 B.J.Tysdahl, William Godwin as Novelist (London: Athlone, 1981), p.35. 
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and later death. 
According to Hm1ley's treatise, those with sensibility are compassionate, and 
grieve and feel for the misery of others (OM i 475). Such a scene involving Emily's 
tragic death which Falkland observed was "most exquisitely agonizing to a man of his 
acute sensibility" (CW 86). As Hartley writes, "Persons whose nerves are easily irritable, 
and those who have experienced great Trials and Afflictions, are, in general, more 
disposed to Compassion than others" (OM i 475, italics added), Godwin's sensitive hero 
cannot bear the spectacle. 
Hawkins, a tenant-farmer, perceives that "the law was better adapted for a 
weapon of tyranny in the hands of the rich" (CW 73), and this is proven right later by 
Tyrrel's despotism inflicted upon himself. The emphatic point is made in the novel that 
Falkland is portrayed as an equal to Tyrrel, while Emily, being an orphan daughter of 
Tyrrel's aunt, and Hawkins a mere farmer, possess no means to free themselves from the 
slavish oppression. The social or class relations render both Emily and Hawkins 
materially dependent upon Tyrrel's benevolent charity or justice which he does not offer, 
and they are at the mercy of Tyrrel's "order" and his decisions. 
Tyrrel seems to possess the character of the typical tyrant, and cannot stand any 
equals. His driving force for the evil prosecution of Emily is one of Hartley'S four 
classes of sympathetic affections, those by which we grieve for the Happiness of others 
(OM i 482). These feelings are called emulation and envy,120 and Tyrrel's heart was 
120 Hartley's detailed account of this feelings is given thus: "These are founded in the 
Desire of Pleasures, Honours, Riches, Power, &c.; and the consequent engrossing what 
others desire, losing what they obtain, in a Comparison of our own Acquisitions with 
those of others &c.; by which the Happiness of others is connected with our Misery; so 
that at last we become uneasy at their Happiness, even where there is no such 
Connexion; i.e. emulate and envy where our own Interest is no-ways concerned" (OMi 
482). 
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burning with such "mean jealousy" (CW 65). Falkland visits him to reason with him 
suggesting that they should not interfere with each others' business and let each suffer 
the other to pursue his own track unmolested: "We neither of us wish to change roads" 
(CW29). This is clearly referring to the line from Political Justice. 
"[ A man's] progress must be upon the plain line of reason and truth. As long 
as he keeps the open road, his journey is prosperous and promising; but, if he 
tum aside into by-paths, he will soon come to a point where there is no longer 
either avenue or track" (P J 501, italics added). 
Falkland well remembers Mr.Clare's admonition to stay on the track of reason; "Beware 
ofMr.Tyrrel," (CW34) "I would have you governed by reason and justice" (CW35). 
What does this expostulation signify in relation to assessing the nature of 
sensibility? When set against Godwin's metaphor of "the open road" in Political Justice, 
Falkland's approach to the vices ofTyrrel seems to suggest that he is strictly adhering to 
reason and uninterrupted intellectual thinking. Nevertheless, as Mr.Clare anticipates, 
Falkland's overwhelming passions defy this rule, and he "has come to a point where 
there is no longer either avenue or track." Falkland later confesses to Caleb, "I am the 
murderer of Tyrrel" (CW 135), and the actual diversion leading to his murdering Tyrrel 
gives him yet more pain. His imagination is easily excited by even a mention of this 
case, and his burying himself in solitude (CW 109) is one way of escaping external 
stimuli that involantarily excite his nerves. 
As Caleb's suspicion of Falkland's crime grows, however, the former's act of 
spying and curious and aggressive remarks provoke Falkland and "touched the spring 
that wakened madness in [his] mind." (CW 117). There are numerous references to the 
involuntary movement of the nerves or springs in relation to Falkland's crime and his 
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conscience. When Falkland, as an auditor, confronts the similar situation to his own 
murder case, his minute bodily reaction to the scene is recorded. 
He [Falkland] at one time started with astonishment, and at another shifted his 
posture like a man who is unable longer to endure the sensations that press 
upon him. Then he new strung his nerves to stubborn patience. I could see, 
while his muscles preserved an inflexible steadiness, tears of anguish roll 
down his cheeks. He dared not trust his eyes to glance towards the side of the 
room where I stood; .... (CW 129) 
In this passage we can observe Godwin's attempt to dissect Falkland's bodily 
interaction of the nerves without the intervention of his wilL The sensations overtake 
Falkland, however strenuously he keeps them in control, and "tears" become a sign of 
his sensible constitution that does not betray the chain or association of his past deed. It 
is through observing it that Caleb's suspicion towards Falkland becomes ever stronger, 
and he finally recognises that Hawkins has been wrongly accused. Caleb's sensibility is 
quick to perceive that for Falkland the word "murder" is "the master key that wakes 
distemper" (CW 126), the "key" that causes a vibration of the nerves. We may perceive 
this idea of "murder" as a Hartleyian vibratiuncle, 121 which is begotten in the 
medullary substance in the brain after a repeated sensory vibration. Caleb's presence 
will act on Falkland's nervous system and stimulate his acute sensibility towards his 
crime, because the presence of Caleb for Falkland is a reminder of truth122 or his 
121 Vibratiuncles are "a disposition to diminutive Vibrations" and these are begot in the 
medullary Substance of the Brain after certain sensory vibrations are repeated 
frequently enough (OMi 58). 
122 Caleb's inquisitive mind and his search for truth is a threat to Mr. Falkland not only 
in realistic terms, but also in their biblical connotation. Marilyn Butler notes that 
Caleb is named after the spy whom Moses sent into the Promised Land-aptly, since 
curiosity is his chief quality, the search for truth his goaL See JaneAusten and the lfEr 
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conscious guilt which is chained to his murder. Falkland is afraid of the sight of Caleb: 
he "dared not trust" his own eyes. 
Such a man as Falkland himself confesses that he values his reputation, "My 
life has been spent in the keenest and most unintermitted sensibility to reputation" (CW 
101). His fear of his crime becoming public knowledge is so great that he would rather 
have Caleb under his perpetual supervision than have himself "insulted, disgraced, 
polluted in the face of hundreds" (CW 135). Caleb's pursuit of truth with his thirst of 
knowledge thus caused the necessary consequence; as Falkland's claims "[a]ll are but 
links of one chain" (ibid.). One event, a blow from Tyrrel, leads to another, a murder, 
and the next business, he says, is to defend himself. In the novel, chains are used also as 
a metaphor of sympathetic relations between contiguous ideas or sentiments within one 
individual. Caleb describes his involuntary sympathy; "One sentiment flows by 
necessity of nature into another sentiment of the same general character" (CW 133). 
Godwinian rationality is on the whole based on "foresight" or "probability" and the 
links of the chain signify the acts, events, or thoughts that are logically associated. 
4. Validity of Truth 
Godwin's understanding of a person's character shares the same logic. He defines the 
word 'character' in Political Justice as "the result of a long series of impressions, 
communicated to a person's mind and modifying it in a certain manner, so as to enable 
us, a number of these modifications and impressions being given, to predict his 
conduct" (PJ 341).123 It is therefore suggested that people's expectation about one's 
of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.71. 
123 Godwin makes a more elaborate analysis of human character in relation to what he 
perceives as "true history" in "Essay on History and Romance" (1797). He writes, "True 
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conduct is based on the already acquired knowledge of that person, which establishes an 
idea of that person's "character." Falkland's change in character therefore perplexes 
Caleb's rational inquiry: "No two characters can be in certain respects more strongly 
contrasted, than the Falkland of a date prior and subsequent to these events," (CW 97) 
after the trial of the murder case. "Previous Falkland" was heroic and his quick change 
into "anti-hero" is one of the novel's stark impression which also bewilders the 
audience-reader. His character, his act of murder and his enslaving of Caleb are all 
hidden behind the public scene, and "the reign of triumphant falshood" (CW 302) gives 
the deceptive image of Falkland. It is the reader's "curiosity," according to Godwin, that 
is required in the investigation of a character: "he[the genuine scholar] is ever upon the 
watch for further, and still further particulars. Trembling for his own fallibility and 
frailty, he employs every precaution to guard himself against them" (EHR 294). Godwin 
himself boasts, in studying historical figures, "I am not contented to observe such a man 
upon the public stage, I would follow him into his closet" (ibid.). This is precisely what 
Caleb is up to. When pursuing evidences of Falkland's crime, he goes through 
Falkland's drawers in his private room stealing a glance at his letters (CW 114,5). 
Godwin's circumspect approach to investigating character or truth is a severe 
critique of the duplicity of a person with rank and wealth. Once in the habit of looking 
up to him as a kind and benevolent ruler or landowner, not only the people of his society 
in the fictional world, but we, the readers, become reluctant to accept anything different. 
history consists in a delineation of consistent, human character, in a display of the 
manner in which such a character acts under successive circumstances, in showing 
how character increases and assimilates new substances to its own, and how it decays, 
together with the catastrophe into which by its own gravity it naturally declines." See 
'Essay of History and Romance' in Political and Philosophical Writings of William 
Godwin. 1101.5: Educational and Literary Writings. ed. Pamela Clemit (London: William 
Pickering, 1993), p.301. Hereafter cited as EHRwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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The heroic chivalric virtue of Falkland is stressed throughout the first part of the novel, 
when he rescues Emily dip laying his power in its best aspect. When his character is 
changed, we are at once led to doubt its coherence, just as Caleb is confounded. 
However there is certainly a contradiction in this method. While Godwin 
makes Caleb rely on Falkland's changed "character" as the principal reason to suspect 
him as the real culprit, he also makes Caleb's detection count on the reliable and 
supposedly coherent and innocent "character" of Hawkins. Caleb cannot understand the 
inconsistency of Hawkins's character: "So firm, so sturdily honest and just, as he 
appeared at first; all at once to become a murderer!" (CW 107) 
There is still another tum to this argument. The judgement of Caleb's character 
itself made by people (including those he associated with during his service to Falkland), 
after his falsely being accused of theft, is wholly based on his status as a criminal, an 
outcast of society. The only impartial or potentially impartial judge, other than the 
penetrating Brightwel and Mr. Raymond, is the reader. Hence, the predicament of Caleb 
in the second part of the novel is also the predicament of truth. The truth that Caleb's 
narrative sustains is set against a series of falsehoods which are put to trial. 
In the first instance where Caleb's truth is tried, Caleb challenges Falkland's 
sense of justice and his conscious guilt. There is certainly a touch of naivety in Caleb in 
believing Falkland's sense of justice, and in calling upon Falkland to be his evidence 
(CW 169) and putting his life and reputation at risk in doing so. This may be an allusion 
to a theme of the father-son metaphor of the monarchy and people in Political Justice, 
in which Godwin shows "what it is like to be terrorised within existing society, by the 
very father-figures whom Burke idealises."124 In this situation, no one except Caleb 
124 Marilyn Butler, Burke, Paine, Godwin, and the Revolution Controversy 
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and Falkland can perceive or know the truth that Caleb is not guilty of theft. Caleb's 
sentimental address to Falkland, however, merely meets with the latter's cold response 
and duplicity. When Falkland accuses Caleb of using the language of "romance" and not 
of reason (CW 175), the former who in youth was much in love with the concept of 
chivalry, is turning his back on his own virtue. In this case, truth fails; Caleb knows the 
truth about Falkland and Falkland lies about him, but it is Falkland, the landowner, who 
gains credance unquestioningly from the party concerned, while Caleb is persecuted and 
imprisoned as a result of this. 
When put into jail, Caleb meets Brightwel, also a victim of society's injustice. 
"He heard my story, as far as I thought proper to disclose it, with interest, he examined 
it with sincere impartiality, and, if at first any doubt remained upon his mind, a frequent 
observation of me in my most unguarded moments taught him in no long time to place 
an unreserved confidence in my innocence" (CW 192). The impartiality is being 
emphasised in this case, as with Mr Raymond, the leader of robbers. Mr Raymond 
knows that Caleb "is not guilty of what is laid to his charge" (CW 223). Rationalising 
Caleb's statement, he comments that his escape is no confirmation of his guilt, and, 
what is more, there is no one fool enough to volunteer to stand trial to prove his 
innocence unless he is innocent. 
The cases of Laura and Mr Collins further reveal the nature of truth and its 
relation with sensibility. One of the most paradoxical arguments in Godwin's theory 
concerns the pursuit of knowledge. Although his sensationalist approach to the 
knowledge of truth is wholly dependent on a person's sensible disposition, "quickness 
of apprehension," because this same sensibility renders the subject acutely aware of his 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), p.150. 
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or her vulnerability to the "contamination of regressive institutions,"125 he or she is not 
to blame for the flight from knowledge which is potentially hannful to or representative 
of the "reign of triumphant falsehood" in the person's character. The question is, how 
can one attain the sense of independence in making his or her judgement? The 
impracticability of Godwin's ambition about "the naked strength of the will to 
emancipate ourselves from the force of habit" is suggested by William Hazlitt, who 
compares Godwin's quest to the passage to "the Arctic Circle and Frozen Regions 
where the understanding is no longer warmed by the affections."126 Hazlitt's critique of 
cold reason which is independent of affection has a Rousseauvian tinge. In The 
Confessions, Rousseau attacks Count de Saint Pierre's moral writings which say that 
men are motivated by their intelligence rather than by their passions; although Rousseau 
acknowledges the usefulness of the idea, he believes it "impracticable" (Confessions 
381). 'Practical' Rousseau, on the other hand, acknowledges the effect of the external 
world, including that of climate, seasons, sounds, colours, darkness, light, the elements, 
food, noise, silence, movement, repose and so on, as controlling those feelings which 
we allow to dominate at their very onset (ibid.). Godwin's ambition is to reverse this 
tide by asserting that truth is omnipotent: "If truth, when properly displayed, be 
omnipotent, then neither climate nor lUXUry are invincible obstacles" (P J 146). 
Hartley's famous proposition about regulating and improving external 
impressions has had an influence on the Romantic belief in the "return to nature" 
(Confessions 381). Mr Clare, the poet, in many ways reminds us of a romantic solitary 
wanderer depicted by Rousseau, and his independence of mind we may presume is 
125 Chris Jones, (1997), p.78. 
126 William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age: or Contemporary Portraits (1825) in Lives of 
The Great Romantics: voLl ed. Pamela Clemit. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999), 
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drawn not only from his disposition but the solitary life he leads. Godwin seems to be 
praising this quality in Mr Clare, but, if his clearness or purity of mind is not separate 
from the conception of avoiding the 'evil' influences that contaminate his mind, Laura's 
case should be justified on the same premise, namely to be conscious of "proper 
Adjustment of the Impressions and Associations" (Confessions 381). 
Laura's remote retirement in the country has the same Rousseauvian 
implication that there is a need to control and adjust the environment to limit incoming 
sense-impressions. The rural life of Laura's family has a paradisiacal image, in which 
only benevolent and harmless people coexist with Nature: "Among people thus remote 
from the bustle of human life there is an open spirit of confidence, by means of which, a 
stranger easily finds access to their benevolence and good will" (CW 290). Laura's 
decision to eschew the encounter with Caleb long after attaching her affections to his 
"amiable" character was ironically based on "the sentiments of unbounded esteem" for 
Falkland. Laura had been accustomed to thinking of him only in favourable terms. 
Godwin seems to be vindicating the knowledge that is communicated through the 
senses and not based on the prejudice of society. However, Laura is too timid to 
enteliain these senses because she is afraid Caleb, with his skills and eloquence, might 
inflict "deceptive influence" upon her mind. Hence, the imperfect society which 
Godwin condemns can make sensitive characters withdraw from knowledge. Laura, 
with "a wonderful quickness of eye, and rapidity of apprehension" (CW 292) chooses to 
block the influence altogether when reading the fiction of "miraculous adventures of 
Caleb Williams" (CW 268). The fabricated story of Caleb Williams which Laura 
unsuspectingly reads influences her mind before she hears his story directly told by 
p.53. 
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himself. 
Woman's sensibility in the late eighteenth century is epitomised in the figure of 
Laura. Her credulity over the fictive narrative and the dangerous influence of novels 
upon her mind becomes linked with the metaphysical frailty of her body. Godwin 
clearly states that women have a frame of body more delicate and susceptible of 
impression than men, and, "in proportion as they receive a less intellectual education, 
are more unreservedly under the empire of feeling."127 The gender implication that 
women's body is weaker than men's is articulated by the former's inability to 
subordinate passions or feelings that are generated by impressions made upon the body. 
Laura's positive characteristic as having a "wonderful quickness of eye, and rapidity of 
apprehension" falls back on the same female credulity that is directly associated with 
her weakness. 
It seems that Godwin's portraiture of female characters has strong resonance 
with Robert Whytt who believed that people with a more delicate bodily constitution are 
more exposed to the impressions made on the mind or "excited by the action of external 
objects" (ON 51, 115). Most ofthese writers held a gender-specific view about the body 
and its relation with the sensibility of the whole nervous system. Emily's nervous 
disorder, we may say, is explained chiefly by her weak and delicate body which is 
susceptible to external impressions. When she is harassed by her cousin, Tyrrel, with 
unjust persecution, the "painful and incredible reality that was thus presented, 
effectually dissipated the illusions of frenzy to which she had just been a prey" (CW84). 
Aged and weakened, Mr Collins is effeminised in his characterisation. When 
127 William Godwin, Memoirs of the Author of The Rights ofWoman'(1798) ed. 
Richard Holmes (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1987), p.276. Hereafter cited as 
Memoirs with page numbers in parentheses. 
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he refuses to hear Caleb's story, his fear of knowing it suggests withered "fortitude," 
which Godwin claims is the precondition for discerning truth (PJ 413): "now in his 
declining years, his own fortitude shrunk from itT' (CW 311). Caleb's address to Laura 
runs through the whole Godwinian notion of knowledge versus ignorance, or experience 
versus innocence: "Can you believe then, that ignorance is the only, or the safest, 
preservation of integrity?" (CW 300). By calling into question the very notion of 
knowledge, he is challenging both the regressive attitude towards enlightenment 
knowledge, and the biblical association of knowledge with sin. This is implicitly noted 
in Godwin's Political Justice: "Innocence is not virtue. Virtue demands the active 
employment of an ardent mind in the promotion of the general good" (PJ 153). 
The published ending, where Caleb's obstinate pursuit of truth is finally made 
fruitful, is "better Godwin"(xx) as McCracken suggests, precisely because of the 
coherence in Godwin's doctrine. When Caleb's true story is finally disclosed, or his 
truth that Falkland was "indeed the murderer of Tyrrel" (CW 321) is "confessed" (CW 
314) in public, justice is done. Godwin seems to be saying that it is not Caleb's emotion 
laid bare before people that gives conviction, but "a faithful narrative" that is being 
unfolded in the court. In the manuscript ending the whole truth is crushed in the hands 
of the despots who conspire with the law and so buried. 
In Political Justice, Godwin often personifies truth, and to some extent confers 
"power" on that truth. Rather than the audience assessing the truthfulness of a story, the 
"force of truth" influences or even overwhelms their mind (P J 142, 13 7). This rhetoric 
causes confusion as to where he locates agency. Hence the question, "does truth come 
forward by itself or active operation of the human mind is the only agent that 
understands and judges?" Therefore Paul Hamilton finds a paradox in the published 
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ending of Caleb U'illiams. The paradox lies in Caleb's having a confidence in the 
integrity of public credence which is more than hypothetical, coexisting with a profound 
scepticism concerning the existing means of communicating the truth. 128 The "faithful 
narrative" of truth which Caleb tells gains the credence of the public as it were, but we 
are left to wonder whether it was his "cool reason" (CW 319) that persuaded the 
audience or his "penitence" and "grief and compunction" (CW 324) that found rapport 
with their feeling. This brings us back to the same question, "Is truth communicated 
through reason or feeling?" Thus the nature of the audience's conviction or belief in "a 
faithful narrative" remains unexplained. 
The Godwinian truth, as he himself maintains, IS grounded on human 
motivation. Since one motive leads to another, one act, or event to another, making the 
chain of connection, Godwin is not without conviction that truth is inevitably traced 
back, or the curtain unveiled. Falkland and Caleb both either voluntarily or involuntarily 
cut themselves off from society. The former stays away from society to veil his past 
conduct, and the latter runs away because he failed to adequately present himself in 
relation to his past suspicious conduct. However the chain of mind strongly connects 
each with his own internal history, and perhaps more with each other. Life without 
sociability leaves them to reflect on their past memories. These two individuals 
demonstrate opposite cases where the former suffers from the memory of the past which 
is inevitably chained to his mind, and the latter is saved and amused because he is able 
to retrieve through memory his pleasant past. Falkland "bur[ies] himself in 
solitude"( 1 09) to evade any impression made upon his sensitive mind, so as not to 
128 Paul Hamilton quotes from John Thelwall, The Tribune 3 vols (London, 1795-6) 
pp.42,3, pp.101-5. See 'Coleridge and Godwin in the 1790s'in The Coleridge 
Connection: Essays for Thomas McFarland eds. R.Gravil and M.Lefebure (London: 
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recover his past memories. Falkland's melancholic state was a consequence of turning 
his feelings back into himself and not letting them out: "Nothing could reach the heart 
of Falkland. He was not insensible to the general kindness and exertions; but it was too 
evident that the melancholy that had taken hold of his mind was invincible" (CW 101). 
Caleb's melancholic reflections of his "imprisoned" circumstances, on the other hand, 
are, overcome with the power of his mind to liberate himself from external degradation. 
Amongst his melancholic reflections, he "tasked [his] memory, and counted over the 
doors, the locks, the bolts, the chains, the massy walls and grated windows that were 
between me and liberty" (CW 181). Caleb's fettered state and susceptibility to the outer 
world are most cleverly fused in the same image. However, he was not fettered with the 
conscious guilt that took hold of Falkland: "In solitude we can pursue our own thoughts 
undisturbed; and I[Caleb] was able to call up at will the most pleasing avocations" (CW 
201). 
Thus, Godwin pennits the notion of chain to reach out to both painful and 
pleasing effects according to necessary consequences. This is where the Godwinian 
virtue that "good is a general name, including pleasure ... [and] evil is a general name, 
including pain" (P J 390) is most incisively expressed in the novel, because it is a sign of 
virtue that Caleb's pleasing thought is retrieved even in a dreary dungeon, while 
Falkland's painful recollection points to his past crime. 
Or can this be vice? Falkland's sensitivity to all external impressions associated 
with his crime is in one sense a testimony to his guilt, and this is what differentiates him 
from the unfeeling Montoni. Caleb makes the most overt tribute to Falkland's character 
and his accomplishment, and this is unaltered even after Falkland obstinately pursued 
Macmillan, 1990), p.49. 
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and persecuted Caleb for unjustifiable reasons: "1 proclaim to all the world that Falkland 
is a man worthy of affection and kindness, and that 1 am myself the basest and most 
odious of mankind!" (CW323) 
Caleb's eulogising of Falkland does call into question Godwin's attitude 
towards sentimentalism, as some critics equate the former's love for the latter with that 
for the father and the God. Storch argues that the novel is a Calvinistic study of the 
psychology of rebelliousness and the guilt it entails.129 Given that the core interest in 
Godwin's study of minds lies in his obsession with guilt,130 we are made to wonder 
with whose guilt it is that we are to sympathise. Godwin celebrates the inquisitive 
mind's search for truth. His notion of a true character is always towards the exoneration 
of "misrepresentation" (CW 112), and this he says is only achieved with curiosity and 
passion. Caleb's curiosity, which is never satiated, trails Falkland's guilty conscience. In 
other words, Caleb successfully finds where the true character of Falkland lies, namely 
in his private room. However Godwin makes him call this incessant pursuit of truth "a 
mistaken thirst of knowledge" (CW 133), clearly a negative statement. Caleb's guilt at 
being "a cool, deliberate, unfeeling murderer" (CW 323) of Falkland by exposing the 
truth in court, therefore, reproaches Godwin's own discourse of reason. What triumphs 
in the end is not adamantine truth for which Caleb so infinitely yearned, but that which 
contradicts his conviction. 
As Pollin cogently points out, "there is irony in the situation; Godwin, the cold 
rationalist, is now to be attacked for advocating too much feeling."131 By having 
129 This annotation is a reference made in Marilyn Butler's article, "Godwin, Burke, 
and Caleb Williams" in Essays in Criticism. vol.32 (1982), p.240. 
130 George Sherburn, "Godwin's later novels" in Studies in Romanticsm vol. 1 (1962), 
p.82. 
131 Burton Ralph Pollin (1962), p.221. 
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recourse to the current practices of his day in using the language and the character type 
typical of the sensibility movement, his doctrine ends up straddling reason and feeling. 
Thus Godwin whose rationalist theory depends on one's ability to extricate oneself from 
the chain of association loses his point of departure. Is it possible for the "sense of 
independence" or reason to rise above spontaneous feelings or passions? Caleb was 
deprived of "Sympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of our life" (CW 308), 
when cut off from the friendship of mankind. Inability to communicate the truth to 
Laura and Mr Collins meant, for Caleb, "solitide, separation, banishment" (CW 303). 
Caleb's predicament started off as his pursuit of independent truth, but stumbled on his 
realisation that what truly counts is not an individual's knowledge of truth but its 
communication to another: "The pride of philosophy has taught us to treat man as an 
individual. He is no such thing. He holds, necessarily, indispensibly, to his species. He is 
like those twin-births, that have two heads indeed, and four hands; but, if you attempt to 
detach them from each other, they are inevitably subjected to miserable and lingering 
destruction" (CW303). 
Caleb Williams, written immediately after Political Justice, shares the same 
political ideas and theoretical basis of the earlier work. Godwinian sensibility draws 
upon the sentimental notion of sensitivity, and Mr. Falkland is portrayed as a character of 
feeling. A person of acute sensibility, however, in Godwinian terms, is inclined to 
"tremble" or be swayed by his vibration or emotions triggered by both external and 
internal impressions. What constitutes virtue, benevolence and truth becomes elusive by 
Caleb's feeling of guilt of accusing Falkland's incoherent "character." Although, by 
showing Caleb's unrelenting will and motive in the tale of perseverance, Godwin attest 
to the immutable truth (P J 117), Godwin's own sensibility is tom in two when this his 
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protagonist Caleb cannot make his truth claim "immutable" to all the spectators without 
his emotional appeal. 
3 
'Machine of the human life' 
in William Godwin's St. Leon 
The Enlightenment which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines. 132 
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The machine of human life, though constituted of a thousand parts, is in all its parts 
regularly and systematically connected; nor is it easy to insert an additional member, the 
spuriousness of which an accurate observation will not readily detect. How was I to assign 
a source of my wealth different from the true, which would not be liable to investigation, 
and, when investigated, would not be seen to be counterfeit? 133 
In Caleb Williams Godwin shows how the mind is chained to the feelings triggered by 
various impressions. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, he is acutely aware of 
the links that the nerve system makes between interior and exterior associations. 
Godwin's perennial interest in "physicalized" associationism also formed the 
centrepiece of St. Leon (1799). In St.Leon we can see that he is increasingly focused on 
the chronological or predictive aspect of associationism, the "machine of human life" 
whose parts are all "regularly and systematically connected." This scientific 
phraseology suggests the treat-life-as-an-experiment attitude recommended by Hume. 
All our reasonings concerning the probability of causes are founded on the 
132 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1979), p.222. 
133 William Godwin, St Leon ed.Pamela Clemit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
pp.198, 199. Henceafter cited as SLwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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transferring of past to future. The transferring of any past experiment to the 
future is sufficient to give us a view of the object; whether that experiment be 
single, or combin'd with others of the same kind; whether it be entire, or 
oppos'd by others of a contrary kind. (HN 13 7, 13 8) 
Ann Jessie Van Sant presents Hume as an experimenter of human nature, and states that 
this tendency is not just his idiosyncrasy, but should be seen as part of a wider, cultural 
pattem of experimentation. 134 Although Hume conceives the notion of experience as a 
means for experiment on conjectural or probable reasonings based on the past, he is 
hesitant to accept that past experience produces "any belief or assurance" for the future. 
He maintains, "[o]ur past experience presents no determinate object; and as our belief, 
however faint, fixes itself on a determinate object, 'tis evident that the belief arises not 
merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy 
conjoin'd with it" (HN 140). 
The pivotal question is, to what extent does Godwin allow this philosophical 
question to dominate the narrative of St. Leon. Does it assume the status of a literary 
experiment in the study of the mind? The novel is based on a Gothic plot where the hero 
and narrator, Reginald St. Leon, is endowed with immortality and a supematural power 
that produces unbounded wealth. The nascent concept of the "machine of human life" is 
already developed in Caleb Williams, but Godwin "steer[s] clear of the supematural,,135 
in his first novel, for Caleb's capacity for "foresight" and estimating "probability" was 
predicated on tracing the "natural" process of a lawful necessity that enables him to 
134 Ann Jessie Van Sant presents Boswell as an experimenter also, combining 
"scientific curiosity and romantic imagination." See Eighteenth-Century Sensibility 
and the Novel: The Sense in Social Context, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp.54-56. 
135 B.J.Tysdahl, (1981), p.84. 
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judge Falkland's coherence in his conduct. Godwin has shown how Falkland's sudden 
change alerts Caleb to a certain doubt about the truthfulness of his character. Therefore 
there is an aspect in the super-natural theme used in St. Leon that belies the 
commonsensical reasoning on which Godwin's philosophy of justice depends. As 
Tysdahl has pointed out, "there is absolutely no short-cut to truth through metaphysical 
revelations" using Gothic themes, and Godwin also argues that such a technique may be 
inadequate for demonstrating truth based on the rationalist principles described in 
Political Justice. 
This is not to say that St. Leon lacks the authenticity of Caleb's narrative. In 
fact St. Leon strongly asserts the truthfulness of his tale: "I have laid it down to myself 
in this narrative as a sacred principle, to relate the simple, unaltered truth" (SL 30). In St. 
Leon, therefore, the role of the narrator is to stitch together the incongruous Gothic 
elements, while providing a gap between himself and the commonsensical others who 
view him as a deviant or "monster" (SL 211). Moreover, this technique of allowing 
supernatural powers to the protagonist does show some different points about Godwin's 
experiment on the operation of the mind, which is strongly reflected in the way St. Leon 
accumulates his memory through a long history of his life. 
Even though Godwin's idea of the integrity of a character is based on a 
"mechanical" concept of life, he also equates a person's "frailty" with the mechanical 
metaphor of the body. This theme runs through not only St. Leon but his later novel, 
Fleetwood (1805);136 and both novels are concerned with the weakness of the human 
mind which inhibits the formation of a virtuous character. 137 Godwin's ambivalence lies 
136 William Godwin, Fleetwood: Or the Man of Feeling (London: William Pickering, 
1992). Henthforth cited as FWwith page numbers in parentheses. 
137 While the dominant sensibility of St. Leon is Gothic, which foreshadows Mary 
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in the usage of the word "machine." The truthfulness of St. Leon's story depends on the 
rational account that faithfully describes the logical progression of the law of nature. 
This machine implies that one part of human history is tightly knit with other parts, 
giving reliability to its story, though his narrative is disbelieved precisely because his 
power is beyond the comprehension of the general public. 
Ironically, the same mechanistic image is used to portray the unreliable or 
passive nature of habits such as gambling or desire for lUxury and splendour, and these 
are depicted as if they were a disease. This latter meaning is reminiscent of the rhetoric 
used by an eighteenth-century medical man, Robert Jones, who perceives the human 
body as being unpredictable and subject to various external influences. 
The human machine was nothing in itself, but in constant and momentary 
dependence upon a number of powers, perfectly distinct from it, the operation 
of which was necessary to its existence. 138 
It is because the body is analogised to a machine that the notion of self becomes 
philosophically problematic for Godwin, as I have discussed in the first chapter. There 
was a widespread consensus about the logical progression (from healthy state to 
diseased condition) that could be explained by the laws of nature, and their application 
to moral philosophy generated doubts about a regular succession of causes and effects 
in life. Is the life of an animate being simply sustained or "forced" into actions by 
Shelley's production of Frankenstein, Fleetwood is closer to the Romantic exploration 
and description of the emotive self. Gary Kelly uses Wordsworth's 'Lines left upon a 
Seat in a Yew-tree' in drawing the parallel between the this novel and Romantic poetry. 
Wordsworth's solitary wanderer inhabits the same site, the English Lakes, visited by 
Fleetwood in his misanthropic wanderings, and where he meets his future wife. See 
Gary Kelly's The English Jacobin Novel 1780-1805. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 
p.241. 
138 Robert Jones, An inquiry into the state of medicine, on the principles ofinductive 
pmlosophy; with an appendix containing cases and observations, (Edinburgh, 
T.Longman and T. Cadell, London, C. Elliott, 1781), p.92. 
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vanous stimuli, and hence no different from its inanimate counterpart? Hume's 
scepticism arises from this perception of a self that is made up of external stimuli, and 
the same mechanistic image perhaps throws some light on Reid's commitment to the 
opposite view that accepts the independence of human will from its mechanism. 
There is an interlocking relationship between the way in which Godwin 
portrays the diseased body and the self in this noveL In this chapter, I want to set a 
theoretical framework for Godwin's rationalism as celebrating "maturity"-the 
end-product being St.Leon-and later show how the narrative disrupts its principle from 
within. I will explore how the mechanistic way of thinking about habits in medical 
discourse penetrated the philosophical notion of the self and the principles of human 
action, causing such disruption. I approach Godwin's St. Leon as a historical echo of the 
medical engagement that can be observed III the works of 
Samuel-Auguste-Andre-David Tissot, chiefly Essay on the Disorders of People of 
Fashion,139 and Thomas Trotter's An Essay, Medical Philosophical, and Chemical, on 
k 140 Drun enness. 
1. Habits as Mechanical Principle 
What differentiates Godwin's rationalist position from Hume's scepticism may be that 
in Political Justice Godwin believes in "the perfection of the human character [which] 
consists in approaching as nearly as possible to the perfectly voluntary state" (P J 127), 
139 S.A. Tissot, An Essay on the Disorders of People of Fashion; and a Treatise on the 
Dieases Incident to Litrary and Sedentary Persons. Translated From the last French 
Edition: By a Physician (Edinburgh, 1772). Henceafter cited as ED with page numbers 
in parentheses. 
140 Thomas Trotter, An Essay, MedicaL Philosophical, and Chemical, on Drunkenness, 
and Its Effects on the Human Body. (London, 1804). Henceafter cited as Drunkenness 
with page numbers in parentheses. 
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and he looks upon the maturing of the mind as gradually enabling the rational principles 
of action to discipline the mechanical principles of the body. In this respect the story of 
St. Leon who is endowed with an infinite length of life would testify to or contradict 
Godwin's theoretical conjecture by hypothetically creating an immortal who outlives 
ordinary human beings. Godwin's theoretical approach has much more resonance with 
Thomas Reid's theory than with Hume's. In his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 
which emphasises the sequential aspect of the self and its predictive ability to perceive 
and determine one's future from past experiences, Reid salvages the self from the law of 
mechanism. Godwin similarly weighs voluntary will against "mechanical" actions, and 
also associates foresight with voluntary action. The principal philosophical question 
here is whether the self is able to rise above its mechanical actions, which Reid calls 
"habits" or "custom," or is left to bury itself under their forces. 
Amongst Reid's three categories or principles of human action (APM 544), 
"mechanical," "animal" and "rational," 141 Godwin's idea of habits takes the 
"mechanical principle" as its point of departure. This is explained more or less by 
Hartleyan associationism, to which Godwinian theory was much indebted, despite his 
hostility to it. The mechanical principles of action, which are reduced to two kinds, 
"instinct" and "habits" (APM 545), Reid says, produce their effect without any will or 
intention (APM 579). By contrast, the rational principles of action are the leading and 
governing principles "to which all our animal principles are subordinate, and to which 
they ought to be subject." What is unique about us as human beings is, Reid argues, that 
"as we grow up to understanding" we are able to "reflect upon what is past, and, by the 
141 Although "animal" principles of action have "some particular and present object," 
unlike instinct or habits, it "looks not beyond that object to its consequences, or to the 
connections it may have with other things"(A.PM580). 
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lamp of experience, discern what will probably happen in time to come" (APM 580). 
This theoretical framework has a deep resonance with Godwin's theory of perfectible 
human nature. 
According to Reid, "Self seems to be Strictly connected with Memory." Upon 
this memory, all the "Successive Ideas are Strung as it were in order." These ideas, Reid 
argues, can be classed and divided, hence drawing the conclusion that the self or 
"Consciousness," which ties these into one and gives them unity, has to exist. 142 Ideas 
are compared to a sheaf of threads, or a pile of garments, strung or knit together by 
something called "self." In giving an account of the connection between an external 
object and the sensation arising from the sense of smelling, Reid stresses the importance 
of "experience" which enables a subject to discover that the nose is the organ of the 
sense of smelling and that the air is a medium of it: "he finds a connection in nature 
betwixt the rose and this sensation" and the experience and the rose are associated in the 
mind and "consequently found conjoined in the imagination" (InquilY 39). 
There is a corresponding idea expressed by Godwin, that everything has to be 
connected in the mind. In Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature 
(1797), he closely observes the relationship between trivial occurrences of everyday life 
and our character. 
Everything in the phenomena of the human mind is connected together ... every 
incident of our lives contributes to form our temper our character and our 
understanding; and the mass thus formed modifies everyone of our actions. 
142 For Reid's theory of the self, see his essay "On the self' dated 22 October, 1748. In 
An Inquiry in to the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. ed. Derek R. 
Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp.316-318. Italics added. 
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All in man is association and habit. 143 
Godwin establishes a mode that promotes a social understanding of the self that is ever 
improving, if not degrading, as a result of its exposure to the repeated action or inaction 
of the sensory organs. How then does Godwin deploy this mode in St. Leon? Habitual or 
customary connections made in the mind, he believes, are inevitable consequences of 
carrying out a life in society. Just as Rousseau took his environment seriously in his 
autobiography, The Confessions, Godwin studied the relationship between self and its 
environment with a curious eye. According to him, it is impossible for a man to be 
"wholly uninfluenced by education and early habits" and to be "independent of his 
parents, his companions, his age and his country" (Enquirer 212). In other words, it is 
not merely a compound of ideas stored in the mind, but the social circle and the whole 
environment that the self carries. 
In order to make his point, Godwin imagines a situation in which a man 
undergoes a change of opinion. Rather than giving a simple answer to why the change 
in inclination was brought about by "a new accession of evidence," he gives more than 
one possibility, and shows how complex human beings are, or how the self is 
intermingled with multitudes of influences. 
I was of one opinion in January, and am of another in June. If I gain a pension, 
or a rich church-living by the change, this circumstance may well be supposed 
to have some weight with / me. . . . Perhaps I am influenced by an 
apprehension of something beautiful, generous and becoming in the sentiment 
to be embraced, instead of being under the mere influence of argument 
143 William Godwin, The Enquirer. Reflections on Education and Manners, and 
Literature. in Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin. vol.5. ed. Pamela 
Clemit (London: William Pickering, 1993), p.215. Italics added. Hereafter cited as 
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(Enquirer 214). 
What we can observe in St. Leon and also Fleetwood is the setting of various situations, 
mostly concerning the forfeiture or possession of wealth, which gives Godwin 
opportunity to analyse how the mind and its established propensities adjust to such 
situations. Godwin's interest in this experiment is actually foretold in Enquirer: "It 
would constitute perhaps the most curious / chapter in the history of the human mind, if 
any person sufficiently competent to the task, were to undertake to detect the various 
causes which generate change of opinion among men" (Enquirer 214). We can say that 
his application of these philosophical principles to fictional characters in St. Leon takes 
a peculiar tum. The protagonist's independence from society is rather exaggerated in the 
novel, and his rationalism brings about misunderstanding and misery and not happiness 
to the people involved. 
The narrative strategy used is that the old St. Leon, who has lived long enough 
to reflect on his own life as a "historian" (SL 23), distances himself from the younger 
self, which gives him authoritative power to judge or rectify his past conduct. "In what I 
have already written," he writes, "I felt myself prompted to enlarge with complacency 
upon the sentiments and scenes of my youth" (SL 27). He attempts the justification of 
his "infatuation" with heroism and the power of wealth (SL 27). The older self realises 
that his early education inspired him with "a proud and restless desire of distinction" 
that brought him to his ruin. The paradox is that the narrator's memory consists of his 
own past perceptions, and that he is still a continuation of his earlier self. 
2. The Love of Splendour 
Enquirerwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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Let us now look at the way in which St. Leon's obsession with wealth is pathologically 
portrayed in the novel. In St.Leon, wealth is given a special consideration in relation to 
its effect upon habits and custom. It is meaningful not just as a marker of social 
distinction, but as an emblem of the protagonist's alchemical power which he later 
acquires from a stranger. Riches are given further emphasis by Godwin's firstly 
introducing St. Leon as a descendant of "one of the most ancient and honourable 
families of the kingdom of France" (SL 3). Secondly his mother's teaching is given 
considerable weight. His obsession with nobility and honour was spurred on by his 
mother's encouragement. Her last words to his son are; 
... I trust your education has not been of that sort which is calculated to render 
a young man helpless and contemptible. You have been taught to know your 
rank in society, and to respect yourself. You have been instructed in every 
thing that might most effectually forward you in the career of glory. (SL 8-9) 
Thus his early education teaches him the "prejudices of nobility and magnificence" and 
the chivalrous virtues. With regard to the idea of wealth, Godwin's aim in this volume 
seems investigative rather than polemical, though to him there is nothing more 
pernicious to the human mind than the love of "lavish splendour" (SL 5). His definition 
of "splendour" seems to be rather broad, encompassing the notion of wealth and heroic 
appearance. Even in his Political Justice there is a passage that hints at the weakness of 
the human mind against the allurement of wealth. 
Wealth, by the sentiments of servility and dependence it produces, makes the 
rich man stand forward as the principal object of general esteem and deference. 
In vain are sobriety, integrity and industry, in vain the sublimest powers of 
mind, and the most ardent benevolence, if their possessor be narrow in his 
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circumstances. (P J 727) 
Is wealth so powerful an influence as to outdo the "sublimest powers of mind"? The 
first circumstance that has a great impact on the youthful mind of St. Leon is a splendid 
scene of the meeting between Francis the First and Henry the Eighth (SL 4), and what is 
relevant here is his attraction to the "splendour of dress" that was worn by them upon 
this occasion (SL 5) and to the "variety of garments" (SL 5). The riveting scene 
continues with the display of "the beauty of armour, the caparisons of the steeds, the 
mettle of the animals themselves, and the ardour and grace of the combatants" (SL 6). St. 
Leon says that he possessed passion for "the theatre of glory," which was accentuated 
by his being prevented from immediately serving the King. 
Next comes his "military passion" (SL 24) awakened by the battle of Pavia, 
which makes him feel "roused upon this glorious occasion" (SL 21), and this elation of 
heart gives him "something indescribably delicious in this concentration of the mind" 
(SL 22). However the defeat of Pavia, according to St. Leon, has given a "deadly wound 
to the reign of chivalry," which leaves him in solitude, without an advisor or a guide (SL 
26). Godwin emphasises that the protagonist is, after this incident, "wholly guided by 
the suggestion of [his] own mind" (SL 26), which eventually leads to a disastrous state. 
The lack of guardianship is also represented as a problem in Fleetwood, for Godwin 
repeatedly stresses the imperfection of youth. When Fleetwood is removed to the 
University of Oxford from his Merionethshire horne, separated from his own father, he 
sees that "the situation was altogether new" (FW 29). He becomes "vicious by the 
operation of a populous and crowded residence . . . , unwarned by experience against 
the rocks that awaited him" (FW 46). Youth is presented as possessing only "imperfect 
reason," for, "when flushed with convivial gaiety and high spirits, tramples without 
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remorse, and unhesitatingly assures itself that 'All is well'" (FW 45). Similarly, after the 
battle, St. Leon's pent-up passions which might be exhausted in the further military 
pursuit no longer find outlet except in the "indulgences of the table" (SL 27), namely, 
gambling; "the turbulence of a scene of high play alone had power to distract my 
attention from the storm within" (SL 54). 
The younger self "mistook profusion and extravagance for splendour and 
dignity" (SL 27), giving a symbolic importance to wealth. He considers the "possession 
of some degree of wealth" as "indispensable to a man who would fill a lofty and 
respectable character in the world" (SL 28). It is the older St. Leon that acknowledges 
the vice of gambling: 
... that concentrated spirit which had sought to expand itself upon the widest 
stage, now found vent in the exhibition of individual expense: and above all, 
the sordid and inglorious passion for gaming, a vice eminently characteristic of 
the age, now especially gained strength, and drew multitudes into its 
destructive vortex. (SL 27) 
This habit of gambling went hand in hand with his "splendid and luxurious" living 
(SL 32), draining his resources. The Marquis de Damville's admonition seems to be a 
voice coming from Godwin himself. He condemns such a man who "having wasted his 
goods in riotous living, yet hungers after the luxuries that have proved his bane, and 
feasts himself upon the steam of dainties of which he has lost the substance" (SL 36). 
Even though St. Leon's conduct seems to be severely censured, it is somehow 
warranted by a lawful necessity or by the inevitable consequences of certain situations. 
When Godwin depicts the formation of St. Leon's ignoble habits, the protagonist is 
often portrayed as being "led into" these vices (SL 32). It is Tissot, the Swiss physician, 
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who famously warns of the danger of certain habits. He advises the rich and the upper 
class people on matters of health, morality and lifestyle, based on the assumption that 
diseases are formed by constitution and by habit. He says that the situation of a man "in 
high life" has "continually before his eyes, and in his imagination, a variety of objects 
that keep him in continual agitation" (ED 22). 
The ambition of honour, the love of titles, the desire of possessing such a 
fortune as lUxury renders necessary, are three principles that incessantly 
animate the man in high life, keeping his soul in continual agitation, which 
alone would be enough to destroy his health; frequently exposed to a reverse 
of fortune, to mortifications, to sorrows, to humiliations, to rage, to vexations, 
which continually imbitter his moments. . .. (ED 23) 
Likewise, St. Leon who has continually been exposed to the display of lUxury is "kept 
in a state of preternatural agitation by the passions of a gamester" (SL 49). The deeper 
associations are fixed in his mind, the more difficult they are to erode, and his mother's 
teaching seems to have had an unfading influence on him. 
Against the evil of these habits, Godwin takes a diagnostic approach, thereby 
censuring the mechanical body that is drawn into addictive behaviour. In some ways, 
this reminds us of the contemporary medical engagement in the rehabilitation of social 
ills such as drunkenness. In his An Essay, Medical Philosophical, and Chemical, on 
Drunkenness, Thomas Trotter states that the habit of drunkenness is "a disease of the 
mind" (Drunkenness 172). Like Tissot, Trotter advises a physician to examine the 
symptoms as well as to "scrutinize the character of his patient, his pursuits, his modes of 
living, his very passions and private affairs" (ibid) so as to locate the cause. This 
rhetorical programme, designed to awaken the reader to the dangers which are incurred 
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through dissipation and unnatural living habits, was a characteristic trait that links 
Trotter to the sociological approach of the contemporary medical interest in 
systematically promoting the health of the general public and also to the 
eighteenth-century philosophical tradition. Removing such tenacious habits is 
considered difficult because "the physical influence of custom, confirmed into habit" is 
"interwoven with the actions of our sentient system" (Drunkenness 3). St. Leon's idea 
of "habits" reverberates with this statement, as he maintains: 
There are habits of the mind and modes of occupying the attention, in which 
when once we have engaged, there seems a sort of physical impossibility of 
ever withdrawing ourselves. This was my case in the present instance. My 
habit was of no long standing. But no reading of my story, no mere power of 
language and words, can enable a by-stander to imagine how deep it was sunk 
into my heart, how inextricably it was twisted with all the fibres of my bosom. 
(SL 258) 
Godwin here takes particular care to show that habits are embedded in the physicality of 
the body. We are led to understand that the "fibres" of the bosom which are directly 
connected with the habits and their mechanical operation are no less physical than the 
nervous fibres which are sensible to basic human cravings such as hunger or thirst. 
According to Trotter, "A due acquaintance with the human character will afford 
much assistance" in finding out whether the propensity to the vicious habit of drinking 
springs "from situation in life, or depended on any peculiar temperament of body" 
(Drunkenness 4). In St. Leon's case, his love of gambling appears to emanate from both 
his temperament, that is the "obstinacy of rooted propensities," and the "seduction of 
long established habits" (SL 52). In St. Leon as well as in Fleetwood, Godwin's prime 
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subjects are "nervous people" whose "tempers are fickle, their spirits unequal, and their 
attachments equivocal." Trotter has notably described nervous people as having a 
"wavering and capricious principle of action." 144 The young St. Leon can be 
categorised as "nervous" in the contemporary medical sense, for he is portrayed as 
passionate, temperamental and emotionally unstable. His body is a diseased body, for he 
likens himself to "a pestilential wind." The wind "breathe [ s] blast to the fruits of nature, 
and sickliness to its aspect" (SL 85). It is interesting to see that there is an implicit 
longing for "maturity" in the way he compares himself with his friends. His Parisian 
friends are described as ideally "matured and improved by the silent influence of time" 
(SL 48), whereas he remains "impetuous, volatile, and dissipated" (SL 49), a character 
unbecoming to his age. Perhaps maturity, which Godwin perceived as a state of having 
learned from past experiences, would quell the dangerous passions that caused nervous 
agitation. 
When Damville urges St. Leon towards "refonnation" (SL 34), warning that his 
habits are "the most dangerous sort" (SL 35), he encourages him to change not only his 
habits, but also his "situation" (SL 37). He then offers his daughter to let him experience 
the "gratifications that attend upon domestic affections" (SL 37). On the condition that 
St. Leon retires into the country with Marguerite, Damville gives St. Leon pennission to 
marry her. 
I have one condition, however, to stipulate with you. I require of you, as the 
pledge of her happiness, that you break off your present modes of life; that you 
separate yourself from your connections, and retire into the country upon your 
144 Thomas Trotter, A lilew of the Nervous Temperament: Being a Practical Enquily 
into the Increasing Prevalence . .. of Those Diseases Commonly Called Nervous 
(London, 1807), p.163. Hereafter cited as VNTwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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paternal estate. (SL 37, italics added) 
Cutting himself from his "connections" is the only way, Damville believes, St. Leon can 
escape the "tyranny of custom" (SL 37). It is highly likely that Godwin viewed a 
person's removal from the metropolis as contributing to a change in habits. 
Speculation concerning the physical consequences of living in the metropolis 
as opposed to the provinces is evident in Godwin's other works. When we tum to his 
later fiction Fleetwood the contrast is more impressively made. The protagonist's "rude 
check put upon [his] excesses" of passions, he says, is because he was in Paris. He 
states, "I was in Paris, and I did as people of fashion in Paris were accustomed to do" 
(FW 60). The time he spent in Oxford and Paris, he confesses, was a period of 
"inebriety" or intoxication (FW 74). In Paris Fleetwood's sexual feeings were incited, 
and this licentiousness lasting no less than five years laid "the foundation in [him], deep 
and broad, for a dissolute character." 
The impressions of my adventures of gallantry in France I cannot overcome. 
Perhaps, in the tranquillity of sober discussion, you might bring me to confess 
that these impressions are unjust; but there they are; such are the associations 
of my mind .... (FW 166) 
Ruffigny's narrative about his misfortune and the good deeds of Fleetwood's family has 
a certain "purifying effect" (FW 128) and brings shame on Fleetwood's inclination 
towards dissipation. However, when he moves into London, he cannot suppress his 
newly emerging infatuation, weakening the resolution that he makes during his stay in 
Switzerland. It seems to me that change of places, for Godwin, was a crucial factor in 
shaping and reshaping a character. 
Therefore it is convmcmg that St. Leon IS temporarily relieved from his 
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"loathsome diseases" (5L 80) of luxury when he retires into the country. St. Leon's 
marriage to the virtuous Marguerite, together with their change in style of life, is 
presented as a possible cure for his disease: "Marguerite could, and ought, by insensible 
degrees, to have rooted out this disease of my mind" (5L 42). In the pastoral scenes of 
their abode, St. Leon finds relief by observing the beauties of nature, and experiences 
most exquisite sensibility in the "contemplation of verdure and fertility, and industry 
and simplicity and cheerfulness"(5L 41), through which "[the mind] trembles with 
pleasure through every fibre and every articulation" (5L 42). The emphasis is again put 
on the physicality of the body through which he acquires this new habit of life, though it 
does not last long enough to sink into his character. 
St. Leon was not formed to enjoy a scene of pastoral simplicity, for "ambition 
still haunts him" (5L 177). While he suffers from "the obstinacy of [his] malady" (5L 
85), a desire to carry out masculine pursuits to earn distinction, Marguerite, who 
celebrates the "romantic scenes of nature" and sees "the cultivators of the fields and the 
vineyards" as her "brethren," represents the realm of nature (5L 85). Marguerite 
considers living in the country as most "natural," rejecting St. Leon's "visionary 
pursuits" as not "flow[ing] in a direct line from any of the genuine principles of our 
nature" (ibid.). He breaches his promise with Damville "to live in the midst of [his] 
family" (5L 48), leaving this pastoral scenes, and returns to Paris to provide his son, 
Charles, a decent schooling. There, he is drawn back to his previous habits. We detect in 
him a certain feeling of resignation: "There seemed to be something in my habits, 
whether of inattention, ostentation, or inconsistency, that baffled the strongest motives 
by which parsimony and frugality can be enforced" (5L 53). His voluntary will even to 
write to his wife fails him, as he states, 
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When my insane project of supplying the inadequateness of my fortune by this 
expedient [gambling] began to produce an effect exactly opposite, I could not, 
but with the extremest difficulty, string my mind to write to the mistress of my 
souL (SL 60, italics added) 
The way Godwin expresses "to make myself write" is thus interestingly replaced by the 
words "to string my mind to write," signifying that, in a Reidian sense, his rational 
capacity to bind ideas with a string to enable him to control them is at this point 
ineffectuaL St. Leon's body is represented as a "mere instrument" or a machine to be 
"played upon" by endless anxieties and constant agitation (SL 55). St. Leon's 
mechanical body is at the same time a diseased body, facing a philosophical dilemma 
from which there is no escape, unless he contrives to form a firm voluntary will. 
3. Paradox of Disease 
The discussion of the representation of the diseased body in the eighteenth century 
would not be complete without addressing the differences in gender. Thomas Laqueur 
has characterised eighteenth-century writings, particularly by women, as committed to 
"passionlessness," but this denial or devaluation of specifically female passion in 
women's writings such as that by Anna Wheeler or Mary Wollstonecraft is part of a 
general devaluation of passion in this period. 145 This becomes a key element in 
understanding not only Godwin's human ideal, but also the reason for his peculiar way 
145 Laqueur takes the term "passionlessness" and an understanding of its political 
meaning in the early nineteenth century from Nancy Cott's article "Passionlessness: An 
Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1859," Signs 4, no, 21 (1978): 
pp.219-36. See Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to 
Freud (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 200, 201. See also 
Laqueur, "Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology" in 
Representations 14 (1986), p.24. 
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of depicting Marguerite. Knowing that Godwin drew Marguerite after the model of his 
wife, Holcroft wrote to Godwin and said that his "heart ached while [he] read it.,,146 It 
is fascinating that Godwin has portrayed his heroine, who allegedly resembles 
Wollstonecraft, as displaying uncommon fortitude that even puts the protagonist himself 
to shame. 
Int t · 1 S L 11 F k . 147 h eres Illg y III t. eon as we as III ran "enstel11, women w 0 are 
circumscribed by men's overreaching acts misconstrue men's passions as sexually 
inspired. Because of the protracted silence of her man, Marguerite suspects that "the 
attractions of some beauty in the metropolis" has made St. Leon indifferent to the affairs 
of his family (SL 61). Elizabeth in Frankenstein also thinks that her fiance is having a 
clandestine affair, though he is in fact engaged in a scientific experiment on life. It may 
be no coincidence that some modem critics have interpreted Victor's "filthy creation" 
(Frankenstein 36) as an obscene act. David Musselwhite maintains that the features 
described in the process of creation resemble or fit that of masturbation, for the overall 
mood, he says, is "one of guilty addiction, tremendous secrecy and isolation.,,148 This 
image would be considered far-fetched, if there were no historical evidence to connect 
male obsession with self-pollution. However Tissot, the author of Essay on the 
Disorders of People of Fashion, has furnished us with a valuable insight. He has 
metaphorised male solitary pursuits or fixation on a "single question" as an act of 
146 William St. Clair, (1989), p.211. 
147 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus (1818) ed. Marilyn Butler 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Unless specifically written, the 
1818 edition is used throughout this thesis. 
148 David Musselwhite, Parting Welded Together: Politics and Desire in the 
Nineteenth-Century English Novel, (London: Methuen, 1987), p.64. Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar have argued that Victor's creation is "filthy" because it is "obscenely 
sexual." They refer to the meaning of "obscenity" and "moral defilement" recorded in 
the OED. See The Madwoman in the Attic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 
p.232. 
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"onanism." He explains how excess in passions, whether in intellectual pursuits, in 
worldly pleasure, or in sexuality, is guilty because it abuses the body. When St. Leon 
"entreat[ s] the reader to consider what are the most imperious passions of the human 
mind" and answers that "[t]hey have rudely been described to be wealth, power, and 
pleasurable sensation" (SL 258), we cannot help acknowledging the similarity with a 
passage in Tissot's major medical treatise, Onanism (1766). 
The masturbator, entirely devoted to his filthy meditations, is subject to the 
same disorders as the man of letters, who fixes his attention on a single 
question; and this excess is almost constantly prejudicial. That part ofthe brain, 
which is then occupied, makes an effort similar to that of a muscle, which has 
been for a long time greatly extended; the consequences of which are such a 
continued motion in the parts as cannot be stopt [sic], or such a fixed attention, 
that the idea cannot be changed ... Although exhausted by perpetual fatigue, 
[these masturbators] are seized with all the disorders incident to the brain, 
melancholy, catalepsy, epilepsy, imbecility, the loss of sensation, weakness of 
the nervous system, and a variety of similar disorders. 149 
Tissot's medical treatise, therefore, moralises about certain types of people who, like 
masturbators, are deeply addicted to their pursuits. Victor, for example, "is engaged, 
heart and soul, in one pursuit." It is equally significant that he calls this enthralment 
"myoid habits" (Frankenstein 36). Similarly St. Leon cannot discontinue the use of the 
alchemical power once acquired, as he states, "I could not resolve to renounce donations 
which I had so dearly appropriated" (SL 200). He knows that the gifts are "accursed" 
149 S. A. Tissot, Onanism, or A Treaties upon the Disorders Produced by Masturbation .. 
or The Dangerous Effects of Secret and Excessive Venery trans. A. H ume, M.D. (New 
York: Garland Publishing, 1985), p.75. 
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and only give him "burden" and "stain" (SL 84), but he refuses to surrender them. Just 
as Victor's scientific pursuit carries a deeply sexual connotation of guilt, so St. Leon is 
conscious of his guilt in receiving the gifts of immortality and inexhaustible wealth 
from the alchemist: "I felt like a person that was guilty of some crime" (SL 132). 
According to Clara Pinto-Correia, Tissot's undertaking of exploring and 
characterising all the diseases that accompany "self-pollution" is a "paradigmatic mirror 
of the movement toward the secularization and medicalization of morality that became 
one of the trends of the Enlightenment." It is apt that she makes mention of Vernon 
Rosario's words that "not only was onanism the defilement of the temple of the soul, 
but also of the temple of Nature-the body.,,]50 St. Leon's obsession with acquiring 
alchemical power could be interpreted as symbolising the transgression of Nature. This 
is perhaps more illustrative in the case of Victor's scientific experiment, as he claims, 
"with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness, I pursued nature to her hiding-places" 
(Frankenstein 36). 
In that St. Leon's supernatural power of producing gold consists of "the 
composition and decomposition of simples" and "experiments on the nature of 
substances, chemical and metallic" (SL 258), the process is not, in the strictest sense, 
magical. He also says his natural magic requires the study of "chemistry" (SL 257). In 
this respect, therefore, the dichotomous relationship between Nature and science 
surfaces: just as the creator of the monster circumvents the natural order of things in 
attaining "life," so St. Leon eschews Nature in procuring the elixir of life. It is revealing 
150 Vernon A. Rosario II, "Phantastical Pollutions: The Public Threat of Private Vice in 
France," in Solitary Pleasures: The Historical, Literary and Artistic Discourse of 
Auto-Eroticism, ed. Paula Bennett and Vernon A. Rosario II, (New York: Routledge, 
1995). Quoted by Clara Pinto-Correia. See The Ovary of Eve: Egg and Sperm and 
Preformation,(Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1997), p.95. 
108 
that in the eighteenth century alchemical procedure or chemical experiment was a 
potent metaphor for coitus. The chemical analogy used by Erasmus Darwin in 
explaining the "appetence" of a living being is demonstrative of this. 
If I might be indulged to make a simile in a philosophical work, I should say, 
that the animal appetencies [sic] are not only perhaps less numerous originally 
than chemical affinities; but that like these latter, they change with every new 
combination; thus vital air and azote, when combined, produce nitrous acid; 
which now acquires the property of dissolving silver; so with every new 
additional part to the embryon, as of the throat or lungs, I suppose a new 
animal appetency [sic] to be produced. (Zoonomia i 499,500) 
However when St. Leon literally bypasses sexual intercourse to produce the "elixir of 
life," it ceases to be a metaphor. Scientific method takes the place of natural coituS. 151 
The alchemical power is therefore symbolic of its masculine/scientific power that is in 
this novel the major drive for intense passions. Significantly "[t]he first and foremost 
passions" of St. Leon's soul (SL 126) excited by the stranger signal the beginning of the 
"estrangement of hearts" between St. Leon and Marguerite. This is a typical situation 
where male bonding reinforces masculinity at the expense ofthe feminine. 152 
Here Godwin wrestles for the definition of "effeminacy." He plays with the 
word "strength" to illustrate the sign of masculinity (SL 136). Initially, St. Leon's 
151 As Paul-Gabriel Bouce has argued, against female reproductive power, seminal 
fluid had a certain cultural signification in the eighteenth century: "That vital liquor 
[semen] in most eighteenth-century medical handbooks appears, literally, as an elixir of 
life, distilled from the choicest blood, and able to cure a variety of female disorders in a 
wellnigh magic way." In a sense, St. Leon's absolute belief in the elixir of life represents 
male arrogance that boasts of its supremacy over female body. See 'Some Sexual Beliefs 
and Myths in Eighteenth-Century Britain" in Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
ed. Paul-Gabriel Bouce (Totowa, New Jersey, Manchester UP, 1982), p.44. 
152 Janet Todd, Feminist Literary History:A Defence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 
p.132. 
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strength of mind is displayed by his resolution to refuse the gifts. But as soon as he 
hears the provocative words of the stranger; "Feeble and effeminate mortal!," and 
observes the stranger's "marks of a vigorous and masculine genius" (SL 141, italics 
added), St. Leon changes his mind and extols the "passions the operation of which had 
long been suspended" in his bosom. He condemns his own feebleness in shrinking from 
such powers, calling his original resolution "uxorious and effeminate" (SL 137). In the 
end, he completely overturns his resolution about protecting his domestic peace, and 
discards it as "effeminate." Furthermore, a mechanical metaphor is yet again used to 
illustrate the "feeble" body. He fears becoming a "puppet" which is "moved with wires, 
and to be played on at will" (SL 134) if he remains within the bounds of the domestic 
sphere. 
The stranger's rhetoric deserves a careful analysis. His persuasion reads like a 
riddle which draws on an analogy with the alchemical process. How one's strong will 
can independently rise above the "feeble" body is no less puzzling than how one 
manages to extract gold out of ordinary metals. The stranger says that: 
the vessel in which it [the talent] was deposited must be purified from the alloy 
of human frailty. It might be abused and applied to the most atrocious designs. 
It might blind the understanding of the wisest, and corrupt the integrity of the 
noblest. It might overturn kingdoms, and change the whole order of human 
society into anarchy and barbarism. (SL 135, italics added) 
The stranger has an extreme view of "dependence." He indiscriminately condemns a 
"dependence" on the will of others as feeble and effeminate. The process of purification 
from the "alloy" is in this sense synonymous with total independence, if not alienation, 
from society. For fear of becoming "corrupted," an alchemist has to stand aloof from 
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others even from his family. In addition, seeing St. Leon's insecurity about his failure to 
become mature, the stranger taunts him about his childishness. He explains that St. Leon 
is "not yet purged of imbecility and weakness" because he is a child: "[t]hough you 
have passed through much, and had considerable experience, you are yet a child." (SL 
136). Maturity seems to be a vital concept in Godwin's rationalism, in that it enables 
one to secure a relatively independent or voluntary position in making a fair and rational 
judgment. St. Leon is as it were caught in the rhetoric of the stranger that praises 
detachment from reality or what Godwin has called the machine of human life, as he 
says, "[ a] man can never be respectable in the eyes of the world or in his own, except so 
far as he stands by himself and is truly independent" (SL 138). Even in "domestic 
connections," St. Leon believes that he should not lose his individuality (ibid.). 
St. Leon's aspiration for independence ironically derives from his dependence 
on "[t]he gestures of worship and the voice of applause" (SL 42). It is Marguerite who is 
truly independent, for her happiness is sustained by the tone of her own mind, and 
"stood in no need of the gaping admiration and stupid wonder of others to make her feel 
herself happy" (SL 42). Her "fortitude" (SL 72, 73, 83) is not proven by alienating 
herself from her family or throwing away domestic affections (SL 174). 
She proved, in the most convincing manner, that her elevation was not the 
offspring of wealth or rank, but was properly her own. She gave a grace, even 
a lustre, to poverty, which it can only receive from the emanations of a 
cultivated mind. (SL 75) 
Independence for her does not mean alienation, but material independence through 
minimising the need for the material "assistance of others" (SL 85). In terms of empathy, 
she celebrates interdependence with others, and is tightly connected to St. Leon with 
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"inviolable attachment" (SL 43). The spontaneity of their feelings towards each other is 
depicted as "the joint result of [their] common affection" (ibid.). The emphasis is thus 
put on their sensibility rather than on actual dialogue when St. Leon tries to prove his 
innocence. St. Leon's credibility lies not so much in what he says as in how he conveys 
his truth claims. About the alleged love affair with another, his facial expression 
communicates his innocence and clears up the misunderstanding. St. Leon recollects: 
It is then only that a man is truly pleased, when pulse replies to pulse, when 
the eyes discourse eloquently to each other, when in responsive tones and 
words the soul is communicated .... My eyes assured Marguerite of the 
constancy of my affection my kisses were those of chaste, undivided, entire 
attachment. (SL 63) 
The point of most contention is whether the truth conveyed through "the common 
affection" of two sympathetic subjects is what Godwin endorses in the novel, for it 
seems to contradict his rationalist claim. 
The wholesome and beneficial effect of the sympathetic tie which is 
represented by Marguerite is favourably depicted throughout the novel. Godwin's 
increasing emphasis on sympathy in moral judgements can be attributed to his 
relationship with Wollstonecraft which was initiated in April 1796. The importance of 
"domestic affections," which are defined as "well-regulated affections," is put forward 
in her Rights of Woman (VRW 212). She makes a distinction between such affections 
and "Natural affections." While the latter is merely a "very faint tie," the former grows 
out of the habitual exercise of a mutual sympathy. Moreover, she advises the reader to 
carry out the "indispensable duty of men and women to fulfil the duties which give birth 
to affections" and says that these affections are "the surest preservatives against vice" 
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(VRW223). Marguerite remains completely untainted by moral vice, because she is free 
from unhealthy and corrupt passions. Not even her physical disorder saps her 
intellectual powers or affections for her family. The female "spirit" who is one of the 
main narrators in Wollstonecraft's 'The Cave of Fancy' represents the ultimate effacing 
of the body. There is certainly a romanticised element in this representation in St. Leon, 
and Godwin uses the image of a "disembodied spirit" which is unaffected by physical 
weakness, which was in fact Wollstonecraft's favourite image of herself. 153 
Marguerite's enthusiasm is said to be "bright, unclouded and serene": "It was the 
eloquence as of a disembodied spirit, freed from the perturbation and alloy of human 
passions" (SL 293). The reverse is true with St.Leon. He boasts of his body as being 
"invulnerable to disease" (SL 2), and proudly claims that, for him, "the laws of nature 
are suspended" (SL 163). He nonetheless fails to shun a more fundamental disorder. He 
is "infected" with another kind of malady, that is, the vices of luxury which are 
illustrated in Godwin's Political Justice. 
Whoever frequents the habitations of the luxurious will speedily be infected 
with the vices of luxury. The ministers and attendants of a sovereign, 
accustomed to the trappings of magnificance, will tum with disdain from the 
merit that is obscured with the clouds of adversity. (P J 447) 
Godwin's sober criticism about the ostentation of splendour in the monarchical system 
such as the above is not simply a moral censure, but also a medicalisation of a state of 
mind. 
The evils indeed that arise out of avarice, an inordinate admiration of wealth 
153 This is chiefly observed in her early fictional works such as 'The Cave of Fancy.' The 
notion of "disembodiment" will be discussed in the later chapters. 
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and an intemperate pursuit of it are so obvious that they have constituted a 
perpetual topic of lamentation and complaint. The object in this place is to 
consider how far they are extended and aggravated by a monarchical 
government, that is, by a constitution the very essence of which is to 
accumulate enormous wealth upon a single head, and to render the ostentation 
of splendour the established instrument for securing honour and veneration. 
(PJ 447,448) 
As he calls it "the effeminate softness of favourites" (ibid.), effeminacy and 
vulnerability to such contagion are irrevocably bound together in his imagination. The 
profoundest irony is that the least likely person to contract any kind of disease in this 
novel is portrayed as most susceptible and effeminate. This makes for a curious 
paradox. 
4. Godwin's Futuristic Vision 
The use of the disease motif in the novel is directly linked to the more general 
epistemological breakdown of the social tie. Initially St. Leon believed that the 
supernatural gifts would empower him to "suspend" or supersede the law of nature, but 
later he realises that the law of nature that lends credence to one's story is in fact "the 
prime source of individual security in human affairs." In other words, the only thing that 
saves a person from "the most injurious suspicions" (SL 199) is to be part of "the chain 
and combination of events, that proceeds systematically from link to link" (SL 228). 
When St. Leon receives the gifts from the stranger, he cannot anticipate the inevitable 
consequence of "suspending" the law of nature. He does not realise that to be endowed 
with supernatural power signifies having a different standard of morality, so he 
114 
subsequently loses his equals. Victor's creature is similarly an outcast who is called a 
"wretch" (Frankenstein 40). It was to gain another of the "same species" that the 
monster asks Victor for his companion (Frankenstein 118). Marguerite's remonstrance 
foreshadows the monster's narrative in Frankenstein. 
Equality is the soul of real and cordial society. A man of rank indeed does not 
live upon equal terms with the whole of his species; but his heart also can 
exult, for he has his equals. How unhappy the wretch, the monster rather let 
me say, who is without an equal. (SL 211, italics added) 
Godwin's choice of words such as "monster" manifests his strong conviction that 
society barely functions without sympathising equals. 154 The theme of "connection" is 
explored not only in relation to a historical aspect of the self, but to the links that society 
makes with the interest of each individual. Because St. Leon's source of wealth remains 
a secret, there is no way to explain his sudden wealth, and the criminal charge of 
robbery and murder of the stranger against him cannot be lifted. People are connected 
with each other both in time and space, and Godwin demonstrates this by observing 
how the unnatural procedure of events arouses suspicion. Marguerite warns her husband 
that the transition cannot be so easily made as he hopes, for it is wrong to think "the 
world is inattentive to the actions of men or their circumstances" (SL 175). Just like the 
inquisitive Caleb in Godwin's first novel, every neighbour is "vested with a sort of 
inquisitorial power" (SL 171) which functions as a check to the natural "chain of 
circumstances" (SL 231). As Godwin states, 
Man is a social being. In society the interests of individuals are intertwisted 
with each other, and cannot be separated. Men should be taught to assist each 
154 St. Leon reiterates this word, "monster" to describe himself (SL 363). 
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other. (Enquirer 83) 
It proclaims the impossibility of man's total independence from society. The only 
anomaly presented in the novel is the invincible misanthrope, Bethlem Gabor, who 
"ha[s] vowed vengeance against the whole human race" (SL 400). Like St. Leon, Gabor 
remains outside of society. Peculiarly, the protagonist feels himself attached to him, 
though he does not feel "sympathised with him [Gabor]" (SL 397). His admiration for 
Gabor resembles his idealisation of the "masculine genius" possessed by the stranger. St. 
Leon describes Gabor as "a man of iron," characterising him as too "colossal a structure 
to be accessible to human feelings and human affections" (SL 397). It is therefore 
perfectly natural that there emerges a deep chasm between these men. As Gabor 
announces, St. Leon's character is "of all beings the most opposite to that of Bethlem 
Gabor" (SL 416). Two people who are either determined or destined to be 
"independent" from the world cannot find ways to reconcile their interests. 
Paradoxically, only when St. Leon commiserates with Gabor on their complete 
alienation from society can he be acknowledged by Gabor as his friend. 
Gabor's cold-blooded act of imprisoning his friend and benefactor, St. Leon, 
can be construed as proof of evil inclination which only inspires in us a feeling of scorn. 
Gabor is, however, an equivocal character. It must be noted that there is truth in his 
moral statement. 
Instead of, like me, seeking occasions of glorious mischief and vengeance, you 
took upon yourself to be the benefactor and parent of mankind. What vocation 
had you to the task? With the spirit of a slave who, the more he is beaten, 
becomes the more servile and submissive, you remunerated injuries with 
benefits .... Poor, soulless poltroon! to say the best of you, to your insensate 
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heart it was the same whether you were treated with reverence or scorn. I saw 
you hunted, hooted at, and pursued by the people you fed; you held on your 
course, and fed them still. CSL 416) 
When St. Leon schemes a grand project for stimulating and reviving the economy of 
Hungary with his wealth, his intention seems purely benevolent, expecting no material 
rewards or elevation of rank. He states that his wish is to effect "the happiness of the 
people" and to be "their benefactor" (SL 376). However, such an influx of money into 
the Hungarian market which is made possible by his magical power proves ineffectual 
against the increasing appetites of the population and lack of provisions (SL 378, 379). 
As long as every thing goes on prosperously, the Hungarian people are grateful for his 
deed, but the sudden reverse of the situation prompts them to regard St. Leon with 
"detestation and abhorrence" (SL 380). He is literally "hunted" and "pursued" by these 
people and Gabor is making a point that St. Leon never learns his lesson from his past 
misjudgments. His folly or rather simplicity in believing that the people will worship 
him as a God again prefigures Victor's unrealistic vision that the creation of an 
immortal being will bring happiness to the world. St. Leon's continual failure testifies to 
the unsoundness of Godwin's hypothesis that advancement in age leads to maturity and 
consequently the perfectibility of man. The protagonist cannot dispense with his 
passions for "distinction" or fame, however experienced he becomes with age. 
Godwin's argument that the elimination of these passions is ultimately 
realisable is epitomized not by St. Leon himself, but by his son, Charles. The greatest 
experiment carried out, through documenting the power of money, is therefore the trial 
and tribulation of Charles. His language is typically that of Godwinian rationalism. He 
does not yield to St. Leon's persuasive appeal and the delivery of his fatherly speech. 
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Charles does not accept St. Leon's insistence that he is not guilty of any crime, not 
because he perceives his father's delivery of the speech to be counterfeit. Charles does 
believe that the manner in which St. Leon asserts his innocence is that of "truth" (SL 
195). He is clearly touched by his father's appeal, but he remains unaffected, unlike 
Marguerite, adhering to his decision which derived from his logical thinking. His 
statement echoes Godwin's sentiments: 
How am I to be convinced that what you ESt. Leon] say at this moment is not 
dictated more by a regard for my tranquillity, than by the simplicity of 
conscious truth? If I believe you, I am afraid my credit will be the offspring 
rather of inclination, than of probability. (SL 193) 
His faith in "probability" is thus displayed by the fact that he is suspicious even of his 
own father's innocence. This strongly reflects Reid's rationalist idea that the self is 
capable of fathoming probable effects from a certain cause regardless of one's own 
feelings. 
However, when we compare Marguerite's penetration of truth through her 
acute sensibility with Charles's failure to discern his father's true paternal affection, we 
cannot but see the tension between these two modes of truth. He tells his father that he 
is "compelled to disclaim all affinity with" and be cut off from him (SL 192), and this 
presents an unnatural picture of a feeling being who has been strongly bound with St. 
Leon by filial affection. We could say that Charles is a paragon of rationalist thought, 
because he can "separate" himself from his own emotion. This sharply contrasts with 
Marguerite, who claims that her husband's life is "never to be separated" (SL 43) from 
her. Charles's independent spirit is expressed in the following passage. 
Standing as I do a candidate for honourable fame, I must henceforth stand by 
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myself, as if a man could be author of his own existence, and must expect no 
aid, no favour, no prepossession, from any earthly consideration, save what I 
am, and what I shall perform. (ibid.) 
Charles thus argues vehemently for the precedence of merit over birth, and disdains the 
wealth and splendour that at first had dazzled him: "My fingers shall not be 
contaminated with an atom of it [money]" (SL 194). While Charles's condemnation of 
relying on material wealth in establishing honour and fame is irreconcilable with St. 
Leon's total dependence on the philosopher's stone, Marguerite and Charles share the 
noble view that independence should be gained through one's own merits and worth (SL 
44). Yet Charles's inclination to distrust his own feelings about St. Leon's truthfulness 
makes him fail to discern what is really happening to his father not just once but twice. 
The second time round, St. Leon, disguised as Henry and appearing young, serves under 
his own son, but Charles cannot properly understand why it is that he feels "ardent 
partiality" towards Henry (SL 474). The external information about Henry prompts him 
to equate his young cadet with the infamous alchemist. This clouds Charles's judgment 
about Henry who is in fact his own father. 
How can I tell that the fraternal resemblance borne by your features to my own, 
and the sudden and ardent partiality that rose in my breast when first I saw you, 
have not been produced by the most detested arts? Magic dissolves the whole 
principle and arrangement of human action, subverts all generous enthusiasm 
and dignity, and renders life itself loathsome and intolerable. (SL 474) 
This statement splits Godwin's claim about the nature of truth into two. First, it reveals 
the unreliability of rational judgment which is predicated on the "objective" information 
coming from outside, hence avowing the validity of truth attained by feelings. Second, 
119 
it demonstrates that a person, even if the person is endowed with power to improve the 
condition of society, is stripped of his or her credibility altogether, if his or her power 
appears "supernatural" or "magical" in the eyes of the general public, or is 
incomprehensible to them. Consequently the person is denounced as a criminal and 
turns into a victim of persecution. The only way out for a persecuted subject like St. 
Leon is to live in alienation or to resort to bribery, but it only works on those "whose 
very soul melted at a bribe" (SL 237). 
In Frankenstein, which I will discuss in the later chapters, we find textual echoes of 
characters and ideas from St. Leon, particularly in relation to the destructive passions of 
the protagonist. In Political Justice, voluntary will precedes "mechanical" actions or 
habits, and Godwin hopes for a future where the rational principle is able to rise above 
vicious "habits" and "custom." However the major thematic structure of St. Leon is 
clearly "the perturbation and alloy of human passions." As we have seen in this chapter, 
the alchemical powers are effectively used as a metaphor for an excessive ardour for 
masculine pursuits away from the domestic arena. Godwin wants to show how 
problematic it is to "change" the habits driven by such passions because they are 
deep-rooted at the level of bodily fibres. This problem mirrors the impossibility of 
"purifying" gold out of the alloy of ordinary metals. In this sense, Godwin fails to 
adhere to his own rationalist argument. Far from it, by using this alchemical motif, he 
demonstrates the hopelessness of excavating "fortitude" from the mechanical body. A 
fundamental question remains. Why did not Godwin assign the heroic role of Charles to 
the protagonist? Unlike Charles, St. Leon represents the incurably diseased body, and 
lacks the will that has commanding power over it. Perhaps the rationalist Charles should 
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have become the narrator-protagonist. Yet such speculation seems off the mark, for 
Godwin does seem to have us sympathize more with St. Leon than his son. St. Leon is a 
feeling being who is "inseparable" from Of, more pertinently, yearning after human 
sympathy. Without resorting to didacticism, Godwin is more effectively able to illustrate 
the moral consequences of having a "weak mind" in this novel. The reader is invited to 
observe the psyche of the protagonist and sympathise with him. St. Leon says that he 
made "a sufficient experiment of the philosopher's stone," but all his experiments 
"miscarried" (SL 434). He uses money ultimately to achieve his goal, that is, to become 
the benefactor of nations, but his failure teaches him to disdain human arrogance to be 
like a God: "I was like a God, who dispenses his bounties profusely through twenty 
climates, but who at the same time sits, separate, elevated, and alone, in the highest 
heaven." As he says, he "could find no equal" (SL 377). When St. Leon turns into a 
persecuted monster, we can all the more empathise with him, as he summons us to do 
so: "They who have never been placed in a situation like mine, will never be able to do 
justice to my grievance. They will perhaps say, that the calamity 1 now endured was a 
trifling one, and that a weak mind only can be elevated by the acclamations and huzzas 
of the multitude, or depressed by their hisses and scorn" (SL 282). Godwin's 
philosophical purpose in writing St. Leon is obscured by the failure of the protagonist to 
form a "strong" mind. However, as in the case of Caleb Williams, the sentimental 
narrative again has illustrated Godwin's philosophical oscillation between reason and 
sensibility. 
4 
~Interwoven' Sensibility and Self-Government 
in Mary Wollstonecraft's Mary 
and Other writings 
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As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the idea the weakness of the human mind 
susceptible to strong emotions is the keys to understanding Godwin's literary works. 
Although his theoretical position is to denounce sensibility as that which inhibits the 
formation of a virtuous character, his literary works such as Caleb Williams and St. Leon 
do not entirely coincide with that position. St. Leon was portrayed as a "nervous" 
person with incurable habits that crave wealth and consequently he neglects his paternal 
duty, but these mechanical habits are constantly in conflict with his own paternal 
affections that inspire care for his family and for his imaginative nation (Hungary). 
There is a thread of hope in the presentation of sensibility that passes between St. Leon 
and Marguerite, who are bound with mutual feelings. It is deeply meaningful that 
Marguerite represents Godwin's own wife, Mary Wollstonecraft. According to Godwin, 
Wollstonecraft "obstinately cling[s] to an ill-starred unhappy passion ... because it is 
of the very essence of affection, to seek to perpetuate itself' (Memoirs 245). This seems 
like a strange depiction of his wife, for she was renowned for being a rigorous 
rationalist. J55 She generally derides those women who are swept away by their own 
passion. Was she in a double-bind situation where she could not decide whether to 
155 This is mainly true of Vindications and a period when she was writing these works. 
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propound rationalism or endorse sensibility? If so, what was the major contextual 
explanation? In the next three chapters, I would like to analyse closely Wollstonecraft's 
works in order to assess her views on sensibility. 
In the novel, Mary, A Fiction (1788), Wollstonecraft takes an active 
engagement in developing a female character different from those generally portrayed. 
She argues that women were kept in ignorance under the specious name of innocence, 
for men expected women to possess virtues incompatible with any vigorous exertion of 
intellect. Contrary to society's expectation that women are generally weak, 
Wollstonecraft aims to endow her fictional character with an ability to "think," and the 
strength of mind to pacify passions. She calls such a character a "genius." In the 
"Advertisement" to the novel Mary, she announces her aim to describe this female 
genius in a fiction where things that are not allowed to happen in reality could 
believably occur. 
In an artless tale, . . . the mind of a woman, who has thinking powers is 
displayed. The female organs have been thought too weak for this arduous 
employment; and experience seems to justify the assertion. Without arguing 
physically about possibilities-in a fiction, such a being may be allowed to 
exist; whose grandeur is derived from the operations of its own faculties, not 
subjugated to opinion; but drawn by the individual from the original source. 156 
In Mary, Wollstonecraft aims to portray an extraordinary heroine commanding her 
appetites and passions. This is not to deny the possibility that a woman who achieves 
self-control has less passion. Far from it, a character with such strength suggests the 
156 Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary; A Fiction in The Works of Mary Woiistonecraft 
vo1.1eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 1989), p.5. 
Hereafter cited as Maryin parentheses with page numbers. 
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power struggle between the body (or heart) and the mind within, and is consonant with 
the philosophical discourse on sexual passion. As Mary Poovey has argued, moralists' 
warnings on appetites for gambling, overeating, or public admiration presuppose that 
"once indulged, any appetite would become voracious and lead eventually to the most 
dangerous desire of all." 157 The same logic applies to the question of feminine 
self-effacement. Feminine modesty, chastity and self-denial are strongly commended, 
not because women have proclivity for them, but because there is an implicit cultural 
agreement that women are more in danger of indulging themselves in sexual appetites. 
As Poovey has argued, therefore, the feminine conduct advised by contemporary 
moralists can be considered in a deeply ambivalent light, for women's allegedly 
emotional responsiveness and acute sensibility were from this angle considered as 
something immoral that might lead to frivolity, luxuriousness, or excessive sexual 
desire. 
Various sensibilities of the body, namely pain and pleasure, are described as the 
source of desires and appetites by eighteenth-century philosophers. The point of most 
contention in the eighteenth century was the moral judgment on these "desires." Both 
Francis Hutcheson and his pupil Adam Smith reject Mandeville's system that 
"represent[ s] every passion as wholly vicious, which is so in any degree and in any 
direction." Wollstonecraft's argument in A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) is 
reminiscent of Smith's point that public good is not necessarily brought about by 
self-love. 
Yes, sir, the regard I have for honest fame, and the friendship of the virtuous, 
falls far short of the respect which I have for myself. And this enlightened 
157 Mary Poovey, (1984), p.20. 
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self-love, if an epithet the meaning of which has been grossly perverted will 
convey my idea, forces me to see; and if I may venture to borrow a prostituted 
term, to feel, that happiness is reflected, and that, in communicating good, my 
soul receives its noble aliment. (VRM 34) 
Moreover, she acknowledges a distinction between purely physical impulse and what 
she calls "feelings of humanity." 
We ought to beware of confounding mechanical instinctive sensations with 
emotions that reason deepens, and justly terms feelings of humanity. This word 
discriminates the active exertions of virtue from the vague declamation of 
sensibility." (VRM 53) 
Wollstonecraft's notion of "instinctive sensations" corresponds with Hutcheson's 
definition of "appetites" which are "preceded naturally by a sense of pain, previously to 
any opinion of good to be found in the object; which is desired chiefly in order to 
remove the pain.,,)58 Interestingly this corresponds with Hume's distinction between 
"direct passions" that arise from a natural impulse and "calm passions" that have a 
moral basis as I have discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. What the benevolent 
school scholars critiqued was Mandeville's elimination of such a distinction. As Smith 
assiduously insists, the common names for the love of pleasure and for the love of sex 
for Mandeville denote vicious and offensive features of human nature, because his tenet 
famously admits of no genuine human virtue. In his The TheOlY of Moral Sentiments 
(1759), Smith refutes Mandeville's claim that human virtue "falls short of that complete 
self-denial which it pretends to, and instead of a conquest, is commonly no more than a 
158 Francis Hutcheson, Observations on 'The Fable of the Bees'in Six Letters (1758) 
(Bristol: Thoemmes, 1989), p.60. Hereafter cited as OFBwith page numbers in 
parentheses. 
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concealed indulgence of our passions.,,]59 Smith's statement implies that self-command 
is possible. Amongst the qualities he upholds, self-command is said to enable us "to 
abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater 
pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future time" (MS 189). Wollstonecraft 
follows Smith's moral teaching that self-denial is the key to developing human virtue, 
even if it signifies endurance of pain. 
However Smith feels that this is inhibited by strong (physical) sensibility, 
while Wollstonecraft saw self-denial as a sufficient deterrent against such desire. The 
sensibility, he states, can be "so strong as to render all self-command impossible." 
No sense of honour can control the fears of the man who is weak enough to 
faint, or to fall into convulsions upon the approach of danger. Whether such 
weakness of nerves, as it has been called may not, by gradual exercise and 
proper discipline, admit of some cure, may, perhaps, be doubtful. (MS 156) 
The weakness of nerves vitiates the power to act in accordance with one's will, and 
Wollstonecraft laments that women glory in such weakness rather than being ashamed 
of it. They both agree that the soft, the amiable, and the gentle feminine virtues seem to 
"have been often regarded as mere weakness" (MS 306). Wollstonecraft's notion of 
female weakness against voracious appetite is articulated through a philosophical 
observation on the appetite for "praise" made by none other than Adam Smith himself. 
The rich and the great, he argues, "desire to be praised for what they themselves do not 
think praise-worthy" (MS 64). The leading comparison in The Rights of Woman is 
between the rich and women. She cites Smith's passage which talks of "the gracefulness 
159 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments eds. D.D.Raphael andA.L.Macfie 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984), p.312. Hereafter cited as MSwith page numbers in 
parentheses. 
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of his [Lewis XIV] shape, and the majestic beauty of his features" which Adam Smith 
calls "a very superfluous attention." The rich who pride themselves on "frivolous 
accomplishments," she argues, can be compared to women who seek to be observed, to 
be attended to (VRW 127-129). 
In the mid eighteenth century, the novel, a newly developing genre, was 
becoming increasingly criticised for inflating women's imagination or stimulating 
passion for romantic love. Samuel Richardson, for instance, has Colonel Morden say to 
Lovelace in Clarissa (1747-8) that "men had generally too many advantages from the 
weakness, credulity, and inexperience of the fair sex: who were apt to be hurried into 
acts of precipitation by their reading inflaming novels and idle romances."J60 Emily 
Atkins in Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling (1771), a woman who is seduced and 
abandoned to become a prostitute, is an exemplary character whose weakness succumbs 
to her admirer's sexual appeal. She falls a prey to Winbrooke's false sincerity which 
hinted that marriage is a subjection "to which genuine love should scorn to be 
confined." Emily does not realise until it is too late that "[i]f it is dangerous to be 
convinced, it is dangerous to listen; for our reason is so much of a machine, that it will 
not always be able to resist, when the ear is perpetually assailed."J6J There is a 
corresponding image in the portraiture of Eliza, the mother of the heroine in Mmy, for 
she is likened to a "mere machine" (Mmy 7). As we discussed in Chapter 1, the use of 
the word "machine" became common among philosophers such as Rousseau and La 
160 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa or, The History of a young Lady: comprehending the 
most important concerns ofprivate hIe and particularly showing the distresses that 
may attend the misconduct both ofparents and children in relation to marriage ed. 
Angus Ross (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), pp.1279-80. 
161 Henry Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling (New York and London: W.W.Norton & 
Company, 1958), pAO. 
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Mettrie who saw the human body as having a self-sustaining system. 162 This is what 
Wollstonecraft called "mechanical instinctive sensations" which are fundamentally 
different from "feelings of humanity." 
Wollstonecraft's contemporary women novelists explored the problematic 
nature of the female body and its adverse effects on women's sexual reputation. 
Women's concern with their exterior beauty had a deleterious effect on their physical 
strength. What Tom Furniss refers to as "the systematic enervation of women,,163 is at 
play when women labour "to be pretty, by counterfeiting weakness," consequently 
beautiful weakness becomes "interwoven in a woman's frame" (VRM 45, 46). 
Wollstonecraft's notion of human virtue does not rest on women's "mean arts to please" 
men, but on securing "her husband's respect." 
Let fancy now present a woman with a tolerable understanding, for I do not 
wish to leave the line of mediocrity, whose constitution, strengthened by 
exercise, has allowed her body to acquire its full vigour; her mind, at the same 
time, gradually expanding itself to comprehend the moral duties of life, and in 
what human virtue and dignity consist. (VRW 119) 
The love arising from feeding a "dying flame" by merely presenting beauty will not last 
forever, for "nature doomed [it] to expire when the object became familiar" (ibid.). That 
a desire to be admired or "to be loved" is grounded in man's natural instinct was 
dramatised in many novels (MS 113). With strong self-command, women struggle to 
overcome the appetite for notice. It is my chief aim to draw attention to Wollstonecraft's 
162 Wollstonecraft's theory and La Mettrie's physiological system are compared in the 
next chapter in more depth. 
163 Tom Furniss, "Gender in revolution: Edmund Burke and Mary Wollstonecraft" in 
Revolution in Writing: British Literary Responses to the French Revolution ed. Kelvin 
Everest (Philadelphia: Open Univeristy Press, 1991), p.91. 
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reprimand of the frivolous nature of this feminine desire, particularly that for inciting 
public admiration, by observing her representation of a female "genius." The sensibility 
of women has been treated in many ways, but it could be reduced to three major 
representations which are more often than not contradictory: fiivolity, delicacy and 
potent force. With the potential good that feminine sensibility has, many novelists, 
Wollsteoncraft in particular, attempted to salvage the benevolent feeling that both 
Hutcheson and Adam Smith praised as a valuable human virtue. 
1. Contemporary Novelists 
Before I examine MGlY, I would like to set the scene for Wollstonecraft's creation of a 
female genius in the novel by looking at some important facets of female desire in four 
novels which were published about the same time as MGlY (1788); A Simple StOlY 
(1791), Julia (1790), Desmond (1792), and Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796). I do not 
intend to prove the influence of MGlY on these four fictional works, but merely wish to 
observe the effort of these authors to salvage some aspects of sensibility while 
censuring its destructive nature. I will later discuss the significance of Wollstonecraft's 
notion of a female genius in this context. 
In her A Simple StOlY, Elizabeth Inchbald demonstrates the moral failure of the 
heroine caused by the serious deficiencies of her education. 164 She depicts Miss Milner 
as a feeling woman whose energies such as "sprightly vivacity," "haughty display of 
charms" or "pensive demeanour" dominate her conduct. Though Inchbald censures 
the heroine's defects, her inability to control her passions is favourably compared with 
164 Elizabeth Inchbald, A Simple Story ed. J.M.S.Tompkins (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). Hereafter cited as Simple Story in parentheses with page 
numbers. 
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Miss Fenton, who was initially thought to be "a proper match" for Lord Elmwood. 
Perceiving that Lord Elmwood's choice of Miss Fenton was the result of duty and not of 
love, Miss Milner boldly suggests the possibility that she could "inspire her [Miss 
Fenton's] destined husband with a passion which she may not have inspired" (Simple 
StOlY 115). When Miss Woodley approves of the match between Lord Elmwood and 
Miss Fenton in terms of their dispositions, their pursuits, and their inclinations, 
depicting their passions as "pure-white as snow," Miss Milner cannot but condemn 
their passions as "not warmer" (Simple StOlY 124). The narrator describes Miss Milner's 
jealousy as "the real passion of jealousy" which one can only feel from "the real passion 
of love." This passion seems to be extolled despite its bodily enervation: "[it] not only 
affects the mind, but every fibre of the frame is a victim to it and Miss Milner's every 
limb ached, with agonizing torment, while Miss Fenton, courted and beloved by Lord 
Elmwood, was present to her imagination" (Simple StOlY 119). Inchbald's sentimental 
heroine embodies the weakness of mind which is interwoven in her physical body. 
As to her passions for public admiration, Miss Milner's lack of education 
leaves her a prey to vanity which triggers two tragic consequences in the novel. First is 
her choice of her dress in attending a masquerade. She dresses like a nun, and therefore 
appears as "the representative for the goddess of Chastity," but is in fact sexually 
provocative for "the petticoat [is] made to festoon far above the ankle" showing "the 
appearance of a female much less virtuous." (Simple StOlY 155). This provokes Lord 
Elmwood's fury which almost disrupts their trusting relationship. Second is when her 
tumultuous passions result in "mixing in the gayest circles of London" after Lord 
Elmwood, then her husband, is away from England. This consequently leads to Miss 
Milner's fate, that she is never to enjoy Lord Elmwood's company. 
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The destructive effect of her passions is therefore ambivalently portrayed in 
the novel. Although, like Dr Gregory's "woman of delicacy," Miss Milner's effort to 
conceal her passion for Lord Elmwood is repeatedly shown at the beginning of the 
novel, she eventually gives vent to her emotions and the reader is shown the intimate 
link between desire and restraint. What Inchbald's novel offers, as Caroline Gonda 
argues, is the tension of self-restraint, redefining enjoyment as forbearance, delicately 
balancing "a pleasure too exquisite" and "the sensation of exquisite pain,,,165 for Miss 
Milner's love is called "real, delicate, and restrained love" (Simple StOlY 81). 
Helen Maria Williams's construction of a virtuous character, Julia Clifford, in 
Julia rests on her ability to regulate unruly passions. The novel's heightened closure is 
marked by the death of Frederick Seymour, caused by his sickly passion for Julia which 
was never consummated in marriage. This death is prefigured in their discussion on 
Werter's suicide. While Julia disapproves of its moral principle, Frederick defends the 
erotic power of the irrepressible passions by saying "People talk of the bad tendency of 
this book [Werter], and blame the author for blending virtue and vice in the same 
character, because the example is dangerous. Does any person, when pleased with a 
book immediately determine to imitate the hero of it in every particular?" 166 
Wollstonecraft, who later reviewed Julia in The Analytical Review, does not consider 
this aspect of Williams's narrative as dangerous, for she warmly recommends the book 
to her young female readers. The novel, Wollstonecraft argues, gives "the author an 
opportunity to display the most exemplary degree of rectitude in the conduct of her 
165 Caroline Gonda, Reading Daughters' Fictions 1709-1834: Novels and Society from 
Manley to Edgeworth (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), p.185. 
166 Helen Maria Williams, Julia: A Novel; interspersed with some poetical pieces, vol. 1 
of 2 vols. (London: T. Cadell, 1790), pp.202, 203. Hereafter cited as Julia in parentheses 
with pages numbers. 
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heroine." She quotes from the "Advertisement" to the novel which IS III a sense 
Williams's response to the contemporary debate on sensibility: 
The purpose of these pages is to trace the danger arising from the uncontrolled 
indulgence of strong affections not in those instances where they lead to the 
guilty excesses of passion in a corrupted mind-but, when disapproved by 
reason, and un circumscribed by prudence, they involve even the virtuous in 
calamity; since under the dominion of passion, if the horror of remorse may be 
avoided, misery at least is inevitable; and though we do not become the slaves 
of vice, we must yield ourselves the victims of sorrow. (Julia iii) 
Wollstonecraft simply confirms Williams's original design that "without a very great 
alloy of romantic notions," the author has had Julia's principles "so fixed that nothing 
can tempt her to act wrong; and as she appears like a rock, against which the waves 
vainly beat, no anxiety will be felt for her safety.,,167 
It is true, drawing on a recognisable story of sentimental novels such as La 
Nouvelle Heloise,168 Williams delineates the heroine's adamantine virtue which does 
not permit her to profess love for Fredrick, who is already the fiance of her beloved 
cousin, Charlotte Clifford (though Julia does so before he dies). As Markman Ellis notes, 
the novel portrays "a young woman's struggle to contain her feelings, weighing her 
potentially erotic passion against her positively constructed moral probity.,,169 The 
adulterous passion of Julia and Fredrick culminates in their hyperbolic romantic 
167 Mary Wollstonecraft, The Analytical Review (1788-1797) in The Works of Mary 
WollstonecraftvoL7 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 
1989), p.252. 
168 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, La Nouvelle Heloise: Julie, or the New Eloise trans. 
Judith H. McDowell (London: Pennsylvania State UP, 1968). Hereafter cited as Heloise 
with page numbers in parentheses. 
169 Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibllity: Race, Gender and Commerce in the 
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suffering. While endorsing the fortitude with which Julia withstands the temptation and 
demonstrates the importance of being "like a rock," Williams negatively portrays 
Charles Seymour's cool principles of calculation as "mechanical as those of a watch" 
(Julia 111). The narrator explains that he is "one of those prudent young men" who 
chose his palmers at a dance by the "solid recommendation of fortune" (Julia 48). 
Ironically, feminine modesty or modest demeanor not only served "to assure the world 
that a woman's appetites were under control; it also indicated that female sexuality was 
still assertive enough to require control." 170 Although the strengthened body is a 
precondition for women's liberation, the female body itself has profound social and 
cultural ramifications, which have to be treated with care. Julia flatly shuts out "the 
regions of romance" which are incessantly displayed to her by Frederick, but her 
glowing body after such seduction makes her feelings visible: "Julia's complexion was 
a little flushed by the agitation she had suffered, which served to heighten her beauty" 
(Julia 145). Her desire is so tightly pressed down that it surfaces on the body. Julia's 
excessively modest gesture does not result in self-destruction, but her giving up the 
fulfillment of her desire is a manifestation of feminine self-effacement. 
In Desmond Charlotte Smith depicts the perfect model of a virtuous woman 
who is the idol of the male protagonist. Geraldine Verney is praised for "the pmity of 
her heart, the excellence of her understanding, and her excessive tenderness for her 
children.,,171 The plot is reminiscent of that of Julia, but the obstacle for Geraldine to 
form an intimate relationship with Desmond is her married status. Desmond reminds 
Sentimental Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), p.216. 
170 Mary Poovey, (1984), pp.18-21. 
171 Charlotte Smith, Desmon~ A Novel eds. Antje Blank and Janet Todd (Toronto: 
Broadview Press, 2001), p.228. Hereafter cited as Desmondin parentheses with page 
numbers. 
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himself that she is "a married woman, and her beauty was not, therefore, to be 
considered by a man, looking out, as I was, for a wife, and who never harboured an idea 
of seducing the wife of another" (Desmond 295). Unlike Miss Milner, Geraldine 
complies with the moralist's ideal of a dutiful wife, and willingly confines herself 
within the domestic circle in the retreat: "I find the perfect seclusion, the uninterrupted 
tranquillity I enjoy now, soothing to my spirits, and of course beneficial to my health" 
(Desmond 192). She is indifferent to all the seductive approaches of admirers who 
intrude upon her domestic tranquility. Yet she laments her feminine delicacy which 
makes her susceptible to much wretchedness caused by her husband's dissipation. 
Is it that I set out in life with too great a share of sensibility? Or is it my lot to 
be particularly wretched?-Every means I take to save myself from pain-to 
save those I love-on whom, indeed, my Happiness depends, serves only to 
render me more miserable. (Desmond 159) 
Although she is depicted as a typically feminine character with acute sensibility, she 
shares Wollstonecraft's liberal views and expresses them with passion. 
I had rather meet death than be in his [Mr Verney's] power ... If I get among 
the wildest collection of those people whose ferocity arises not from their 
present liberty, but their recent bondage, is it possible to suppose they will 
injure me, who am myself a miserable slave, returning with trembling and 
reluctant steps, to put on the most dreadful of all fetters? Fetters that would 
even destroy the freedom of my mind. (Desmond 303-4) 
However she is not radical enough to strip off the fetters that impinge on her freedom. 
Geraldine is portrayed as a martyr who puts on these fetters by herself. She says she 
does so because "it is my duty" (Desmond 304). Mr Bethel acts as a mouthpiece of 
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Smith when he poses an enigmatic question, "why is it that the strongest minds ... shall 
yet sink: under the influence of images impressed on the brain by a disturbed digestion, 
or a quickened circulation?" and observes that there "appears to be a strange propensity 
in human nature to torment itself' (Desmond 177). The answer is implied. Because the 
strongest mind does not give way to bodily desire, it consequently "torments" itself by 
restraining various feelings which the body generates. 
Emma Courtney, depicted as a liberal, romantic and passionate woman by 
Mary Hays, is also conscious that her affections are "interwoven" with her body. 
Emma's description of the attachment she developed towards Mr Harley has strong 
sexual implications: "I drank: in large and intoxicating droughts of a delicious 
poison.,,172 Although it was not customary for a woman to propose to a man, Emma 
ventures to confide her sentiments to Mr Harley through a letter. 
It is certain, however singular it may appear, that many months before we 
became personally acquainted, the report of your worth and high qualities had 
generated in my mind, an esteem and reverence, which has gradually ripened 
into a tenderness, that has, at length, mixed itself with all my associations, and 
is become interwoven with every fibre of my heart. (Emma 80) 
Amongst the four female novelists Hays is most markedly aware of the physical body as 
that which is closely entwined with the mind. 173 When her love is not returned by Mr 
Harley, Emma suffers from an "internal malady" (Emma 151) which is described as a 
172 Mary Hays, Memoirs of Emma Courtney Ed. Eleanor Ty (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p.72. Hereafter cited as Emma in parentheses with 
page numbers. 
173 Mary Hays was immensely influenced by the French philosopher Claude Adrien 
Helvetius (1751-71) who argues that "strong passions" are the "germ productive of 
genius, and the powerful spring that carries men to great actions." See De L'esprit:o~ 
Essays on the Mind. and its Several Faculties (London, 1759), p.150. 
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condition where "the faculties both of mind and body seemed almost suspended," and 
this was gradually succeeded by the "disease of body" which "brought on a slow, 
remitting, fever" (Emma 149). Moreover Emma justifies her passions by questioning, 
"Are we, or are we not ... the creatures of sensation and circumstance?" and by further 
asking herself, "[i]s it possible that you can be insensible of all the mighty mischiefs 
which have been caused by this passion ... ?" (Emma 142, 143), as if to say that one's 
character is destined to be formed by the result of unavoidable impressions, which 
makes self-command unthinkable. Like Miss Milner, Emma celebrates such passions, 
citing Rousseau: "Common men know nothing of violent sorrows, nor do great passions 
ever break out in weak minds" (Emma 156). Claiming that "passions and powers are 
synonimous," she says the capacity to be "impressed" is and generates the power 
(Emma 147, italics added). This definition of bodily sensibility therefore is in direct 
opposition to the general conception that yielding to passions is a human flaw or a 
sign of weakness. 
All the heroines of these novels possessed sensibility to a varying degree, and 
struggle either to restrain or justify it. Except in A Simple StOlY they receive sufficient 
education which cultivates their understanding. Contrary to Wollstonecraft's 
educationalist position, however, education (both formal and self-taught) which gives 
them opportunity to expand their mind into political or philosophical inquiry, forming 
their virtuous characters, does not necessarily quell their passions. At best the 
stimulation of the mind "divelied" or "abated" the force of passions (Emma 148). The 
treatment of female passions is indeed a problematic issue for women writers, for the 
word has sexual connotations, but passion is also thought to be a productive energy that 
gives a certain force to the mind. 
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2. Female Genius in Mary 
A female genius is hypothetically conceived and dramatised in the novel Mmy. The chief 
characteristic of a female genius may be that such a character makes moral teachings on 
frivolity and delicacy completely redundant, for she is naturally strong and prefers 
solitude to social gaiety. By creating a narrative about such a character in "A Fiction," 
Wollstonecraft attempted to reconcile the discrepancy between the ideal and actual 
strength in women. 
The educational background of Mary differs from Julia or Emma whose fathers 
took the entire responsibility for their education, since Mary's parents were indifferent to 
their daughter's intellectual development. However much she was neglected, she had the 
power to develop her own thinking faculties: "Neglected in every respect, and left to the 
operations of her own mind, she considered every thing that came under her inspection, 
and learned to think" (Mmy 10). Although like Geraldine the heroine of Mmy repeats the 
marriage vows without thinking, it being the wish of her parents, she soon realises that 
the marriage was a mistake. Neither does she consider living with her husband, Charles, 
absolutely necessary at the beginning. While Charles goes to finish his education, she sets 
off to Lisbon with her dying friend, Ann. When she meets the hero, a literary "genius," 
Hem-y, she is instantly attracted to him, but their relationship remains strictly Platonic. 
Henry eventually dies, and the novel ends with Mary hoping for death and a world where 
"there is neither marrying, nor giving in marriage" (Mmy 73). 
While Mary's intellect develops in spite of the fact that her education was 
totally neglected, the indolent and delicate body of Mary's mother, Eliza, is portrayed as 
a natural consequence of the wrong kind of education, which is reminiscent of Emily 
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Atkins's background. Reading too many fictional works resulted in Eliza's sickly and 
die-away languor. Like Emily, Eliza indulges in reading novels: "she ran over those 
most delightful substitutes for bodily dissipation, novels." As a result her imagination 
and passions are stimulated, as the narrator remarks, "Nothing could be more natural 
than the development of the passions" (Mmy 8). Her desire to read novels is described 
as emanating from the "bodily or the animal soul" and all the other pleasures such as 
"the glare of lights, the studied inelegancies of dress, and the compliments offered up at 
the sIrrine of false beauty" are all addressed to the "senses" (ibid.). 
One would expect the portraiture of Mary to be the direct opposite of Eliza, 
and to reflect Wollstonecraft's faith in reason based on physical and mental strength, 
and its ability to develop both morally and intellectually. Interestingly, however, Mary's 
feelings seem to outweigh her reason and understanding: "Her understanding was strong 
and clear, when not clouded by her feelings; but she was too much the creature of 
impulse, and the slave of compassion" (Mmy 12). This seems like the faithful depiction 
of what Adam Smith has called "the warfare within the breast" which "may be too 
violent to be at all consistent with internal tranquillity and happiness" (MS 245). It is 
also worth noting that Wollstonecraft categorises those susceptible to the "senses" into 
two morally distinct types. While she despises the "captive of sense" or "depraved 
sensualist, who is only moved by what strikes his gross senses" (Mmy 59, 60), she 
celebrates sensibility which is "the most exquisite feeling of which the human soul is 
susceptible" (ibid.). 
On the one hand Wollstonecraft endorses reason in women, and, on the other, 
praises sensibility. This ambivalence must result in the "fate" of genius, as she would 
have said. She begins by writing "Rousseau's fate is the fate of genius" in her review of 
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Rousseau's The Confessions, and she gives sympathetic comments on his character: 
... the excess of his affection for his fellow-creatures, his exquisite sensibility, 
and that panting after distinction, so characteristic of genius, all contributed to 
render his conduct strange and inexplicable to little minds; for experience 
seems to prove, that a man of genius is seldom respected by his inferiors, if 
they live within his vortex, nor are his moral virtues allowed to be pure, 
because he is a rule to himself.174 
Mary's genius is also drawn from her exquisite sensibility, which enables her to 
appreciate nature and to feel "ecstacies" (Mmy 16). She resembles Rousseau in that she 
also sheds tears not only from sympathy but from "the affections which bound her to her 
fellow creatures" (Mmy 59). Mary's sensibility "prompted her to search for an object to 
love" rather than to be loved like Miss Milner (Lady Elmwood) who could not endure the 
solitary life where there is nobody to love or admire her. What is extraordinary about 
Mary is that she is quite indifferent to being loved, for, as Adam Smith has said, "[m]an 
naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely" (MS 113). While the portraiture 
of Mary's mother was concentrated on her sensual aspects, Mary's sensibility is 
disconnected from sensuality altogether. Her pure affection towards Ann which "work[s] 
up her mind to such a degree of anxiety" is markedly compared with "some 
common-place comfort" administered by the ladies surrounding them (Mary 31,32). This 
kind of genius would require little social interaction, disregarding the external factors 
such as the role of a mentor or an instructor. 
Like Geraldine, Mary is portrayed as a woman of strong sensibility with liberal 
174 Mary Wollstonecraft, Analytical Review Vol. 6 (1790) in The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraftvo1.7 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: Pickering, 1989), 
pp.231, 232. 
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ideas, but is carefully depicted with some positive feminine traits. She has "tenderness" 
and she "exercised her compassion so continually, that it became more than a match for 
self-love" (Mmy 11). This statement appears to reiterate Smith's argument against 
Mandeville, that sympathy "cmIDot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle" (MS 
317). At the same time Wollstonecraft does not fail to explicate the dangerous nature of 
sensibility. She depicts Mary as "violent in her temper," though only as a detestable 
inheritance from her "passionate" father (Mmy 10). How then can Wollstonecraft salvage 
passion from a self-sustaining machine which has its own system of movements? This 
question is raised by Henry in the novel. He repeats Humean scepticism, and advises 
Mary on the fluctuating nature of "our sentiments." 
Our affections as well as our sentiments are fluctuating; you will not perhaps 
always either think or feel as you do at present: the object you now shun may 
appear in a different light ... In advising thee in this style, I have only thy good at 
heart, Mary. (Mmy 45,46) 
However Mary believes in what Adam Smith had confidently pronounced, that one's 
"affections are involuntary-yet they can only be fixed by reflection." She further 
reassures Henry that, when her affections are involuntary, they "make quite a part of my 
soul, are interwoven in it" (Mmy 46). While Henry views "affections" as something 
uncertain and impalpable, Mary sees "affections" as something that can be fixed within a 
self, or intertwined with the "soul." This fixation is perhaps what Wollstonecraft admired 
in the characterisation of Julia, because her principles are "so fixed that nothing can 
tempt her to act wrong; and as she appears like a rock." Even though the body is 
associated with a "machine" that has its own logic, by believing that it can be properly 
fixed with continual effort, Wollstonecraft was able to defend not only the "affections" 
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but also the "body" with which these affections are "intertwined." She could believe in 
Hutchesonian benevolence as immovable human nature. 
Mary's benevolence "knew no bounds," and what makes her an "interested 
observer," the narrator says, is the "warmth of her compassion" (Mmy 16). Passion and 
compassion are often accompanied by an adjective "warm" and this functions as an 
important cultural category which signifies humane and moral qualities. When Miss 
Milner scorns Miss Fenton's passion for not being warmer, she hints at her own "warm" 
passion. Mary's affections are coloured by religious feelings and with almost Cowperian 
enthusiasm, and they are roused by the "display of divine mercy" (Mmy 17). Her desire 
or passion seems to be directed towards what Hutcheson calls "the most constant, and 
lively pleasure" in "kind affections to our fellow-creatures." He explains that 
[this pleasure is] so great and durable, and so much strengthened by the 
probable hope of every other valuable pleasure of life, especially the esteem and 
love of our fellows, or at least of the better part of them, that other pleasures 
seem almost to vanish when separated from them; and ever the greatest pains 
seem supportable if they do not exclude them. (OFB 64). 
The kind of affections which Wollstonecraft presents are more corporeal and are 
compared to muscles or physical features, for "those affections that have once been called 
forth and strengthened by exercise, are only smothered, not killed, by disappointment" 
(Mmy 35, italics added). This metaphor is perhaps unique amongst other women writers 
who used such an expression as "affectionate heart" metaphysically to signify moral 
goodness. It is evident that the novel is shot through with the language of Adam Smith's 
The TheOlY of Moral Sentiments, for it was he who allegorised "exercise" to mean 
moral discipline. 
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The wise man whom Nature has endowed with this too exquisite sensibility, and 
whose too lively feelings have not been sufficiently blunted and hardened by 
early education and proper exercise, will avoid, as much as duty and propriety 
will permit, the situations for which he is not perfectly fitted. (MS 245) 
Wollstonecraft's conviction that "exertion" whether it be mental, bodily or even 
emotional will have a lasting effect on the tangible part of the self echoes Smith's belief 
in "proper exercise," which makes the notion of "fortitude" appropriate in moral contexts. 
Mary's strength stands out amongst many other "weak" characters in the novel 
including Ann and Henry, whose constitutions are naturally weak (Mmy 40). There is, for 
instance, a sharp contrast between the strength of Mary's body and the failing of Ann's 
health. Mary has so fit a body that she can forget to take nourishment when she is 
absorbed in study (Mmy 17), whereas Ann can hardly support "the animal function" 
when she does the same. 
Ann has not fortitude enough to brave such accumulated misery; and besides, 
the canker-worm is lodged in her heart, and preys on her health. She denies herself every 
little comfort; things that would be no sacrifice when a person is well, are absolutely 
necessary to alleviate bodily pain, and support the animal functions. (Mary 18) Thus 
Mary's physical strength enables her to be absorbed in intellectual researches or carry out 
charitable activities. 
It is a common understanding that Wollstonecraft's critical attitude towards 
essentialism in The Rights of Woman is based on the notion that education or environment 
generates gender difference or promotes individual talents, but this is fundamentally 
opposite to the way Mary developed her virtues. Mary's genius seems to contradict 
Wollstonecraft's later educational theory of what modem commentators call 
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"enviromnentalism," a theory which conceives the self as a product of environment and 
therefore emphasizes the importance of social interaction and education. 
3. Women and Self-Government 
Wollstonecraft's inclination to co-opt external influences III the process of identity 
creation IS observed in her earlier educational writings such as Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters (1787) and Original Stories ji'om Real Life; with Conversations 
Calculated to Regulate the Affections, and Form the Mind to Truth and Goodness 
(1788). In The Education of Daughters, she believes that a child is born with instincts 
and passions which it is the business of education to bring under the control of 
reason.
175 Original Stories is particularly focused on the role of education in developing 
self-control in female children. The governess called Mrs Mason tries to reform two 
indolent children, Mary and Caroline, who have been misguided by willful parents. 
They are described as "shamefully ignorant,,176 and their idleness and gluttony are 
severely criticized. Their excessive appetites are represented as the ill-effect of 
civilization. Mrs Mason's attempts to improve the inner qualities of these children are 
based on Wollstonecraft's "perfectibilist" view 177 that anyone is capable of 
improvement. Improvement, for her, meant that one's mental exertion will gradually 
enable one to reflect on the emotive aspect of hislherself and control it. Considering that 
"self-control" is Wollstonecraft's primary interest in educational writings, it is quite apt 
175 Mary Wollstonecraft, Thoughts on the Education of Daughters in The Works of 
Mary Wollstonecraft vol. 4 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William 
Pickering, 1989). 
176 Mary Wollstonecraft, Original Stories from Real Life in The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraftvol. 4 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 
1989), p.361. Hereafter cited as Original Stories in parentheses with page numbers. 
177 Harriet Devine Jump, Mary Wollstonecraft: Writer (New York and London: 
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that the novel Mary is about the heroine's self-control and firmness of mind. However 
the importance of environment is hardly exemplified by the heroine of this novel. 
Moreover Ann is Mary's role model but not a mentor. Mary takes the initiative to learn 
how to write just by imitating Ann's writing, because a genius, the narrator says, 
requires little instruction. 
The most highlighted theme in Original Stories is the ever-present body or 
bodily desire which needs to be suppressed. Mrs Mason, for instance, teaches the 
importance of enduring bodily pain. Regulating "appetites and whims" she believes all 
contribute to forming strength of mind and a habit of controlling violent passions. Mrs 
Mason admonishes, 
Believe me, it is the patient endurance of pain, that will [enable] you to resist 
your passions; after you have borne bodily pain, you will have firmness enough 
to sustain the still more excruciating agonies of the mind. (Original Stories 
438) 
Mary, without any great effort, the narrator says, "conquers her appetites and whims" so 
entirely that "when her understanding or affections had an object, she almost forgot she 
had a body which required nourishment" (Mmy 17). This forgetfulness of her own body 
accentuates the importance of the mind and the disconnection from the body or the 
nerve system: "she could endure the greatest fatigue without appearing sensible of it" 
(Mmy 38). While the body or its sensuality is gendered feminine by Wollstonecraft and 
her contemporary novelists, the disembodied part of the self, the mind or "spirits," is 
non-gendered. The obsession with bodily needs is condemned as indulgent and 
sometimes vicious. When she is with Henry sitting on the damp ground, Mary cares 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p.17. 
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about his illness, but is negligent of the "material injury" that may be caused to her own 
body: "she did not fear bodily pain" (ibid.). As Adam Smith has said, "a certain 
firmness of nerves and hardiness of constitution, whether natural or acquired, are 
undoubtedly the best preparatives for all the great exertions of self-command" (MS 
245). 
In terms of "appetites" and "vulgar" passions, Wollstonecraft wanted to efface 
the source, namely the body, and this is consistent throughout her writings, especially in 
Mary and A Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Mary's Platonic love 
relationship with Henry was possible only because of her absolute control over physical 
passion. By denying desire or the bodily aspects of the self, she almost reduces the self 
to the point where she calls it "spirit." Many modem critics have argued that Mary's 
passion for Henry strangely lacks eroticism, but I believe that this was purposefully 
done to show that a genius could command passions as strong as physical love. 
This tendency is observed in other texts such as 'The Cave of Fancy' (1786)178 
written a year before Mary. The most interesting aspect of this text is that one of the 
main narrators is a female "spirit." The question of why the speaker had to be a "spirit" 
is worth considering. The spirit has lately entered the cave where all mortals go after 
death. The story closely resembles that of Mary in that this spirit, when she was alive, 
was in a hopeless love relationship with a "friend", but was confined to an unhappy 
arranged marriage with an older businessman. Just before this female narrator was 
forced to marry against her will, she was tempted to let her secret feelings escape her 
own lips. It was the "spirit" which watched over her impulse to give away the secret, 
178 Mary Wollstonecraft, 'Extract of a Cave of Fancy' in The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraftvo1.1 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William Pickering, 
1989). Hereafter cited as CFwith page numbers in parentheses. 
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"My active spirit was painfully on the watch to repress every tender emotion" (CF 204). 
The "spirit" is as it were the Superego in Freudian terminology. In this narrative, the 
sentimentalism of the female spirit is developed to such a degree that the afterlife is 
again romanticized, and the theme of immortality is brought to the fore. At the same 
time, the spirit is represented as an ongoing entity that has an independent existence 
after the destruction of the body. The spirit recounts how she wished for immortal life. 
[We] began to talk of the immortality of the soul; I declared that I could 
not live without this conviction. . . . the affection we felt was not of a 
perishable nature. (CF 202). 
The effacing of the body or bodily presence not only suggested the morally destructive 
aspect of sensibility, but also indicated that Wollstonecraft believed in the existence of 
the immortal soul separate from the sexualized body. 
Some commentators have argued that the spirit in 'The Cave of Fancy' is 
neither male nor female, and this is true to some extent, in that a soul which has lost its 
body is sexless. Barbara Taylor has argued that the female spirit is in fact, "a 
proto-feminist whose sublimity points to a moral stature rarely accorded women.,,179 
Wollstonecraft may well have asked such a question as, "Why should imaginative 
grandeur be all on men's side?" as Taylor supposes. But Wollstonecraft would have 
taken it further and asked, "Why should the bodily display and its sensuality be all on 
women's side?", for there would be no or little importance attached to beauty if there 
were no physical presence of the body. 
The purity of the heroine's paSSIOn IS of course a runnmg theme of 
179 Barbara Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.64. 
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eighteenth-century novels, in which Platonic love is idealized. Julie and St.Preux in 
Rousseau's Nouvelle Heloise are a case in point. But the complex representation of the 
body is equally important in explaining Wollstonecraft's preoccupation with the 
disembodiment of the self. On the one hand, Wollstonecraft considered bodily strength 
as the major premise of intellectual capacity, but on the other, she thought the concept of 
the body too problematic to handle especially in fiction, for it was charged with 
meanings such as sexual desire, sexual difference, or sensualism. It is possible that she 
wanted to dismiss it altogether. Both in Mmy and 'The Cave of Fancy,' Wollstonecraft is 
much preoccupied with controlling bodily desire. The narrative spends so much time on 
monitoring the passions of the heroines that these female geniuses become excessively 
"reflective" and consequently "melancholic" or even "solipsistic." Their narratives are 
dominated by their excessive emotion caused by too much self-control. 
4. Solitary Genius 
When Wollstonecraft depicted a female genius as excessively emotional, it could be that 
she was falling back on a rather hackneyed idea that a Romantic genius has emotions 
too powerful to suppress. However hard Mary tries, she can hardly "conceal her violent 
emotions" (Mmy 17). Reason and judgment are on occasion played down at the cost of 
praising the sensibility of a genius: "That as judgment improves, genius evaporates" 
(Mmy 37). Sensibility is not repudiated as much as in The Rights of Woman and its 
excess is allowed a certain grandeur. When she has her heroine, Mary, question "why do 
thoughts [and rapturous emotions] so rapidly rush into my mind, and yet when they 
disappear leave such deep traces?" (Mmy 57), she sets aside her tenet that instructs 
women to monitor and curb excessive emotion, and she almost takes pride in her 
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heroine's inability to control such rapturous emotions. It could be said that 
Wollstonecraft's attempt to portray a female genius involves a manipulation of gender 
representation. Mary, however, does not only possess acute sensibility but is also 
capable of exerting self-command which is principally a masculine trait. The effusive 
nature of sensibility may be denominated feminine, but the heroine is also an 
em bodiment of the virtues of self-deniaL This gender distinction may reflect a particular 
anthropological observation. We could observe a strong parallel between Mary's 
stoicism and Adam Smith's theory on the "Influence of Custom and Fashion upon 
Moral Sentiments." 
In the section on the Influence of Custom, cultivated virtues in civilized nations 
are set against the virtues of self-denial in barbarous nations. 
Among civilized nations, the virtues which are founded upon humanity, are 
more cultivated than those which are founded upon self-denial and the 
command of the passions. Among rude and barbarous nations, it is quite 
otherwise, the virtues of self-denial are more cultivated than those of 
humanity. The general security and happiness which prevail in ages of civility 
and politeness, afford little exercise to the contempt of danger, to patience in 
enduring labour, hunger and pain. (MS 205) 
Once again "exercise" is the key to developing the virtues of self-denial. Smith praises 
the unconquerable firmness of the "savages," which does not pennit them to indulge in 
the weakness of love. Over this passion, Smith argues, they exert absolute 
self-command. Whereas the weaknesses of those who are brought up to live in civilized 
societies are such that they "complain when they are in pain, if they grieve when they 
are in distress, if they allow themselves either to be overcome by love, or to be 
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discomposed by anger" (MS 207). His rhetoric is heavily reliant on Burke's ideas of the 
sublime and beautiful, and is also gendered. For instance, such weakness of civilized 
manners IS characterised as "unpardonable effeminacy" or "indecent and unmanly 
sensuality. " 
Since our sentiments concerning beauty of every kind, are so much influenced 
by custom and fashion, it cannot be expected, that those, concerning the beauty 
of conduct, should be entirely exempted from the dominion of those principles. 
(MS200) 
Mrs Mason's two pupils and Mary's mother, Eliza, reminds us of Emily Atkins and 
Miss Milner whose vanity or love of praise was a syrnpton of their weakness. They are 
typical feminine characters whose minds have been affected by the civilized way of life. 
In Mary, "[r]iches, and the consequent state" are said to be "the sublime of weak 
minds." Their minds, the narrator says, are "shackled with a set of notions concerning 
propriety, the fitness of things for the world's eye, trammels which always hamper weak 
people" (Mary 30). 
Smith further depicts the style of manners in civilized society as effeminate: 
"the delicate sensibility required in civilized nations sometimes destroys the masculine 
firmness of the character" (MS 209). The genius in Mary is defined not so much as 
feminine "exquisite sensibility" as masculine firmness to command it. The 
characterisaton of such a primitive genius is therefore divested of feminine delicacy or 
"unmanly sensuality." As we have earlier noted, Wollstonecraft's effort to distinguish 
sensibility from sensuality is reinforced by the principle of self-denial, which is strictly 
masculine. Mary discovers after a long journey that 
Sensibility is the most exquisite feeling of which the human soul is susceptible: 
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when it pervades us, we feel happy and could it last unmixed, we might fonn 
some conjecture of the bliss of those paradisiacal days, when the obedient 
passions were under the dominion of reason, and the impulses of the heart did 
not need correction (Mmy 59). 
This in tum suggests that one's heart does need correction in a civilized society. That is 
the reason why Original Stories is a tribute to masculine firmness of mind as well as a 
rebuttal to feminine weakness. By giving Mary's genius a special status, her failure in 
finding happiness is attributed to society and the fault is always outside of the self, 
namely the society where inner virtues are not valued. Her solitary or rather solipsistic 
way of life is not negatively portrayed in the novel. Rather, the death wish is presented 
as the only way out for such an "anachronistic" woman. I use this tenn, anachronistic, 
because Wollstonecraft, consciously or not, projected her ideal woman as a primitive 
genius whose happiness was predicated upon living in the state of nature. Self-control is 
the key to the intellectual development of a genius in the age of civilization as Mrs 
Mason demonstrates, but too much of it will ultimately lead to the absence of the body, 
hence death. The fear of death is the ultimate passion which threatens humanity, and 
those who conquer "the king of terrors," Adam Smith wrote, are "not likely to lose his 
presence of mind at the approach of any other natural evil." The command of fear and 
anger, he adds, denominates "fortitude, manhood, and strength of mind" (MS 238, 239). 
By presenting a female genius as an almost disembodied being, Wollstonecraft was 
fonning a contradictory view to her feminist theory which she was later to develop. For 
her, this balance between the body and mind was subtle; perhaps it made sense to 
herself, but she has often been criticized for being incoherent and muddled. This is a 
reasonable evaluation. Her rhetoric of a primitive genius recuperates a grandeur in a 
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female character to some extent, but fails to support her progressIve ideas. This 
oscillation partly reflects the contemporary philosophical issues concerning the essential 
character of self, but is partly symbolic of Wollstonecraft's own ambivalent ideas that 
what makes self a genius has been education and exertion, but what propelled her to 
develop her own intellect was her extraordinary passion. After all, Wollstonecraft has 
given her own name, Mary, to the heroine of the noveL 
5 
Imagining the Body in 
Mary W ollstonecraft' s 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
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The female body was re-presented by Wollstonecraft in her fictional character, Mary, 
her alter-ego, in which excessive emotion was harmonised with extraordinary physical 
strength. Hyper-sensibility is, however, negatively depicted, if not repudiated, in The 
Rights of Woman. In this political tract, there is a sharp awareness of bodily sensibility, 
expressed by the words "animal spirits," "passions" and "sensations," which affects the 
human capacity to reason. Therefore, there is a strange contest between reason and 
sensibility in her supposedly rationalist argument, as Miriam Brody points out. The 
female body and passion, which Wollstonecraft "attempted to submerge surfaced in her 
text in spite of herself to disrupt and qualify her argument.,,180 This may be partly due 
to the eighteenth-century literary trend of endorsing sensibility, which invoked "human 
nature" and "the passions" as Chris Jones has argued, lSI but there are two other 
contiguous factors that can be registered to explain the prominence of the body in 
Wollstonecraft's texts. 
The first refers to the fact that the knowledge of bodies in the very nature of 
their bones, nerves, and reproductive organs, not just of men but of women, became 
180 See Miriam Brody, Introduction to A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), p.69. 
lSI See Chris Jones, (1993). 
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more accessible in the eighteenth century. I 82 These "bodies," in the corporeal and 
scientific sense, came to bear an enormous weight of cultural meaning in the 
Enlightenment era. However, what seemed to be "scientific" and "neutral" is actually 
embedded in cultural and moral values that are heavily gendered, especially with 
reference to bodily sensibility. Wollstonecraft's enlightenment statement about reason, 
which has been generally treated as an exemplar of her feminist theory of gender, can 
only be properly understood within the cultural context in which the female body had 
special prominence as the metaphysical site of sensibility.183 This body, however, 
proved more problematic than it seemed. The culture of sensibility represented the body 
no less as the source of desire and passions that are the counterforce to reason than as 
the organic "machine" which enables mental exertion and unfolds intellectual 
development. To elaborate, not only does Wollstonecraft metaphorically transpose "the 
body" into that which causes passions to arise and sometimes aggravates uncontrollable 
desire, but more importantly uses it as the basis of mental strength. The fruit of 
education which strengthens the mind, according to her, produces the power of 
"reflection." In The Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft uses this word as almost synonymous 
with "reason," which she argues must be "the director of the whole host of passions," 
for the "passions, are neither good nor evil dispositions, till they receive a direction" 
(VRM 31).184 We need to inquire whether her frequent references to mental "strength" 
182 See for example Thomas Laqueur, (1990). 
183 G.J.Barker-Benfield has demonstrated how profound and widespread this culture 
was in literature, religion (evangelicalism), and economy (consumerism). See The 
Culture ofSensibi1ity: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain. (Chicago and 
London: Chicago UP, 1992). 
184Thomas Paine also acknowledges these "two distinct classes of what are called 
thoughts-those that we produce in ourselves by reflection and the act of thinking, and 
those that bolt into the mind of their own accord." See The Age of Reason (1794) (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1984), p.50. Hereafter cited as ARwith page numbers in 
parentheses. Wollstonecraft met Paine in the late 1780s when Johnson organised 
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and "exercise" are purely metaphorical. While she talks of mentality, her terminology is 
often profoundly physical. In The Rights of Woman, she maintains that 
... the mind gains strength by the exercise, sufficient, perhaps, to comprehend 
the answers which, in another step of existence, it may receive to the anxious 
questions it asked, when the understanding with feeble wing was fluttering 
round the visible effects to dive into the hidden cause. The passion also, the 
winds of life, would be useless, if not injurious, did the substance which 
composes our thinking being, after we have thought in vain, only become the 
support of vegetable life, and invigorate a cabbage, or blush in a rose." (VRW 
178) 
Wollstonecraft does not explicate what constitutes "the substance," but this word in a 
physiological sense prompts one to conceive "the matter or tissue composing an animal 
body" or "any particular kind of corporeal matter.,,185 With this frame of reference, 
together with the fact that medical discourse had a profound influence on the notion of 
the body, it is possible that she could no longer clearly distinguish the realm of the body 
from that of the mind, despite her rigorous argument about independent human reason. 
It is also worth commenting on her perception of this term "substance." She touches 
upon "passion" which would be useless or even injurious when the "substance" only 
contributes to the maintenance of organic life. The power of soul to direct and move, 
she suggests, does more than what is needed for material subsistence, which alerts us to 
see a spiritual level beyond corporeality. 
weekly dinners. 
185 See The Oxford English Dictionary. "Substance" 7. & 8. According to the OED, the 
first use of the word in this sentence in the eighteenth century is by Richard Blackmore, 
in his Treatise of Consumptions (1724). He is also the author of A Treatise of the Spleen 
and Vapours (London 1725). 
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The second fonnidable influence comes from Rousseau who considered the 
state of nature to be superior to civilization. Fuseli's "faults" from which Wollstonecraft 
"caught the infection" of Rousseauvian idealism are elaborated in Godwin's Memoirs of 
the Author of The Rights of Woman (1798). Godwin says that "Smitten with Rousseau's 
conception of the perfection of the savage state, the essential abortiveness of all 
civilization, Mr Fuseli ... looks at all our little attempts at improvement, with a spirit 
that borders perhaps too much upon contempt and indifference" (Memoirs 234). 
Similarly, Wollstonecraft's language of sensibility could well have been in great part 
shaped by Rousseau's criticism of the artificialities and inequalities of high society. 
Being a syrnpathiser with radicalism and a visionary of egalitarian society,186 like 
Rousseau Wollstonecraft disdains the idle and "effeminate" or weakened bodies of the 
aristocratic class as opposed to the robust and strong physique of primitive people. 
Yet we must highlight their opposing views on the treatment of sex and gender. 
Wollstonecraft refutes Rousseau's claim that women are made the scapegoat for 
"unlimited desires.,,187 It may be argued, quite rightly, that The Rights of Woman, 
resolutely advocating women's rationality and self-control, is the antithesis to Emile 
(1762) with its gentle and pleasing 'Sophie,' Rousseau's fictional creation of the ideal 
woman of sensibility fit to marry Emile. However Wollstonecraft cannot wholly deny 
the claim that the female body from infancy has been "made the weathercock of its own 
sensations" (VRW 136,137) and is inclined to sensual and gluttonous indulgence. 
Wollstonecraft's ambivalent attitude towards "refinement," "progress" and 
186 See Introduction by Miriam Brody. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), p.4S. 
187 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education ed. Allan Bloom (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin books, 1991), p.359. Hereafter referred to as Emile with page numbers in 
parentheses. 
155 
"civilization" can be attributed to her confusion about "whether one's passions multiply 
or diminish with the progression of civilization" and to her optimism about sensibility. 
She connects sensibility and passions with naturalness and the body to which she, in one 
form or another, pays tribute as "exquisitely polished instinct" (VRW 132) that 
"perceives" truth. Her equivocal view about materialism added further complication. On 
the one hand, she celebrates the increased knowledge of science and art in civilized 
societies, with cultivated taste and reason. On the other, she embraces Rousseau's belief 
that civilization brings more evils than good, such as "indolence," "vanity" and 
"passions." These contradictory views coexist in Wollstonecraft's writings, and 
convolute her argument. In essence, however, I would like to argue that her 
self-propelling paradox is generated by her pseudo-materialist position, namely her 
eagerness to prioritise the immaterial soul over bodily sensibility, while failing to 
extricate it from the body or the passions. Medical discourse had an immense role in the 
development of anthropological speculations about what puts the human soul above any 
other entity, induding animals. It also had a profound bearing upon the notion of a 
cosmic spirit moving through nature,I88 for these issues were constantly raised by 
eighteenth-century physiologists. On the score of human reason against passions, they 
were bound together by the term "sensitive soul," to which many writers across 
disciplines referred as the working of "nature." 
This chapter neither sets out to simplify the discourse on sensibility into 
comprehensive binaries of reason and instinct, spirit and matter, or soul and body, nor 
tries to foreground Wollstonecraft's convoluted argument about reason and sensibility. It 
188 See Janet Todd, Mary Wollstonecraft:A Revolutionary Life (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2000), p.329. 
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aims to clarify where the argument about the "body" or "bodies" in relation to reason 
led. This will be discussed with reference to medical discourse and to her educationist 
stance. 189 It seems to me that the themes in The Rights of Woman, like those in 
Godwin's Political Justice, integrate an ontological attempt to excavate not only reason 
but moral agency.190 The soul as the seat of intellectual properties, even when isolated 
from the gendered body, proved problematic for Wollstonecraft. Her constant references 
to the body with pent-up desire and sexual passion deviate from what she had set out to 
do, that is, to overturn Rousseau's sensual female body and to sublimate the soul. 
1. The Soul as the Power of the Mind 
The Sensorium or the nerve system that could operate independently of one's "will" or 
rational mind becomes a feminist issue for Wollstonecraft. One cannot enjoy or 
experience anything without the body or the "organs of sense," but "to their senses, are 
women made slaves." 
This overstretched sensibility naturally relaxes the other powers of the mind, 
and prevents intellect from attaining that sovereignty which it ought to attain to 
render a rational creature useful to others, and content with its own station; for 
the exercise of the understanding, as life advances, is the only method pointed 
out by nature to claim the passions (VRW 130). 
Sensibility or what she also calls the movement of "subtile electric fluid" produces 
"habitual association" (VRW 186), which could become a hindrance to exercising reason. 
The sixth chapter of The Rights of Woman discusses this, arguing that "[0 ]ver those 
189 Both Rousseau and Wollstonecraft produce instructive books such as the former's 
Emile and the latter's Original Stories. 
190 Rousseau had also sought to locate moral agency in the body, but only in the male 
157 
instantaneous associations we have little power" (VRW 185). For her, through the 
process of "growth," ideas are associated by the workings of "animal spirits" or "the 
happy energy of associating thoughts," and this association has a "great effect on the 
moral character" (VRW 186). She thus ascribes moral character to associations made in 
the course of life. The vulnerability of the sensible mind commonly possessed by 
women is here set against the "strength of mind" which could "efface the 
superinductions of art that have smothered nature" (ibid.). 
Yet Rousseau had considered this "sensitivity" or "delicacy" to be an admirable 
viltue. He believed there exist those with "sensitive souls" living apart from perverted 
society, in whom "nature" still reigns. For him, Julie and Saint Preux, in La Nouvelle 
Heloi"se, undoubtedly belong to this group. Saint Preux admires Julie for possessing the 
"voice of nature," which is stronger than that of her wisdom (Heloise 45), and the latter 
acknowledges it: "While teaching us to think, you [Saint Preux] have learned from us to 
feel" (Heloise 238). As Denise Riley states, Rousseauvian thought is the readiest 
example that suggests the association of "women" with the natural191 or the realm of 
feeling, and consequently left a gloomy but powerful impression upon Wollstonecraft 
about sexual difference. 
Wollstonecraft unfolds a hypothetical argument about future women who, with 
their independent reason, would "guard the mind from storing up vicious associations" 
(VRW 190) which "entangled love with their motives of action" (VRW 189). Thus, her 
animadversion on women's indolence and negligence about self-improvement is 
partially directed towards their lack of mental strength, "reasons" and "will." Although 
body. 
191 Denise Riley, {:.1m I That Name?"Feminism and the Category of {{Women" in HistOly 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1990), p.36. 
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she laments the state of "Half the sex, in its present infantile state," she believes that the 
condition is still curable, in that women's weakness of mind is less owing to natural 
difference than to education. 
Nevertheless, Wollstonecraft attaches a great deal of importance to bodily 
strength, and argues that "strength of mind has in most cases been accompanied by 
superior strength of body" (VRW 107). Emphasising the homologous relationship 
between the mind and the body, she talks of the "education of the body" as well as of 
the mind (VRW 150). This argument is elaborated in the third chapter, which Ellison 
points out, is marked by Wollstonecraft's dictum, "dependence of body naturally 
produces dependence of mind."l92 It is worth noting that the word "mind" is frequently 
used interchangeably with "soul," especially when she tries to make a distinction with 
the body, for it is the sphere of the body that complicates the philosophical problem of 
agency. 
Wollstonecraft scrutinises the notion of the soul in The Rights of Woman by 
critically reviewing Rousseau's statement: 
"Whencesoever girls derive this first lesson, it is a very good one. As the body 
is born, in a manner, before the soul, our first concern should be to cultivate the 
former; this order is common to both sexes, but the object of that cultivation is 
different. In the one sex it is the development of corporeal powers; in the other, 
that of personal charms .... Women certainly require as much strength as to 
enable them to move and act gracefully, and men as much address as to qualify 
them to act with ease .... And, in fact, almost all of them [women] learn with 
192 Julie Ellison, 'Redoubled Feeling: Politics, Sentiment, and the Sublime in Williams 
and Wollstonecraft' in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culturevo1.20 eds. L.E. Brown 
and P.B.Craddock (Colleageus Press, 1991), p.206. 
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reluctance to read and write; but very readily apply themselves to the use of 
their needles." (VRW 149, 150). 
In this context the "soul" does not signify the principle of "life" in man or animals, or 
that which is bestowed by God, used in a traditional Christian sense. Instead, it implies 
the mind or intellectual properties. The closest definition which The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives of this sort of soul is: "The principle of thought and action in man, 
commonly regarded as an entity distinct from the body; the spiritual part of man in 
contrast to the purely physical.,,193 The body here signifies a physical presence or 
matelial frame/ structure that "acts" according to its need. Even though Rousseau 
differentiates the "education of the body" by sex, he leaves the original body free from 
sexual difference. There was a general trend to deny sexual identity to the subject, and 
following that, Wollstonecraft declared that the neutral, rational subject has in essence 
no sex. 194 
The inclination to isolate the "original" body from sexual traits is also observed 
in Rousseau's statement at the beginning of Book 5 of Emile. He acknowledges that 
both women and men are of the same nature with respect to their capacity and bodily 
functions. 
In everything not connected with sex, woman is man. She has the same organs, 
the same needs, the same faculties. The machine is constructed in the same 
way; its parts are the same; the one functions as does the other; the form is 
similar; and in whatever respect one considers them the difference between 
them is only one of more or less. In everything connected with sex, woman and 
193 See The Oxford English Dictionary. 2.a 
194 Thomas Laqueur (1986), p.23. 
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man are in every respect related and in every respect different.(Emile 357) 
Rousseau believes that woman's corporeal "machine" is constructed in the same way as 
man's except for some aspects connected with sex,195 but in discussing gender 
difference, he tends to ignore the corporeal faculties as the basis of mental exertions, 
and asserts that the female body should be strengthened so as to move "gracefully." 
Wollstonecraft has sharply criticised this tendency: "the difference between 
strengthening the body, on which strength of mind in a great measure depends, and only 
giving it an easy motion, is very wide" (VRW 151). This is a pertinent remark, for 
Rousseau, when it comes to female education, takes away the premise that the body 
could be the ground for intellectual improvement. He gives women credit by raising 
their status above "a veritable automaton," and yet he adds that their education should 
be limited to "those that are suitable for [her] to know" (Emile 364). 
What Wollstonecraft is challenging is not Rousseau's representation of the 
female body itself. Her ridicule of the Rousseauvian notion that the female soul "was 
fond of dress" in a pre-existent state (VRW 97), displays her uncompromising attitude to 
the attribution of gender traits to the physical features. She problematises Rousseau's 
idea of the soul which is sexualised. According to Wollstonecraft, Rousseau's sexualised 
"soul" or gender distinction ("the manly or the effeminate manner") is moulded by 
education. 
Thus a robust or a delicate temperament, together with the strength or 
weakness attaching to it, often derives from the manly or the effeminate 
manner in which one has been raised rather than from the original constitution 
195 This idea perhaps has its root in his liberal theory put forward in his A Discourse 
on Inequality. 
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of the body. The same is true of the powers of the mind; and not only does 
education establish a difference between cultivated minds and those which are 
not, but it increases the differences among cultivated minds in proportion to 
their culture .... " (Discourse 1 05) 
Rousseau's general philosophical observation on the "original" body and mind, as we 
can see, is not gender-specific. Wollstonecraft points out his contradiction, "if it be not 
philosophical to think of sex when the soul is mentioned, the inferiority must depend on 
the organs" (VRW 103). Her sceptical comment suggests that the only thing required of 
women to build intellectual strength is a firm body which can be attained by "industry" 
and physical "exercise" (VRW 183). 
By setting the bodily organs of male and female on an equal footing, as 
Rousseau had done in principle, Wollstonecraft tries to redraw the social categories or 
hierarchy not by sex, class, or religious authority, but by "sweat," "blood," "industry," 
or "knowledge" (VRW 127). This gesture gives new privilege to the professional class 
and their accomplishments, no longer assessed by wealth, rank or manner, or sense of 
superiority. 
It is of great importance to observe that the character of every man is, in some 
degree, formed by his profession. A man of sense may only have a cast of 
countenance that wears off as you trace his individuality, whilst the weak, 
common man has scarcely ever any character, but what belongs to the 
body; .... Society, therefore, as it becomes more enlightened, should be very 
careful not to establish bodies of men who must necessarily be made foolish or 
vicious by the very constitution of their profession. (VRW 87) 
On the whole Wollstonecraft's approach to human excellence is strictly based on moral, 
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intellectual or physical meritocracy. It shares its basis with the enlightenment ideology 
that departed from both hereditary nobility and bourgeoisie and aimed at an ascendancy 
of the intellectual class, including those making a living from writing; Wollstonecraft 
herself was undeniably one of them. 
Though Rousseau would have been indignant to be categorised with so 
"disreputable" a figure as La Mettrie,196 there is no denying that these two French 
philosophes, as well as Wollstonecraft, were influenced by the same political milieu 
which resented social value measured by class or wealth, and they shared the same 
liberal idea that the "body" with its intellect intact should be the basis of fair evaluation. 
Although the association that La Mettrie makes between "delicacy" and "the fair sex" is 
the sweeping stereotype that Wollstonecraft wished to undermine, some of her ideas 
have resonance with La Mettrie's assertion that lack of education reinforces women's 
already degraded souL In emphasising her point, Wollstonecraft consciously uses the 
trope of the body, stating that the property of an honest mechanic "is in his nervous 
arms." With these arms the mechanic is "compelled to pull a strange rope at the surly 
command of a tyrannic boy, who probably obtained his rank on account of his family 
connections" (VRM 15). The body is symbolically compared to an organic machine, not 
merely because it requires nervous and muscular fibres, but because its quality lies in its 
operation. The relation between the mechanic and the tyrannic boy is defined by class, 
but she further underlines the importance of the body as a natural property possessed 
and fully utilised by the professional class. "Mental as well as bodily exertion is at first 
196 Aram Vartanian, 'La Mettrie and Rousseau' in British Journal for 
Eighteenth-Century Studies VoL8, No.2 (1985), p.156. In this essay, Vartanian 
discusses the theme of guilt (in a Christian sense) persistent in the works of both 
Rousseau and La Mettrie. They share similar idea about primitive man holding the 
virtues of simplicity, ignorance and innocence. 
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irksome," she points out, and she explains why "the many would fain let others both 
work and think for them" (VRW 182). 
This allows room for a revaluation of human excellence in terms of a 
developing organism. Wollstonecraft did not believe that a ready-made spiritual soul 
bestowed upon any types of body, weak or strong, would sustain its quality. Her 
celebration of "bodily strength," for example, is expressed in her discussion about 
genius. Contrary to what "superficial observers have inferred," she argues, in most cases 
strength of mind has been accompanied by superior strength of body-natural 
soundness of constitution (VRW 107). Her idea that comlects the physiological 
constitution with intellectual power may partly be indebted to Rousseau's notion of the 
soul which grows after the body is born and La Mettrie's theory of the mind, which he 
considers a part of the organic "machine." Most importantly, medical discourse which 
prevailed in the late eighteenth century about what constitutes "intelligence" or the 
capacity to think must have had a definitive influence. 
Physiological investigation focused on the nerve as the bridge between the 
philosophical/psychological inquiry into the soul and the anatomical concern with the 
brain. Therefore, the idea about the "sensorium" or "sensibility" was partly 
philosophical, and partly anatomical. 197 Albrecht von Haller was one of the first to 
examine the sensibility of an organism and its soul within the physiological system, and 
he is also renowned for introducing the theory of the irritability of muscular fibres. 
Wollstonecraft's rhetorical appeal is dominated by these images. When it comes to 
"education" of the minds, it is the muscular and nervous "fibres" that have to be 
197 Karl M. Figlio, 'Theories of Perception and the Physology of Mind in the Late 
Eighteenth Century' in History of Science XII (1975), pp.177-212. 
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strengthened (VRW 183). By preserving personal beauty, women's limbs and faculties 
are "cramped with worse than Chinese bands, and the sedentary life which they are 
condemned to live, whilst boys frolic in the open air, weakens the muscles and relaxes 
the nerves" (VRW 110, 111). 
That spirit or soul is nothing more than the bodily organisation of matter is 
pivotal to the development of medical discourse in the early nineteenth century. Already 
in the late eighteenth century, when Wollstonecraft published her The Rights of Woman, 
the debates on mental activity and its relation to the brain were present among her social 
circle. Joseph Priestley whose books were published by Joseph Johnson, like 
Wollstonecraft, is one of the major figures devoted to exploring the operation of the 
mind as part of the bodily organism. His Free Discussion of the Doctrines of 
Materialism and Philosophical Necessity (1778) concerns his materialistic idea. In 1788, 
a columnist reviewed Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man in Johnson's 
journal, The Analytical Review (1788), and he is right to stress Priestley's materialist 
position. 
On the received principles of induction, he [Dr Priestley] asserts, that we ought 
to ascribe the capacity of intelligence to matter, as well as the property of 
gravitation. Thought he believed to arise necessarily from a certain 
organization of the brain, and, resting on this, he denies the existence of an 
immaterial principle. 198 
If man is a product of his biomedical makeup, does he or she have free will? Can he or 
she be held responsible for his or her actions? Is consciousness the captain of the soul, 
198 See "Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man" reviewed in The Analytical Review 
or History of Literature, Domestic and Foreign. voL 1 (May to August 1788), p.147. 
Italics added. 
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or is it just a by-product of the brain? I 99 These questions are in part answered by Reid's 
inquiry into the extent of human power. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, he divides 
the power into the innate, and those faculties dependent on exercise which he calls 
"moral." By distinguishing the latter from the original animal faculties which, left alone, 
grow up like the trees of the forest, Reid is able to show that moral qualities have to be 
acquired and maintained by exertion. For Wollstonecraft, too, it is only by one's own 
exeltion and "industry" that one can attain strength. Her writing is strikingly similar to 
Reid's theory in that she compares the human body to "shooting tendrils" or a "tree," 
that grows strong (VRW 183). The fact that Reid's theory is discussed in the Analytical 
Review is relevant, for Wollstonecraft herself contributed to it.2oO 
In the same year this review came out, Joseph Johnson published John Brown's 
Elements of Medicine (1788) which will be more closely analysed in the next chapter. 
According to Janet Todd, Wollstonecraft probably read the treatise and was impressed 
with his work, after which she was able to make more sense about human ills or her 
own "nervous complaints." Her malaise, she thought, could be explained more by the 
"unnatural sedentary life of middle-class ladies" or too little extemal stimuli than by her 
sensitive "nerves.,,201 The stimuli or what Brown called "exciting powers" have to be 
kept to a moderate degree, for the body with its "intellectual part" is necessarily affected 
by these powers. John Brown shares a similar materialist view with Priestley. 
The property, on which both sets of [extemal and intemal] powers act, may be 
named Excitability; and the powers themselves, Exciting Powers. By the word 
199 These questions were often posed by medical scientists and philosophers. See Roy 
Porter's essay, ''Medical Science and Human Science in the Enlightenment" in 
Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth- Century Domains eds. Christopher Fox, Roy 
Porter and Robert Wokler (Los Angeles and London: California UP, 1995), p.70. 
200 Janet Todd (2000), p.138. 
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Body, is meant both the body simply so called, and also as endued with an 
intellectual part, a part appropriated to passion and emotion, or a soul: the usual 
appellation in medical writing is system (Elements Pal1 I 4). 
Brown bundles together the system of the nerves with "muscular contraction," "sense of 
perception" and the "energy of the brain in thinking." This does not make for a clear 
explanation ofWollstonecraft's theory about reason, but it underlies her curious paradox. 
She acknowledges free will, as Reid does, but how is that possible if she premises this 
on the corporeal capacity? Does one need a strong "animal faculty" to begin with in 
order that one might have a stronger will for exertion? 
2. Social Progress: Is human perfectibility possible? 
There is a similar pattern of convolution in Wollstonecraft's argument about instinct. In 
The Rights of Woman, there is almost a mimicry of La Mettrie's notion that the 
"sensitive soul" resides in every organic machine, whether of animal or man, stating 
that she grants "brutes of every description a soul" (VRW 132). As I have explained in 
Chapter I, La Mettrie claims that putting "man in the same class as them [animals] is to 
do him a great honour" for the former are endowed with fewer "instincts" than animals. 
His notion of "machine" became a nexus, as it were, of concepts such as "animal" or 
"man" so that they could be grouped together, pointing at the original and "natural" 
state of man prior to civilization. 
Wollstonecraft largely upholds Rousseau's theory of social progress. Amongst 
Rousseau's works, A Discourse on Inequality which lambasts the growth of civilization 
and its corruption of natural goodness, comes nearest to upholding La Mettrie's 
201 Janet Todd (2000), p.132. 
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argument that the human body is a self-sustaining organic mechanism. There are three 
major ideas in Discourse which she recuperates in The Rights of Woman and which are 
likely to have affected her opinion about "reason" in relation to society's progress and 
civilization. Firstly, Rousseau's idea about "desire" and "passions" inhibited a 
straightforward identification with the spontaneity or the "natural" urge of the body, 
thereby contradicting her instinctive "passions." Unlike what Hobbes had believed, 
multiplied passions for Rousseau were "the product of society." Rousseau believed that 
man in the state of nature possessed no excessive desire except for the purely physical 
impulse that drove him to procreate. Since primitive man could content himself with 
minimum needs, "nothing is more peaceable than man in his primitive state" (Discourse 
115): "It is by the activity of the passions that our reason improves itself' (Discourse 
89). Secondly, while acknowledging in passing that "the mind became enlightened and 
more industry improved" as society developed, Rousseau's favour inclined towards the 
robustness of primitive man (Discourse 99), for he disdained the degenerate and 
"softened" body and excessive imagination of civilized man. Finally, Rousseau put an 
emphasis on "free-will" (Discourse 87) as man's prerogative, which is different from 
earlier materialist thinking. 
La Mettrie constantly makes analogies between man and animals in rejecting 
the assumption that animals, or in a sense man in the state of nature, are all ferocious 
(MM 20). By the same token, Rousseau foregrounds the "naturalness" of primitive men 
who were free, equal, self-sufficient and peaceful with little devouring desires: 
I see in all animals only an ingenious machine to which nature has given senses 
in order to keep itself in motion and protect itself, up to a certain point, against 
everything that is likely to destroy or disturb it. I see exactly the same things in 
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the human machine, with this difference: that while nature alone activates 
everything in the operations of a beast, man participates in his own actions in 
his capacity as a free agent (Discourse 87, italics added). 
Because of his robust health, primitive man was free from "the excess of idleness" and 
"the over-elaborate foods" (Discourse 84). Rousseau's primitivism in some way echoes 
eighteenth-century medical ideas, typically expressed by George Cheyne. Cheyne had 
stated that the bodily constitutions of a generation are always more corrupt, infirm, and 
diseased, than those of an earlier, as they advance in time, implying that social progress 
necessarily weakens the bodily organs and their functions, and also because of 
"Luxury" and "Intemperance" (Cheyne 174). This is reiterated in S.A.Tissot's An Essay 
on the Disorders of People of Fashion (1772). Like Cheyne, Tissot considers that the 
rural simplicity "dictated by nature" is an ideal situation for "our constitution" (ED 7). 
The deviation from simplicity was more and more observed among the citizens of his 
time, and with this change, he remarks, their health proportionately diminished (ED 8). 
People in high life, in particular, are said to "indulge with [food which is] more than is 
needful, which is less than what the working labourer requires." This causes their 
stomachs to be affected "because the nerves are so," and this condition, according to 
Tissot, "struggles the whole frame into disorder" (ED 14). Tissot's classic idea that 
excess of food does harm to the bodily constitution is reiterated by Rousseau: "the ease 
of stimulating and gratifying our appetites and our senses, the over-elaborate foods of 
the rich, which inflame and overwhelm them with indigestion" and are means by which 
"the human soul is constantly tormented" (Discourse 84, 85). 
Rousseau's Discourse demonstrates the tensions between nature and 
civilization, freedom and society, or between the primitive state and the civilized state. 
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The model oveliurned Hobbesian notion of a "savage" people with violent passions and 
selfish desires. 
Above all, let us not conclude with Hobbes that man is naturally evil just 
because he has no idea of goodness, that he is vicious for want of any 
knowledge of virtue .... [Hobbes introduced illogically] into the savage man's 
care for his own preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions which 
are the product of society and which have made laws necessary. (Discourse 98) 
Thus Rousseau uses the idea of innocence from a wider historical perspective than 
Locke. Innocence here is considered to be a significant trait of primitive man. 
Wollstonecraft gives allowance to Rousseau's assertion that the state of nature 
IS preferable to civilization, stating that his arguments are "plausible" (VRW 83). 
However, she laments that he did not investigate further. If he had found out whether 
"the evils ... were the consequence of civilization or the vestiges of barbarism" (VRW 
84), she believes, "his mind would have darted forward to contemplate the perfection of 
man in the establishment of true civilization" (VRW 87). Yet she is not unaware of the 
"follies and vices" that civilization has produced, particularly in regard to women. 
I once knew a weak woman of fashion, who was more than commonly proud 
of her delicacy and sensibility. She thought a distinguishing taste and puny 
appetite the height of all human perfection, and acted accordingly. I have seen 
this weak sophisticated being neglect all the duties of life, yet recline with 
self-complacency on a sofa, and boast of her want of appetite as a proof of 
delicacy that extended to, or perhaps, arose from, her exquisite sensibility. 
(VRW 112, 113) 
Her equivocal position regarding the effects of civilization may largely be explained by 
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her attitude to the effeminate delicacy encouraged in civilized society and also by the 
notion of progress advanced in the enlightenment. She repeatedly attlibutes femininity 
or licentious features of a woman to education. It is absurd, she says, "that a girl is 
naturally a coquette" and that "a desire connected with the impulse of nature to 
propagate the species, should appear even before an improper education has, by heating 
the imagination, called it forth prematurely"(VRW 111). 
La Mettrie and Rousseau have compared primitive man with contemporary 
man in favour of the former. Edward Young, who discussed the notion of genius, held a 
similar but more democratic view about social progress. In his Conjectures on Original 
Composition (1759), he states that "human souls, thro' all periods, are equal; that due 
care, and exertion, would set us nearer our immortal predecessors than we are at 
present; and he who questions and confutes this, will show abilities not a little tending 
toward a proof of that equality, which he denies.,,202 Wollstonecraft was also concerned 
with the makeup of genius and the favourable conditions for such an extraordinary 
quality to arise. In thinking about Newton, she is encouraged to believe that "a being of 
superior order" could be "accidentally caged in a human body," but she does not accept 
that a female genius is only explained by "male spirits" (VRW 103). While Young 
discounts reason in thinking about a genius, she considers improvement and a rational 
mind to be equally important, for she demarcates a historical stage of "reason" and the 
stage preceding that rational stage. By stressing that reason is the prerogative of and 
exclusive to human beings, Wollstonecraft revised the cursory view of materialists who 
believed human instinct to be indistinguishable from animal instinct. The idea that 
202 Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition ed. Edith J.Morley (London 
and New York: Manchester UP, 1918), p.10. Hereafter cited as Conjectures with page 
numbers in parentheses. 
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women are "the link which unites man with brutes" (VRW 104) was, to her, absurd. 
In The Rights of Men she downplays the role of instinct defining it as "a 
congregate of sensations and passions": "In what respect are we superior to the brute 
creation, if intellect is not allowed to be the guide of passion?" (VRM 31) She explores 
the notion of instinct in relation to the Burkean notion of the "inbred sentiments." 
In England we have not yet been completely emboweled of our natural entrails; 
we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate those inbred sentiments 
which are faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true 
supporters of all liberal and manly morals. 
But Wollstonecraft inveighs against the notion of "inbred powers," stating that appetites 
are the only perfect form of inbred powers she can discern, and "like instinct" they can 
be satisfied, yet are inherently different from "improvable reason" (VRM33) . 
. . . the exercise of instinct and sensibility may be the step which they [brutes] 
are to take, in this life, towards the attainment of reason in the next; so that 
through all eternity they will lag behind man, who, why we cannot tell, had the 
power given him of attaining reason in his first mode of existence" (VRW 132). 
This is why Wollstonecraft could not "agree with Mr.S[mellie] that instinct is only a 
lesser degree of reason.,,203 She has often used the term "instinct" interchangeably with 
sensibility, as we can see in The Rights of Men: "This instinct, for I know not what other 
name to give it, has been termed common sense, and more frequently sensibility" (VRM 
30). Thus it is natural for her to equate instinct with the impulse or the sensibility of the 
body, just as Rousseau had made an analogy between "the voice of the body" and 
203 Mary Wollstonecraft, The Analytical Review (Volume VIII 1790) in The Works of 
Mary Wollstonecraftvo1.7 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William 
Pickering, 1989), p.295. 
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"instinct" (Emile 286). 
The greatest legacy of materialism from the earlier period must be the belief 
that "the reasoning faculty itself is a necessary result of instinct" (Natural HistOlY 145). 
William Smellie argued this in his Philosophy of Natural HistOlY (1790), which 
Wollstonecraft absolutely refused to accept. Sensibility or what Dr Johnson calls "the 
most exquisitely polished instinct," for her is "still material" after being "[r]efined 
seventy times seven," so "intellect dwells not there" (VRW 132). She would also have 
refuted Cheyne's statement that the intellectual faculty has "animal Organs" (EM 52). 
Yet she exalted "instinctive perceptions" calling it "natural morality," when she 
reviewed Jacques-Henri Meister's On Natural Morality (1788),204 stating that such a 
"hidden instinct" or "compassion" links our moral sentiments with "involuntary 
sensations." Further, when she considers the "distinction of heroes" or "[p]eople of 
genius" and the "source of their undue power," she is concerned about the "violence of 
their passions" as much as their intellectual capacity (VRW 107). She ascribes men's 
superior judgement to the "grand passions" (VRW 179). Heat, fire or flames which are 
often the metaphors for passions occupy an ambivalent position; they can evoke the 
"excess" of feelings as compared with "the cool work of reason" (VRW 153), or they 
can also recall the essence of genius, "the heavenly fire" (VRW 120). 
Wollstonecraft's glamorisation of "passions" resonates with Julie's assertion in 
La Nouvelle Heloise. 
Cold reason has never achieved anything illustrious, and we triumph over 
passions only by opposing one to another. When the passion of virtue comes to 
204 Mary Wollstonecraft, Analytical Review. (Article XLI 1789) in The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraftvol.7 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler vol. 7 (London: William 
Pickering, 1989), p.10l. 
173 
the fore, it alone dominates and keeps all the rest in a state of equilibrium. That 
is how the truly wise man is formed, who is alone capable of subduing them 
with themselves, as a pilot sails by adverse winds. (Heloise 319) 
If primitive "instinct" or "passions" could be an essential feature of genius, on an equal 
level with reason, to what extent does social progress explain the fundamental 
difference between man and animal? Bodily strength is necessary for mental 
development, but this idea, when associated with "instinct" as a privilege of animals, 
evokes the rude, unrefined or unpolished sensibility of primitive man. However the cult 
of genius was often associated with natural or "organic" progress rather than intellectual 
refinement in a civilised society. Edward Young's organic metaphor of genius which 
"grows" is an interesting comparison with "Imitations" that are referred to as a kind of 
"manufacture wrought up by those mechanics" (Conjectures 7). Education, as is 
represented by the heroine of Mary, is no longer seen as the product of a series of 
lessons to make the pupil memorise everything, but as an organic process, involving the 
dynamic interaction of an individual with the world. Wollstonecraft's justification for a 
statement such as, "the poetry written in the infancy of society, is most natural" is that 
such a poetry is the "transcript of immediate sensations, in all their native wildness and 
simplicity, when fancy, awakened by the sight of interesting objects, was most actively 
at work" (OP 7). 
The absence of reason or intellectual development in the primitive state meant 
degradation to non-human standards, which probably affected Wollstonecraft's attitude 
towards "instinct" and "passions." As I have so far shown, she endorses these notions 
with mixed feelings. In her writings, therefore, bodily strength was often shifted to 
mean "mental" strength or firmness, thereby using the word more or less 
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metaphorically: "[t]he amiable weakness of his [or her] mind is a strong argument 
against its immateriality, and seems to prove that beauty relaxes the solids of the soul as 
well as the body" (VRM 46). 
3. The Immortality of Soul 
In the late eighteenth century, philosophical questions concerning the soul frequently 
involved physiological issues. Post-1750 investigators, according to Roy Porter, 
accentuated the qualitative distinctions they discerned between living and non-living 
bodies,205 so the "agency" could be defined not just in terms of free will or intelligence, 
but of life or the motive force of the body. According to John Brown, "If the property 
which distinguishes living from dead matter, or the operation of either of the two sets of 
powers [external and internal] be withdrawn, life ceases. Nothing else than the presence 
of these is necessary to life" (Elements I 4). Rousseau's ontological inquiry is much 
indebted to medical ideas which perceive the cause of sensations to be "external" to 
one's body rather than internal: "My sensations take place in me, since they make me 
sense my existence; but their cause is external to me, since they affect me without my 
having anything to do with it, and I have nothing to do with producing or annihilating 
them" (Emile 270). Rousseau's philosophical argument goes further to undermine the 
boundary of the body, asking where "external" matter begins. 
But if it is true that all matter senses, where shall I conceive the sensitive unity 
or the individual I to be? Will it be in each molecule of matter or in the 
aggregate bodies? Shall I put this unity equally in fluids and solids, in 
compounds and elements? There are, it is said, only individuals in nature. But 
205 Roy Porter (1995), p.396. 
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what are these individuals? . . . The sensible parts are extended, but the 
sensitive being is indivisible and one. It cannot be divided; it is whole, or it is 
nothing." (Emile 279, italics added) 
It can be inferred that Rousseau presupposed two categories of existence, one IS an 
extendable matter, the body, and the other is an indivisible "whole," the soul. There is a 
relative separation between these two; as Rousseau notes, "the sensitive being is ... not 
a body" (ibid.).206 In this sense, Rousseau follows the footsteps of Locke who 
considered that the idea of body "is an extended solid substance, capable of 
communicating motion by impulse" while calling soul "an immaterial spirit" which is 
"of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by will or 
thought." 207 However, Rousseau, while acknowledging the separation, ascribes 
sensibility to both the body and the soul, thereby embracing the belief in the fusion of 
the body and soul. There is no doubt that the materialist philosophy which regarded 
matter as that which "contains the motive force which animates it and which is the 
immediate cause of all the laws of movement" (TS 49) was deeply ingrained in his mind, 
and, furthermore, that the very nature of sensibility that cannot be isolated from either 
matter or motive force may have caused him to use such ambivalent phraseology. 
Wollstonecraft, though registering the effects that the body has on the mind, 
discredits materialist ideas about the body, saying that she was "inclined to laugh at 
206 Rousseau differentiates "matter" ("all that I sense outside of me and which acts on 
my senses") from ''bodies'' ("all the portions of matter which I conceive to be joined 
together in individual beings"). (Emile 270). 
207 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understandinged. John W. Yolton 
(London: J.M.Dent, 1993), p.159. As a student of Thomas Willis, a physiologist, Locke 
based his notion of soul on an ambivalent agent that is both "immaterial" and of a 
"substance." I have said in Chapter 1, La Mettrie has focused on the materialist ideas 
of Locke to elaborate his own physiological theory. It could be argued that La Mettrie 
dismissed or ignored Locke's ambivalent side of this argument. 
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materialists" (VRW 185). She considers an "immortal soul" could be free from 
"mechanical laws" or "the shackles of matter" (VRW 116). There is profound resonance 
with Rousseau's statement about the "mortal body": "I aspire to the moment when, after 
being delivered from the shackles of the body, 1 shall be me without contradiction or 
division and shall need only myself in order to be happy." (Emile 293). Both 
Wollstonecraft and Godwin share the same Rousseauvian image of the body as that 
which "chains" the soul, as Rousseau questions, "Why is my soul subjected to my 
senses and chained to this body which enslaves it and interferes it?" (Emile 292) 
We cannot help observing a close parallel between Wollstoncraft repugnance 
towards materialist thinking and Jacques Necker's statement about the soul in his Of the 
Importance of ReligiOUS Opinions, which she translated from French in 1788. For him, 
the soul should be located on a different level from the body: "[w]e ought to consider 
our senses as messengers, which bring to our mind new subjects of reflection; but they 
are in such a manner subordinate to the sublime part of ourselves," that he could not but 
refute those thinkers who "grant [the absolute empire] to exterior objects over the 
powers of our soul.,,208 Though it deals with theological issues, the statement is 
germane to Reid's scientific theory, which we discussed earlier. Following Necker's 
spiritualist theory, Wollstonecraft ventures to eliminate gender difference by sublimating 
the soul; "if woman be allowed to have an immortal soul, she must have, as the 
employment of life, an understanding to improve.,,209 By detaching the soul from the 
enervated female body, she hypothesises a whole new body on which reason and 
208 Mary Wollstonecraft, Of the Importance of Religious Opinions in The Works of 
Mary Wollstonecraftvo1.3 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: William 
Pickering, 1989), pp.97, 98. 
209 As Janet Todd argues, the sexes were psychologically identical, basing this on 
Wollstonecraft's continuing religious sense of an immortal soul. See Janet Todd (2000), 
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understanding could be more readily secured. There is an element of irony, though, in 
our finding her assertion persuasive, for Wollstonecraft's theory of education is 
predicated upon the idea that the progression of the soul keeps abreast of "the education 
of the body." 
And if the dignity of the female soul be as disputable as that of animals-if 
their reason does not afford sufficient light to direct their conduct whilst 
unerring instinct is denied-they are surely of all creatures the most miserable! 
and, bent beneath the iron hand of destiny, must submit to be a fair defect in 
creation (VRW 114). 
The absence of rationality does not just occaSIOn degradation in a secular sense. 
Wollstonecraft touches upon the theme of immortality in elaborating on the notion of 
the "soul," for she argues that she builds her "belief of the immortality of the soul" on 
the perfectibility of human reason. Calling reason "the simple power of improvement," 
she negates human perfection in the terrestrial realm. She believes, if there is such a 
thing as perfection, his or her existence will cease to continue "after the dissolution of 
the body" (VRW 122), inadvertently following the deistic philosophy of Thomas Paine. 
I trouble not myself about the manner of future existence. I content myself with 
believing, even to positive conviction, that the Power that gave me existence is 
able to continue it, in any fonn and manner he pleases, either with or without 
his body; and it appears more probable to me that I shall continue to exist 
hereafter, than that I should have had existence, as I now have, before that 
existence began. (AR 76) 
According to Wollstonecraft, "life IS merely an education" (VRW 178), for it IS to 
p.180. 
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"another step of existence" that human beings bring themselves after their deaths. Her 
notion of perfectibility extends to the afterlife, and material existence for her is merely 
"a state of infancy." Contemplating in this frame of mind, one may be persuaded to 
believe that the "powers of the soul that are of little use here [in this world], and, 
probably, disturb our animal enjoyments" or "happy" life are worth exerting. She asks 
herself, "why should we injure our health by close study?" and neglect "moderation in 
every pursuit"? To this question, she answers, 
the mind gains strength by the exercise, sufficient, perhaps, to comprehend the 
answers which, in another step of existence, it may receive to the anxious 
questions it asked, when the understanding with feeble wing was fluttering 
round the visible effects to dive into the hidden cause (ibid.). 
It is the capacity of "passions" to open and enlarge their minds, she says, that explains 
"why men have superior judgement, and more fortitude than women" (VRW 179). She 
contradicts herself when she endorses the "passions" at the expense of the body. The 
immortal soul and its improvement justifies the intellectual pursuits which could "injure 
our health." What the body requires and restrains only "produce more moderate and 
permanent happiness." It makes it sound as though "ease and prosperity" or earthly 
happiness do not encourage one to "rise above the common standard" or attain "great 
virtues" (VRW 178, 179). 
On the whole, Wollstonecraft censures "passions" when there are not accompanied by 
reason: "they are only brutal when unchecked by reason" (VRW 200). However, when 
her imagination flies over to that boundary which divides life and death, she is inclined 
to disembody the "passions" and "soul" by immortalising them. As we have seen above, 
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the soul takes different shapes in vanous contexts. Wollstonecraft shares the 
ambivalence about the physicality/spirituality of the soul with Rousseau. At the same 
time, medical discourse in the late eighteenth century has certain rhetorical 
ramifications. The soul or the "mind" constituted a physical entity which operated as a 
nervous system within the realm of the body, which therefore gave sufficient 
justification for intelligence to be grounded in bodily strength. However, the symbolic 
frailty of the body in a civilized society somehow weakened this principle, for the body 
weakens as society progresses. The body becomes a malleable metaphor; it grows with 
the soul, it causes disruption in the mind, and it also defines a line between life and 
death, as if the body "cages" the soul from attaining a greater virtue. 
It is not directly relevant to investigate Wollstonecraft's religious belief, but her 
references to "another step" of life, "God" and "immortality" suggest her belief in an 
existence other than "this world." Because of her equivocal view about the soul, her 
"God" is also ambiguous. Wollstonecraft contemplates the idea of God within the 
human capacity for reason: "the conduct of an accountable being must be regulated by 
the operations of its own reason; or on what foundation rests the throne of God?" (VRW 
105). 
When that wise Being who created us and placed us here, saw the fair idea, He 
willed, by allowing it to be so, that the passions should unfold our reason, 
because he could see that present evil would produce future good. (VRW83) 
It is less in the religious than in the philosophical sense that she uses the word "God." It 
is used as a point of reference to show the existence of a spiritual being. 
While passion has to be constantly checked by reason, she considers it to be 
vital for raising virtues above the common standard. Not only this, but passion is also 
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required to perpetuate affection. Her favourable view on affections compares with her 
criticism against "momentary flashes of sensibility." The most difficult task in the 
education of both sexes, she asserts, is to broaden the understanding, while keeping the 
heart "warmed by the generous juices of spring" and preventing the education from 
"[ drying] up the feelings by employing the mind in investigations remote from life" 
(VRW 135). It was this balance between the hot-"warm heart" and the cold-"cool 
reason" that she wished to maintain. Only that balance she was convinced would enable 
man to progress towards perfectibility. 
6 
Political Empiricism in 
Mary Wollstonecraft's A Historical and 
Moral View of the French Revolution 
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As I have observed in the previous chapter, strength of mind for Wollstonecraft is 
founded on a robust body or organs, and with a proper education she believed that 
women could exercise as much intellectual power as men. Therefore when she 
acknowledges bodily frailty in women, she is making concessions to the general belief 
that they are not in reality capable of this "arduous task" of thinking and "are wanting a 
due proportion of reflection and self-government." She castigates women's delicate and 
often "contingent" sensibility (VRW 136). In the political debate in the 1790s, this 
image of the female body was transposed into the volatile "body" of the radical 
movement during the French Revolution. 
As Dorinda Outram has argued, so much had the eighteenth century and the 
Revolution itself succeeded in charging the body with meaning, that the debate on the 
Revolution had collapsed previously external moral grids, such as ideas of moral vice 
and virtue, on to the body itself.210 The image of bodily passions, for example, is 
applied to represent the unruly mob and their energy. Passions are not only morally 
ambiguous for individuals, but perceived as a major political issue for an entire society. 
Edmund Burke is regarded as one of the precursors of this conviction. 
210 Dorinda Outram (1989), p.51. 
182 
Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, 
but that even in the mass and body as well as in the individuals, the inclinations 
of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions 
brought into subjection.211 
Furthermore Burke associates "passions" with "appetites," which, for Wollstonecraft, 
also signify a highly impulsive and non-rational part of human nature which has to be 
controlled. In Chapter 4, I discussed Wollstonecraft's ambivalent view of the body as a 
problem of self-government. Interestingly this volatile image of the body reverberates 
with Burke's political trope, that individual passion has to be controlled and subdued 
through the "firmness" of the state: "the natural progress of the passions, from frailty to 
vice, ought to be prevented by a watchful eye and a firm hand" (Reflections 251). Both 
The Rights of Woman and MGlY stress the necessity of the independent status of the 
individual mind. The heroine of the novel MGlY, for example, could easily forget her 
appetite when she was engaged in deep reflection. Wollstonecraft acknowledges bodily 
strength as the precondition of intellectual development, but in her early works she also 
wants to sever the rational mind from the voluptuous or sensual body. However, in later 
works such as A Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark (1796), she takes a 
more indulgent view of sensibility and the passions, and is less strict about the 
severance of the mind from the body. A Historical and Moral View of the French 
Revo/ution,212 which was produced in the period between these texts, The Rights of 
Woman and A Short Residence, may mark a watershed in her writing career, especially 
211 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) ed. Conor Cruise 
O'Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p.151. Hereafter cited as Reflections 
in parentheses with page numbers. 
212 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Historical and Moral V7ew of the French Revolution in The 
Works of Mary Wollstoneraftvo1.6 eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London: 
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in the way she perceived the sensibility of the body. 
Nerve theory which stresses the constant interaction of the body and soul 
emphasises the functional integrity of the organism, and the degree to which this 
organic theory influenced the debate on the French Revolution is considerable. In 
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), the holistic image of feudal 
society is, for example, compared to the "whole original fabric" (Reflections 192). 
Foucault addresses the analogy between the human body and the political unit 
underlying the familiar image of a corporealized state made up of "head," "organs," and 
"members." He explicates the concern with the "body politic" as a set of material 
elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and 
supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate 
them by turning them into objects of knowledge.213 In this chapter I would like to 
explore the rationale behind Wollstonecraft's suspicion about the "mass" and their 
capacity to control and knowledge. Firstly, I will examine Wollstonecraft's use of the 
metaphor of the body-politic that is pivotal to her political debate on the French 
Revolution by comparing it with that of Burke. Secondly, I will discuss the newly 
emerging notion of "empiricism," and finally, I will deal with the concept of medical 
intervention. These issues are particularly relevant in studying the image of the 
physiological body adopted by political pamphleteers such as Burke in his Reflections 
and Helen Maria Williams in her Letters Tfhtten in France.214 
1. Organic vs. Mechanical Society 
William Pickering, 1989). Hereafter cited as FRin parentheses with page numbers. 
213 Michel Foucualt, (1979), p.28. 
214 Helen Maria Williams, Letters Written in France in the Summer 1790 (Oxford: 
184 
While Burke uses the image of an organic unity bound by blood, and knitted together by 
natural instincts and affections to naturalize unequal property and social hierarchy,215 
Wollstonecraft and Helen Maria Williams show that the Burkean ideal of such a 
hierarchical society is only possible with the SUppOlt of the mass which carries out the 
mechanical function. What I wish to focus on here is not merely the disparity between 
the ways in which Burke and Wollstonecraft or Williams use the image of the 
body-politic, but also the shared rhetorical device that views the body-politic or 
"humanity" as an organic entity. 
Burke exalts the hereditary system of "what they have received from their 
ancestors" and "what is due to their posterity," and elevates it to a Gothic symbolism of 
transmigrating spirit that is renovated in "new organs": "The spirit transmigrates; and, 
far from losing its principle of life by the change of its appearance, it is renovated in its 
new organs with the fresh vigour of a juvenile activity" (Reflections 248). Burke is 
confident that however much blood is shed by "most dreadful civil war" and 
"massacres" the revolutionary people of France "have not slain the mind" of France 
(Reflections 137). Similarly England as an organic entity is alluded to and its robustness 
is depicted in the following passage: 
At both those periods [of the Restoration and Revolution in England] the nation 
had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice, they did not however, 
dissolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the 
deficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not impaired. 
They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part recovered might be 
Woodstock Books, 1989). Hereater cited as Letters in parentheses with page numbers. 
21,5 Elizabeth Bohls, Women Tra vel Writers and the Language of Aesthetics 1716-1818 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), p.111. 
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suited to them. They acted by the ancient organized states in the shape of their 
old organization, and not by the organic moleculae of a disbanded people. 
(Rejl ections 106). 
This allusion is reminiscent of Cartesian dualism, that the spirit can be divisible from 
the body. As long as the spirit survives or "transmigrates," the body or the organic 
members of the body in different shapes will be given life by the immortal spirit. To 
prove the point, Burke explains that in the sixteenth century France recovered and 
"emerged from the longest and most dreadful civil war that ever was known in any 
nation" (Rejlections 137). 
Wollstonecraft attempts to demystify the operation by unmasking the reality of 
the feudal system, and by pointing out that the luxuries of the monarchs were barely 
supp0l1ed by the labour of the poorer classes. She addresses Burke, "then you must 
have seen the clogged wheels of corruption continually oiled by the sweat of the 
labourious poor, squeezed out of them by unceasing taxation" (VRM 39). Similarly, a 
radical, Helen Maria Williams asserts the artificiality of feudalism. 
But I now hear that, instead of their new attempt to form the great machine of 
society upon a simple principle of general amity upon the FEDERATION of its 
members, they ought to have repaired the feudal wheels and springs, by which 
their ancestors directed its movements.(Letters 220) 
The idealised picture of elastic energy spontaneously arising from the old feudal state is 
thus slighted. Williams ridicules the cowardly attitude of Burke in sluinking from 
experimenting on the machine of society. In Burke's self-sustaining system of the 
body-politic, its health was predicated upon the "spring," the energy source as well as 
the checking device of moderation, since he states, "This distemper of remedy, grown 
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habitual, relaxes and wears out, by a vulgar and prostituted use, the spring of that spirit 
which is to be exerted on great occasions" (Reflections 154). The Oxford English 
Dictiona7Y has a meaning close to his usage: "the quality or capacity of springing; the 
power inherent in, or possessed by, a thing of spontaneously resuming or returning to its 
normal state or bulk when pressure or other force is withdrawn; elastic energy or force; 
elasticity." However the context in which Williams uses this term redirects our thoughts 
to another meaning given by the OED, "An elastic contrivance or mechanical device, 
usually consisting of a strip or plate of steel (or a number of these) suitably shaped or 
adjusted, which, when compressed, bent, coiled, or otherwise forced out of its normal 
shape, possesses the property of returning to it." This device was perhaps more 
pervasive in the radical arguments to refute the royalist assessment. 
According to Burke, the organs which constitute the material parts of society 
are interpreted as being subjugated by the "spiritual" head of state, which is the 
monarch with sovereign power. Wollstoneraft is critical of the spirituality of the ruling 
class which Burke presents, calling it "a kind of mysterious instinct," or the "subtle 
magnetic fluid, that runs round the whole circle of society" (VRM 49). Again, in The 
Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft inveighs against Burke's organic metaphor of the British 
constitution not because she rejects the organic metaphor of the body-politic altogether, 
but because his representation is to her both inaccurate and mystifying. 
Burke invites us to see the naturalness of political hierarchy by strictly dividing 
the head of the state from the citizens, equated with the mind and "passions" 
respectively. Wollstonecraft however vindicates the rights of men to rule themselves as 
a corporate body. This clearly follows the Rousseauvian ideal of collective citizens who 
share in sovereign power: "Each one of us puts into the community his person and all 
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his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we 
incorporate every member as an indivisible pari of the whole.,,216 Rousseau's definition 
of the body-politic deviates from Burke's, for the latter strongly believed in the major 
function that the head of the state, or the mind, plays when conceiving the term 
body-politic. Rousseau on the other hand states that "[t]he public person thus formed by 
the union of all other persons was once called the city, and is now known as the republic 
or the body politic" (Social Contract 61). 
Wollstonecraft's approach provides a strong parallel with Rousseau's in that 
she attempts to expose the delusion of Burke's political ideal, that hierarchical society 
provides the organic-like, self-sustaining system that generates political harmony within. 
I want to show that her view ultimately projects a voice favourable to the Brunonian 
system of health management in that it scientifically reaches true self-management. Yet, 
while celebrating the liberation of the French people from the yoke of despotism, and 
showing a degree of faith in the republican body-politic even without the "external" 
agent in managing or checking licentious freedom, she cannot wholeheartedly entrust 
them to "manage" their own political affairs. 
2. John Brown's Empiricist Approach 
The chief objective of progressives like Wollstonecraft and Williams was to strip away, 
in the imagination of the reader, the "rust of antiquity" that protected social hierarchies. 
They attempted to discredit Burke's representation of hierarchical body designated by 
the hereditary ties, thereby giving agency back to the people. Republicanism and 
216 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract (1762) trans. Maurice Cranston 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p.61. Hereafter cited as Social Contract in 
parentheses with page numbers. 
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individualism gained ascendancy not only among political radicals, but also in medical 
culture. One of the Brunonian physicians, Robeli Jones, severely criticised the medical 
community of Edinburgh which turned into "interested corporations" breeding prejudice 
in philosophy. Brunonian physicians believed in the individual's power to make 
independent judgments. If the full implications of the inductive philosophy were 
realised, Jones wrote, "a great part of mankind would find themselves qualified not only 
for making improvements, but discoveries.,,217 
Brown's application of the model of inductive inquiry to medicine follows a 
certain procedure. If the body is inclined to be in an "asthenic" condition, defective of 
stimulation, and is not "sufficiently invigorated by the stimulant operation of corporeal 
or mental exercise," one is recommended to take "a dose of strong liquor" or 
"opium"(Elements Part I 28). He usually starts with examining the simple phenomena 
of health; he then considers the powers which operate on men in that state, and next, 
deviations from the healthy state; and finally, he moves on to disease itself. 218 
Newtonian induction taught these physicians that similar effects always implied similar 
causes. That is why Brunonianism could function empirically, sidestepping authority. 
On the other hand, because judgment is made by each individual practitioner, his 
diagnosis can result in dispute with another. One practitioner may conclude that the 
patient is in an asthenic condition while another may think otherwise. Hence, if the 
patient should die, the responsibility that the physician has to take is enormous, and the 
death is controversiaL But, as Thomas Beddoes wrote in his edition of Elements of 
217 Robert Jones, An InqUliy in to the State of Medicine, on the Principles of Inductive 
Philosophy, with an Appendix Containing Cases and Observations (Edinburgh: 
T.Longman and T.Cadell, London: C.Elliott, 1781), p.179. 
218 Michael Barfoot, 'Brunonianism Under the Bed: An Alternative to University 
Medicine in Edingurgh in the 1780s'in Medical History, Supplement No.8 (1988), p.33. 
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Medicine, this did not prevent Brown from committing himself to the advancement of 
knowledge at the expense of the life of the patient (Elements lxvi). Beddoes relates a 
story of a student of medicine, Mr Isaacson, who was seized with a fever (Elements 
lxvii-Ixxiv). He emphasises that this took place "during the heat of contention between 
the opposers and defenders of the new [Brunoni an] system" triggered by the death of 
another student, and he gives details of how the wavering nurse who attended the 
patient had to be persuaded to follow the plan of curing the asthenic condition without 
taking recourse to the authoritative treatment of bleeding, which Brown believed could 
only do harm to a patient with a debilitating condition. The medication proved 
successful, but this case only demonstrates the high risk taken in venturing to suggest 
alternative therapy to "bleeding and other evacuant antiphlogistic means," which were 
the common methods of treating fever. 
Just like the new inductive system of Brown which attempted to empower the 
individual physician to give his own diagnosis, Wollstonecraft and Williams tried to 
recuperate independent thought and judgement which were buried under the beautiful 
"drapery" hung by Burke: "I wish to hunt out of their lurking holes; and to show you 
[Burke] to yourself, stripped of the gorgeous drapery in which you have enwrapped 
your tyrannic principles" (VRM 60). Naturally, Williams and Wollstonecraft are both in 
favour of scientific empiricism. Williams, for example, states that she has "always been 
told that the improvement of every science depends upon experiment." She further 
defends the Revolution by asking "Why should they not be suffered to make an 
experiment in politics?"(Letters 220). Williams' exhortation to political experiments is 
the manifestation of the most salient characteristic of medical and political culture at the 
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time, its tendency to "desacrilize the body.,,219 
Brunonianism presupposes that the balance between excess and defect of 
passions is the key to health management, and both Williams and Wollstoneraft 
emphasise this point, that moderation of stimulus is required in both the physiological 
body and body-politic. The utility of the energy of the passions is commended by 
Wollstonecraft. While Burke associates passions with "unserviceable" or "noxious" 
energies (Reflections 268), Wollstonecraft is· convinced that "the same energy of 
character, which renders a man a daring villain, would have rendered him useful to 
society, had that society been well organized.,,22o 
The individual's life was also increasingly becoming the object of experiment. 
It was conceived as something more than a set of physical responses and experiences. 
This way of looking at life is strongly reflected in Wollstonecraft's approval of the 
gradual improvement which medicine and philosophy have made in the past. As to the 
French Revolution, she paints a bloody picture of the sacrificed victims of medical 
experiments in order to show the dire consequences of political experiments. 
Like the empirics, who bled a patient to death to prevent a mortification from 
becoming fatal, the tyrants of the earth have had recourse to cutting off the 
heads, or torturing the bodies of those persons who have attempted to check 
their sway, or doubt their omnipotence. (FR 229) 
This fear is later reiterated in A Short Residence in Sweden (l 796), when she denounces 
Danish men who drank "a glass of the criminal's blood, as an infallible remedy for the 
219 Dorinda Outram, (1989), p.49. 
220 Mary Wollstonecraft, Letters m-itten During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark in The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft vol. 6 eds.J anet Todd and Marilyn 
Butler (London: William Pickering, 1989), p.323. Hereafter cited as Residence in 
parentheses with page numbers. 
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apoplexy" (Residence 323). She uses the word "empiricism" to describe this incident, 
but only perjoratively. In this context the word is used in a common eighteenth-century 
medical sense to suggest quakery. Although she is sceptical of empirical methods in 
both A Historical and Moral Views of the French Revolution and A Short Residence in 
Sweden, she does concede that the accumulation of scientific findings contributes to 
improvements in the medical as well as in the political arena: 
But, though thousands have perished the victims of empirics, and of despots, 
yet the improvements made both in medicine and moral philosophy have kept a 
sure, though gradual pac e.-And, if men have not clearly discovered a specific 
remedy for every evil, physical, moral and political, it is to be presumed, that 
the accumulation of experimental facts will greatly tend to lessen them in 
future (FR 229). 
Thus both Williams and Wollstonecraft take issue with Burke's static Image of the 
body-politic which prioritises the head over the body and presupposes the 
interchangeability of its "organs" or "organic moleculae." For them the organs are 
essential parts of life as much as the "spirit." In other words, their mechanical trope not 
only attacked the optimism of Burkean conservatism, but also salvaged the 
metaphorical body as the prerequisite part of the whole. 
3. John Brown's Interventionist Approach 
The body had long been understood as an instrument or "organ" through which 
emotions of various kinds are excited by external stimuli. In Wollstonecraft's A Short 
Residence in Sweden, there are some textual echoes from Godwin's musical metaphor 
of the body: "every beauteous feeling and emotion excites responsive sympathy, and the 
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harmonized soul sinks into melancholy, or rises to extasy, just as the chords are touched, 
like the aeolian harp agitated by the changing wind" (Residence 271). This is 
representative of the fundamental idea introduced by nerve theory, that one's physical 
well-being or its condition is dependent on factors both internal and external to the body 
which directly affects the nerves. Instead of codifying these factors into internal and 
external components, the classification of "natural" or "non-natural" adopted by Outram 
are much more suited to illustrating the "collapse" of the moral criteria on to the body. 
The concept of mental and bodily well-being or moral virtue shifted from something 
regulated or controlled by another party to something that every individual has to strive 
for and be responsible for.221 One could well denominate factors such as diet, drink, 
exercise or indolence as "external," for these things seem to be objectively chosen by 
each person, but the primary reason why Outram has avoided the use of the term 
"external" factors is because, though they are "stimulants" or factors external to man, 
the "appetites," an excess of which is considered as vice, are so intimately connected 
with both "internal" and "external" factors that this demarcation becomes inadequate. 
Based on nerve theory, many eighteenth-century medical men confounded the 
"natural" and "non-natural" factors which affected the physical and mental well-being 
of man. This is also hue for Brown, who writes, 
Temperature particularly affects the surface of the body; diet, the stomach and 
bowels; the blood and other fluids their respective vessels; labour and rest both 
the vessels and muscular fibres; passion and meditation, the brain; all these 
affect the parts mentioned (each that upon which its action is exerted) more 
than any other equal part. (Elements Part I 40, 41) 
221 Dorinda Outram (1989), p.48. 
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Temperature and diet may be thought of as "external" but the remammg factors, 
"blood," "labour" or "passion" do not squarely fit into either category of external or 
internal cause. Passions were increasingly united, as it were, with various organic 
functions and required the same degree of attention as did diet or exercise. Diseases or 
excessive passions can be cured by controlling the quantity of stimulants of food, 
exercise, alcohol or opium. It is worth citing here a brief case history of Brown's 
treatment of his gout which best illustrates the Brunonian system. 
In 1771 Brown suffered his first attack of gouty arthritis. The disease followed 
then, as now, an erratic clinical course, and its origin and treatment were 
poorly understood. Brown went on a strict vegetarian diet and avoided 
alcoholic beverages in accordance with the accepted belief that gout was an 
inflammatory or phlogistic disease, occurring in people with excessive 
vigour .... Dissatisfied, he dropped the food restrictions and went back to his 
meat and alcohol, believing that perhaps gout arose out of weakened 
constitution. This coincided with the onset of an inter-critical period common 
in gout. Brown remained free of acute attacks for a period of several years, 
and naturally claimed success for his treatment. It kindled his enthusiasm.222 
This is clearly an exemplary case of treating what Brown calls an "asthenic" (defective 
stimulation) condition. On the other hand, excessive passions or "the noxious exciting 
powers" which produce sthenic diseases, are "the remedies of asthenic; and those which 
produce asthenic, are the remedies of the sthenic" (Elements Part II 35, italics added). 
222 Gunter B. Risse, "The Brownian System of Medicine: Its Theoretical and Practical 
Implications" in Acta Academiae InternationaJis Historiae Medicinae 5, 1 (Oxford, New 
York, London and Paris: Pergamon Press, 1970), p.47. 
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Although he has been criticised for plagiarising William Cullen's ideas,:m 
Brown's belief in promoting the self-help system of therapy may have appealed to the 
reader at a time when the public attitude towards the plinciple of individualism was 
becoming much more welcoming. Brown regards life as "solely the effect of stimulus; 
which produces disease in proportion to its excess or defect"(Elements Part I 31). He 
believed that the environment and internal circulation shape and condition the activities 
of the organism, but denies the existence of a healing power of nature. His theory is 
strictly stoical and systematic, for he does not believe in leaving bodily activities to their 
"natural" course. Health has to be rigorously pursued and carefully "managed" 
according to certain rules. 
Managing health was part ofWollstonecraft's life as well, and this, for instance, 
is observed from her conscious adjustment to her surrounding environment in A Short 
Residence. She is determined to "seek for health" after contracting a fever in Norway, 
and is careful to note what kind of effects the non-natural factors have on her body. Like 
a professional practitioner, she judges that "the good effect of the various waters which 
invalids are sent to drink, depends ... more on the air, exercise and change of scene, 
than on their medicinal qualities" (Residence 281), tacitly approving the vital principle 
of excitability, that sense, motion and passions are produced by a mechanical impUlse of 
the nerve. In another instance, Wollstonecraft, believing it crucial to "treat their children, 
and manage their sick properly," attempts to persuade the women in T0nsberg that "they 
injured their children by keeping them too warm" (Residence 284), but her attempt is 
223 John Thomson, An Account of the Life, Lectures and Writings of William Cullen 
MD., vol.2 (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859), p.224. Thomson assessed 
that there was nothing new in Brown's thinking, claiming that the "novelty of the 
terms ... the simplicity ofthe views ... and the ease with which a knowledge of these 
could be attained." 
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inhibited by "custom." Adjusting the bodily temperature and dietary consumption was 
considered as a precaution for any nervous related disease. While censuring the 
indulgent mothers whom Wollstonecraft encountered during the tour, she celebrates the 
Danish queen, Caroline Matilda, whose maternal character is praised for her 
"management of her son": "she used to bathe him herself every morning; insisted on his 
being loosely clad; and would not permit his attendants to injure his digestion, by 
humouring his appetite" (Residence 321). 
Bnmonian therapy does not wholly disapprove of the sthenic condition, or too 
much passion. Abundance of blood and heat is a great stimulus" (Elements Part III 
183), and "bleeding," for this condition, "is the most powerful of all remedies." The 
next place to bleeding in the Brunonian system ranks cold, for "[h]eat is always hurtful" 
(Elements Part II 2). Of course, to treat a sthenic disease, one should reduce excessive 
excitement by the application of debilitating measures, but for Brown passions 
themselves are not entirely malignant, though too much of them will become "noxious." 
In her Letters Written in France, Williams points out that this balance is crucial, 
for she does not wholly dismiss the "passions" as dangerous. This is demonstrated in 
her trope of navigation. She maintains that there is a possibility "within the compass of 
human ability to form a system of politics ... like a modem ship of discovery." She 
says that this ship is 
built upon principles that defy the opposition of the tempestuous elements 
("and passions are the elements of life"-) instead of yielding to their fury 
makes them subservient to its purpose, and sailing sublimely over the 
untracked ocean, unites those together whom nature seemed for ever to have 
separated, and throws a line of connection across the divided world. (Letters 
196 
222, italics added) 
The italicised sentence is particularly significant in that it shows Williams's avowal of 
"passions" as part of life, unlike Burke, who considered passions to be destructive 
propeliies of the body. Passions are compared to the tumultuous ocean through which a 
ship embarks on a journey of discovery, implying that passions are not to be controlled, 
but can in fact be "subservient to" some purpose. 
While Brown and other Brunonian physicians believed that the health balance 
of the human organism can be maintained by means of stimulating or debilitating 
measures, Burke used the same rhetoric to discredit its virtue. Deliberately making an 
analogy between the body-politic and the physiological body, Burke naturalises a 
certain static condition of a society as perfectly healthy, which is inconceivable in the 
Brunonian system. According to Burke, 
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the 
order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent 
body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous 
wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human 
race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but in a 
condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenour of 
perpetual decay, fall renovation, and progression. (Reflections 120) 
Brown perceives health as only sustainable as a momentary equilibrium with no fixed 
position, whereas Burke's image of the body is permanent and unchangeable. The 
body-politic of the feudal system, Burke believed, is best left as it is. He has recourse to 
medical language and likens the revolution of this system to "the practice of making the 
extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread" (Reflections 154). He accuses the 
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revolutionaries of staging the spectacle of massacres before the eyes of the Parisians, in 
order "to stimulate their cannibal appetites" (Reflections 249). There is a strong parallel 
between the Revolution and the negative effect which abundant stimulants have on the 
body. Burke's rhetoric is most effective when he sarcastically calls it "remedy": "[t]his 
distemper of remedy, grown habitual, relaxes and wears out, by a vulgar and prostituted 
use, the spring of that spirit which is to be exerted on great occasions" (Reflections 154, 
italics added). Just as an organic body functions with the power of the spring, Burke 
perceives the spring to be the prime mover of society. 
His derisive view of medicine justifies the harmonious state of "things as they 
are," and, just like a suspicious patient, he denies the need for medical attention. The 
self-sustaining system is justified by his claim that in the old constitution "you had that 
action and counteraction which, in the natural and in the political world, from the 
reciprocal struggle of discordant powers, draws out the harmony of the universe." 
Furthermore, he entrenches his conservatism by acknowledging the healing power of 
nature. The community was "happily composed," because 
they make all change a subject of compromise, which naturally begets 
moderation; they produce temperaments, preventing the sore evil of harsh, 
crude, unqualified reformations; and rendering all the headlong exertions of 
arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable. (Reflections 
122, italics added) 
According to this view, moderation is naturally arrived at, and medical intervention is 
made redundant. In the feudal system, Burke argues, no individual or group is 
strong enough or qualified to pull down the foundations of a noble and venerable castle 
(Reflections 121) or the castle-prison. He also boasts of N ewgate, the English 
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counterpart of the Bastille: "We have prisons almost as strong as the Bastile [sic]" 
(Reflections 179). As Elizabeth A. Bohls has argued, one way in which the aesthetics of 
the ruin abetted the conservatism of the picturesque was by downplaying human 
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agency.--
Burke made it seem that hierarchy did not mean "enforcement" or the 
obedience to sublime authority by making "kings into companions" and "power gentle." 
Burke laments that "All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle, and obedience 
liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life ... are to be dissolved by this new 
conquering empire of light and reason" (Reflections 171). In fact Burke's distrust of 
enlightenment culture was not only directed towards reason or individual rights, but also 
towards the empiricist approach which is typified by the interventionist therapy such as 
has been observed in the Brunonian system. 
3. The Body and Body-Politic 
The body-politic was conceived by Rousseau as that which could be strengthened, or 
made vulnerable to various physical weaknesses such as "convulsion," "indulgence" or 
even "disease": 
The body politic, no less than the body of a man, begins to die as soon as it is 
born, and bears within itself the causes of its own destruction. Either kind of 
body may have a constitution of a greater or less robustness, fitted to preserve 
it for a longer or shorter time. (Social Contract 134) 
On the other hand, the body, in progressive "enlightenment" thought, was a rhetorical 
tool for philosophers to envision liberation from such "self-denial" (FR 22). Burke's 
224 Elizabeth Bohls, (1995), p.120. 
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insistence on the "spirit" of feudalism and its immortality is refuted in Wollstonecraft's 
A Historical and Moral View (1794). Perhaps with a degree of cynicism, she calls 
Burke's perfect state the "present imperfect state of society" in which the "imagination, 
continually tantalized, becomes the inflated wen of the mind, draining off the 
nourishment from the vital parts" (ibid.). This statement is made on the basis that "men 
become vicious in the same proportion as they are obliged, by the defects of society, to 
submit to a kind of self-denial, which ignorance, not morals, prescribes." In place of 
"these evils" she welcomes "a new spirit" which has gone forth to "organise the perfect 
body-politic" (ibid.). For Wollstonecraft the court is no longer a part of the body but a 
"dying savage" who is "mortally wounded by his enemy" (FR 61). The new spirit and 
its enthusiasm "extended itself like thought from one end of the kingdom to the other" 
(ibid.). 
In A Historical and Moral View, Wollstonecraft gives a medical diagnosis to 
the political culture of France, namely examining the collectivity of the nation as one 
body, as Rousseau had done. Outram has shown the usefulness of approaching a 
political debate through a history of the body. The French Revolution, she says, was the 
re-creation of a public sphere which for centuries had been dominated and defined by 
two key concepts: by images of the body-politic and of the king's body (or the 
queen's).225 However, in A Historical and Moral View, the king's body is alienated 
from the corporate body. Quoting from Thomas Christie's letter, Wollstonecraft stresses 
that the king "remained ALONE in the midst of the nation, occupied with the 
establishment of concord" (FR 71). Not only is he left alone, but he is degraded to 
become an "instrument" which proves useless when the object is achieved. By 
225 Dorinda Outram (1989), p.4. 
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separating the king from the nation, and dispelling the "pleasing illusion" or the 
beautification of the king, she is able to desacralise the king's body: 
The person of the king, in itself very disgusting, was rendered more so by 
gluttony, and a total disregard of delicacy, and even decency in his apartments: 
and, when jealous of the queen, for whom he had a kind of devouring passion, 
he treated her with great brutality, till she acquired sufficient finesse to 
subjugate him. (FR 73) 
Wollstonecraft reiterates the image of the degenerate state of society caused by the 
dissipation of the monarch. Rather than elevating the king to the sublime station, she 
debases him to a creature prone to "gluttony" and sexual appetites. A century before, 
she believes, the people "would have submitted, with brutal acquiescence, to the 
majestic WILL of the king, without daring to scan it's import," but in her view things 
have changed. People "recognizing their own dignity, they insisted, that all authority, 
which did not originate with them was illegal and despotic" (FR 37). 
The French Revolution is then represented as a "natural" (FR 51) reaction of 
the body-politic, for the people no longer wished to rely on the monarch for the 
management of their own country. Though she holds a partially favourable view on 
civilization, such as its polishing of manners and its bringing of peace, she is severely 
critical of the consequences. I will not recite the popular debate about Burke's 
effeminised monarchy which is rhetorically stamped with weakness. However, there 
arises a problem in her use of the term "natural." Wollstonecraft approves the initiatives 
taken by French citizens to manage themselves, but, from the point of view of the 
"body-politic," their self-management is considered as can-ied out from within. 
Furthermore, A Historical and Moral View is filled with allusions to the body-politic 
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that is diseased, and it would be paradoxical to say that the controlling citizens can be 
severed from this establishment. 
But the people could no longer bear bleeding-for their veins were already so 
lacerated, it was difficult to find room to make a fresh incision; and the 
emollient prescriptions, the practice of former times, were now insufficient to 
stop the progress of a deadly disease (FR 43). 
This seems to show the very condition of asthenic disease where the body is completely 
debilitated. "Bleeding," or the practice of fonner times, is no longer effective to cure the 
disease. Wollstonecraft's belief that civilization "weakened all the organs of the 
body-politic, and rendered man such a beast of prey" (FR 46) can only dissuade the 
reader that the people hold sufficient strength to revive the nation. 
Somehow the newly emerging "public" or "the people," which functions as 
"the hidden springs" or "secret mechanism" (FR 42), leads to recovery. With "the 
common instinct of corporate bodies," this "herculean force of the whole empire was 
now clearing away every obstacle to freedom" (FR 43). The "spirit" of millions of men 
in France unanimously opposed the threats of despotism (FR 128). Frequently, in 
Wollstonecraft's writings, the image of the body becomes so dominant that the word 
"mind" is metaphorically subsumed within the boundary of the material body, and, 
further, because the body extends to signify that of the collective body, "the mind" 
comes to denote the totality of the public mass: 
When, therefore, the improvements of civil life consisted almost entirely in 
polishing the manners, and exercising the transient sympathies of the heart, it is 
clear, that this partial civilization must have worn itself out by destroying all 
energy of mind (FR 111). 
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Wollstonecraft sympathises with the republican ideal in the hope of recovering this 
energy. "Partial" civilization can refine manners at the expense of morals and the 
"natural" mind. She states, "their minds, in fact, instead of being cultivated, have been 
so warped by education, that it may require some ages to bring them back to nature" 
(VRM 18). Burke's utopia seems to Wollstonecraft far from being healthy, rather it is 
debilitated. For her, the hidden springs of people, or passions, are the true source oflife. 
The unanimity of the nation is stressed throughout the treatise, and the 
collectivity is expressed by the quickness of communication or "electrical sympathy." 
Obstacles did hamper the smooth path of the progress of the National Assembly, but 
such "conspiracies" or "corruption" of the old system only "proved a stimulus" rather 
than a hindrance (FR 128): 
So rapid was the spirit, so general the momentum, that in the course of a week 
upwards of three millions of men in arms were formed into companies by a 
common interest resembling an electrical sympathy. Such was the quick 
succession of events-Such the unanimous sense of the nation; and such the 
formidable force which instantly opposed itself to the important threats of 
departing despotism. (FR 128) 
One is here reminded of the sympathetic interaction of bodily organs elaborated by 
Robert Whytt. Xavier Bichat similarly propounds the importance of the "great 
sympathetic" (PR 272).226 Bichat stresses the plural form of the "nerves," for a series of 
communications within the body subsist between a great number of small nervous 
systems, all independent of each other, and all of which have ganglion as their centre" 
226 Many of his democratic ideas are interestingly shared by Wollstoncraft in that they 
both believed that the notion of "sympathy" connoted the interaction between a great 
number of social groups / nervous systems as opposed to injunctions given by the head 
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(PR, 272, italics added). It is this metaphor of a vast anay of nervous communications 
that lies beneath the revolution in the idea of the body-politic. 
Likewise Wollstonecraft approves the fundamental principle of freedom, but 
her writing is constantly haunted by the "violence" and "fervour" of the "dreadful 
convulsion" (FR 43).227 The word "convulsion" is again a medical term, for it was a 
major symptom of nervous disease. It is crucial to note that by the time Wollstonecraft 
was working on the text in 1793, retrospectively writing about the Revolution in the late 
1780s, her impressions had most likely been transformed by the political and moral 
consequences. Wollstonecraft's analysis quite frequently resembles the Brunonian 
prescliption especially with regard to passions: 
Besides, the sudden emancipation of the people occasioned a delirium of joy, 
which required to be managed with the greatest delicacy. A vigorous ministry 
was certainly necessary to check the licentious spirit manifesting itself 
continually by acts of violence in so many parts of the kingdom, where tumults 
and assassinations were the effects of the giddiness of unexpected success. 
(FR 133, italics added) 
As if the entire kingdom was the body that functions with its logic, Wollstonecraft takes 
special precaution as to the management of the violence and passions that arise in 
various parts of the kingdom. She begins to wonder whether men are naturally good and 
civilization a product of improvement. The examples of the "unintelligent beings" 
whose imagination and passions are easily dominated by circumstantial elements 
illustrate this point. The minister's "premature reforms" to urge the speedy destruction 
of the state / brain. 
227 In his Memoir, Godwin writes that Wollstonecraft "described to him ... the anguish 
she felt at hearing of the death of Brissot, Bergniaud, an the twenty deputies, as one of 
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of obstinate prejudices, to "strike at the root of all their misery at once," only caused 
further destruction of comfort and was pushed in opposition to the "theory of reason" 
(FR 45). The emphasis on the gradual improvement towards the "perfectibility" (FR 46) 
of human nature is Godwinian,228 but, as the chapters progress, numerous illustrations 
of "the foibles of the multitude" take the upperhand. 
In the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft had clearly stated that "monsters" are 
those who have "tyrannized over thousands of their fellow-creatures" without 
sufficiently showing "discernment of human excellence" (VRW 105), dehumanising the 
monarch. However, this view shifts as the French Revolution leads to brutal 
consequences. The "inconstancy" of the general public (FR 133) is highlighted with 
their fluttering imagination: 
Thus sentiments spouted from the lips corne oftener from the head than the 
heart. Indeed natural sentiments are only the characters given by the 
imagination to recollected sensations; but the French, by the continual 
gratification of their senses, stifle the revenes of their imagination, which 
always requires to be acted upon by outward objects; and seldom reflecting on 
their feelings, their sensations are ever lively and transitory; exhaled / by every 
passing beam, and dissipated by the slightest storm. (FR 25) 
The imagination of the Parisians, full of plots, "produced many false alarms," and 
"inflamed the people," but they proved to be "the idle rumours of fear" (FR 93). The 
"disturbed imagination" of the people was, therefore, filled with plots, and it even 
caused the people to make a false report about troops of banditti to the National 
the most intolerable sensations she had ever experienced" (Memoirs 244). 
228 According to Harriet Devine Jump, Wollstonecraft read Godwin's Political Justice in 
early summer 1793. See Jump (1994), p.ll0. 
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Assembly; the disturbance in fact originally arose from a trivial quarrel (FR 129). 
Therefore, even in the provinces, "a number of idle rumours of present danger tended to 
make the country people [not only] eager to guard against they scarcely knew what" 
(FR 127). In Wollstonecraft's sarcastic remarks about the violence and murder 
committed by the people, they are denominated "monsters": "Strange, that a people, 
who often leave the theatre before the catastrophe, should have bred up such monsters!" 
(FR 125). The foible of the multitude is, thus, explicated as having the inclination to 
"run from one extreme to another, and that despair adopts the most violent measures" 
(FR 136). If Brown were to give a medical diagnosis, he would say that what is most 
needed is to take moderate measures. 
One detrimental cause is located III the actions of the new government. 
Wollstonecraft laments that this dreadful convulsion which "shook the kingdom from 
one extremity to the other" could have been prevented if one of the ministers, Necker, 
had possessed "the eye of genius" (ibid.). The "feeble measures" of the minister and 
selfish views ofthe parliaments (FR 44) had precipitated the condition. Necker's vanity 
and his popularity-seeking measures are contrasted with Mirabeau's "earnestness" in 
argument; he always stood forth as the sturdy champion of reason (FR 124). 
Mirabeau229 who we may say is a capable physician of the body-politic, delivered a 
speech which was aided by the medical trope. Mirabeau's address which was delivered 
to save the ruinous state of the finances in France is portrayed as a heroic one: 
Our efforts to support the government are fruitless, a fatal numbness cramps all 
it's powers. The public revenue is no more; and credit cannot gain strength at a 
moment, when our fears equal our hopes.-This spring of social power unbent, 
229 Wollstonecraft admires Mirabeau as a genius (FR 174). 
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has weakened the whole machine; men and things, resolution, courage, and 
even virtue itself, have lost their tension. If your concurrence do not speedily 
restore life and motion to the body-politic, the grandest revolutions, perishing 
with the hopes it generated, will mingle again in the chaos .... (FR 175). 
Again the body is compared to a "machine," though this does not necessarily contradict 
the idea that the body-politic is like the physiological body. 
Taking on this line of argument, Wollstonecraft's anxiety about the loss of 
"tension" in the "spring" of the body-politic is expressed. She went as far as to take the 
side of Mirabeau in demanding an upper chamber so that it would function as a check. 
Unlike those "hot-headed men, who found it the shortest way to popularity, to deliver 
exaggerated eulogiums on liberty," Mirabeau convinced Wollstonecraft that he 
supported the veto of the King in the interest of the people, though risking their favour 
(FR 158). This is perhaps what Wollstonecraft meant by "principle": "men without 
principle rise like foam during a storm sparkling on the top of the billow, in which it 
[foam] is soon absorbed when the commotion dies away" (FR 47). Wollstonecraft's 
philosophical problem was that there is no other "check" but "the veto of the king." As 
some "judicious deputies" perceived that the minds of people not being completely ripe 
for a total change of government-from absolute despotism to complete republicanism 
Wollstonecraft hints at the necessity of maintaining "the shadow of monarchy" (FR 158). 
The fear was that, if the assembly allowed a "senate" to become a kind of "cradle of a 
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new aristocracy," the ancient hydra might "again rear it's head" (FR 163). In the end she 
assents to Mirabeau's policy that a second chamber or "senate" would not be under the 
influence of the same faction, consequently arriving at the suggestion that the "system 
of an old government is susceptible of improvement" (FR 165). 
Inadvertently Wollstonecraft reverts back to Burkean conservatism for a 
different reason. She strongly believes that the Revolution is a necessary step to 
liberation from despotism, but regretfully concludes that the perfectible society is still in 
its "infancy." She hoped that the body-politic would be "managed" by the citizens of 
France themselves, but the "restless mob," the powerful symbol of "licentious freedom" 
(FR 210), are not yet capable of self-management: 
Slaves and mobs have always indulged themselves in the same excesses, when 
once they broke loose from authority. The bent bow recoils with violence, 
when the hand is suddenly relaxed that forcibly held it; and sensibility, the 
plaything of outward circumstances, must be subjected to authority, or 
moderated by reason (VRM 181, 182). 
Brunonian tenninology is here incorporated. She is in favour of the interventionist view, 
and envisions that each citizen makes his or her own rational judgment while checking 
the "excesses" of their sensibility. Wollstonecraft however observes the failure of 
human agency. She believes that the "minds of young men generally have more fire, 
activity, and invention," but need to be balanced by another political influence 
represented by the age of thirty-five, or forty years (FR 165). The passions of youth are 
hence not to be trusted, a sentiment which was shared by Godwin. The National 
Assembly is to blame for not maintaining its "finnness of conduct," but Wollstonecraft 
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relapses into contradicting her first diagnosis that the body-politic, namely the corporate 
body, will be responsible for its own action. Indeed, she is now suggesting that the 
effective intervention of a third party is necessary to form a healthy body-politic. The 
picture of the mob that invaded the palace holds such a powerful image of inconigible 
passions that she cannot but understand it as an expression of the self-indulgent 
sensibility of the population which needs curbing. 
Wollstonecraft however accentuates the stubbornness, not the transient or 
mutable nature, of sensibility; thereby its movement will stay as the "memory" and 
"conscience," like the "stains of deepest dye": 
It is morals, not feelings, which distinguish men from the beast of prey! These 
were transactions, over which, for the honour of human nature, it were to be 
wished oblivion could draw the winding-sheet, that has often enwrapped a 
heart, whose benevolence has been felt, but not known. But, if it be impossible 
to erase from the memory these foul deeds, which like the stains of deepest dye 
revived by remorse in the conscience, can never be rubbed out .... (FR 126). 
This is a "physical sensibility" (FR 151) or a "bodily" register, "excited by a commotion 
of the animal spirits." Hence it requires "a considerable length of time" to accustom 
men to change their habit. Provided that passions are an integral part of the body-politic, 
one can only expect a third party to check excess. Alternatively, the citizens would have 
to gradually improve themselves based on their unfaltering "conscience." 
Wollstonecraft's approach in employing an extensive medical vocabulary 
enabled her to diagnose the "disease" which culminated in the French Revolution. It 
also helped her justify the "passions" for freedom and at the same time warn of the 
danger of its "violence" during the aftermath of the Revolution. Throughout the text of 
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A Historical and Moral View, her empiricist view is upheld by the trial and en-or 
approach of recommending the stimulation of passions, but, when it amounts to excess, 
she suggests the necessary "check." Her allusion to the mistreatment of the new 
government suggests the necessity of supporting the infant society fully to achieve its 
perfect stage. 
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7 
Monster's Organic Body 
in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
Enlightenment thinkers bent on demystification held that lack of reason bred monsters. 
Wollstonecraft, in remarking on the violence and murder committed by the people of 
France, denominated them "monsters" (FR 125). Although Mary Shelley'S passive 
position on politics seems out of place amongst other radical philosophers, the subject 
she takes up in her novel is one that was most popular amongst enlightenment thinkers, 
the notion of the Burkean awe for a patriarchal order. Frankenstein230 constantly 
presents tension between Victor and his father, and Victor and his creature (the monster), 
and perhaps this alone demonstrates Shelley's interest in the contemporary political 
debate on the loci of patriarchal power. Thomas Paine's Rights of Man (1791, 1792), 
which was "without doubt the single most successful response to Burke,,,231 addresses 
this issue with force and precision. Paine explicates Burke's argument as absurd in that 
he asserts that a "certain body of men, who existed a hundred years ago, made a law; 
and that there does not now exist in the nation, nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to 
alter it" (Rights of Man 93): 
The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man, (for it has its 
230 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (the 1818 text) ed. Marilyn butler (Oxford & New York 
Oxford UP, 1993). Hereafter cited as Frankenstein with page numbers in parentheses. 
All citations are from this 1818 edition, because my aim is to examine the immediate 
impact of the medical writings which appeared at the turn of the century. 
231 Mark Philp. Introduction to Thomas Paine's Rights of Man, Common Sense and 
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origin from the Maker of man) relates, not only to the living individuals, but to 
generations of men succeeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights 
to the generations which preceded it, by the same rule that every individual is 
born equal in rights with his contemporary .... [M]en are all of one degree, and 
consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural right, in the 
same manner as if posterity had been continued by creation instead of 
generation; the latter being only the mode by which the former is carried 
forward; and consequently, every child born into the world must be considered 
as deriving its existence from God. (Rights of Man 117) 
"Creation" is here distinguished from "generation," for that is what makes God special 
in a Christian community. Burke's appraisal of the patriarchal order is evident in his 
defence of the parliamentary authority established in 1688. Paine accuses Burke of 
making it an "immortal power," and justifying authority by perceiving it as "a sort of 
political Adam" who allegedly possesses a power to bind posterity forever (Rights of 
Man 94). Paine rejects this claim and calls it "monstrous" (Rights of Man 92), and 
inveighs against the artificiality of power. 
Paine's rejection of the "authority of the dead" is perhaps echoed in Shelley's 
novel, in that Victor's monstrous creation is similarly artificial, for nobody except God 
can re-create the dead. Some commentators have noted that the monster's relationship 
with Victor is that of a rebellious son. The monster's revenge is to ensure the end of the 
Frankenstein line by killing William and finally leading Victor to his death. This 
parricidal theme is hence often interpreted as an allegory of the French Revolution?32 
Other Political Writings (Oxford:Oxford UP, 1998), p.xii. 
232 Lee Sterrenburg, 'Mary Shelley's Monster:Politics and Psyche in Frankenstein' in 
The Endurance of Frankenstein: Essays on Jj-fary Shelley's Novel ed.George Levine and 
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Shelley's readiest source of political allusion is her mother's A Historical and Moral 
Jliew, but it was hardly necessary for Shelley to learn the political argument from her 
mother's account, for the controversy over the French Revolution was the master theme 
of her epoch. 
Few would fail to acknowledge the fact that Enlightenment philosophy 
occupies the central place in Shelley's Frankenstein, but it is no easy task to isolate one 
definition that best exemplifies the essence of the novel, for the debate on the 
Revolution is as much a part of that philosophy as the science-oriented approach is. 
That is why I would like, in a highly selective manner, to draw attention to some of the 
relevant Enlightemnent themes in this and the ensuing chapter. We tend to identify 
eighteenth-century faith in reason with the Enlightenment, but as Peter Gay has 
scrupulously rephrased it, "faith" should be designated by the more neutral term 
"confidence.,,233 The rational method, which is strictly scientific, is superior to other 
methods of gaining knowledge such as superstition, revelation, authority or tradition, 
because its affirmations were open to examination and refutation. If the Enlightenment 
thinkers were to use the term faith, it would contradict their own "faith." 
So far, we have discussed Godwin and Wollstonecraft's belief in the rational 
soul, but confidence in its existence is hard to come by, when the specimen is not 
visually present. Instead, the body, in progressive enlightenment thought, became the 
object of the penetrating eyes of the philosophers as well as medical men in revealing 
human nature. The debate on rationalism involved the issues of the soul and body, and 
U.C.Knoepflmacher (Berkeley and London: California UP, 1979), p.169. See also Chris 
Baldick's In Frankenstein's Shadow: Myth Monstrosity, and Mneteenth-century 
JiIil-iting(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
233 Peter Gay, 'Becker's Heavenly City'in Carl Becker's Heavenly Cited Revisted ed. 
Raymond O. Rockwood (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), p.33. 
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consequently led to the question of the afterlife, which propelled not only scientific 
endeavour in searching for the cause of life but also religious and philosophical enquiry. 
Where does the "soul" come from, and where does it go after the dissolution of the 
body? Can the dead be restored to life? If so, what would be the consequence? Would 
there be a coherent self that represents the rational soul? I want to argue that the medical 
discourse in which both Shelley's parents and herself had deep interest had an 
unfathomable impact on the way Shelley dealt with these philosophical questions. Her 
primary source of inspiration, she writes, came from "various philosophical doctrines" 
discussed by Lord Byron and Percy Bysshe Shelley, amongst which the nature of "the 
principle of life" and the possibility of its being discovered and communicated were the 
main subjects. 234 Various philosophical doctrines most likely involved scientific, 
physiological, and theological issues which I have already touched upon, and these are 
the areas irrevocably bound together in thinking about life. 
We must however remember that much of physiological theory in the 
eighteenth century was predicated upon earlier mechanical philosophy. 235 The 
mechanical thinking which had been useful in medical theory became a threat in 
religious traditions with their fundamental beliefs. The development in chemical science 
furthered this movement. The mechanical and chemical sciences both increased doubt 
about the existence of an "immaterial" agent. This new idea caused frictions between 
234 See Author's introduction in Mary Shelley's Frankensein Or The Modern 
Prometheus .. (1831) ed. Maurice Hindle (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), p.8. 
235 In the earlier century, Descartes attempted to explain embryological development 
by mechanical causation based on matter and motion alone, which was adopted by 
Nicolas Malebranche to observe the construction of organic bodies, while insisting that 
the mechanical cause alone could not account for reproduction. If matter could form 
organized beings, living creatures, a theological problem of what role was left for the 
Divine Creator remained. See Shirley A. Roe's Matter, Life, and Generation: 
Eighteenth -Century Embryology and the Haller Wolff debate (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1981), p.8. 
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materialism that attributed motion and life energy to matter itself, and the dualist 
position that separated the material and immaterial realms.236 How can an immaterial 
agency be scrutinized if it is "invisible"? What role does mechanism have in explaining 
biological operation? What is the relationship of God to his Creation? It is impossible 
for me to contextualise this discourse without referring to Joseph Priestley's philosophy, 
for this is undoubtedly the centrepiece of the new radicalism in thinking about the 
relation between matter and spirit. Even more important is Erasmus Darwin, who shared 
a similar interest with Priestley and was well versed in scientific and medical literature. 
Darwin and William Lawrence are two major influences discemable from Shelley's 
Frankenstein. Lawrence's lecture "On Life" is said to have focused on the issue of 
physiology and anatomy "in the spirit and avant-garde medical terminology of 
M.F.Xavier Bichat, a French physiologist.,,237 We can only speculate whether the 
Shelleys had read or were familiar with Bichat's works, but since Lawrence's work 
presents many textual echoes of his organic theory, it is worth citing Bichat's works. It 
is my aim in this chapter to clarify Mary Shelley's application of these authors' ideas 
and how they took shape in Frankenstein within an Enlightenment context. 
236 One of the most popular theorists was David Hartley, but there were other 
physiologists who made use of Newton's aetherial theory. See, for example, Browne 
Langrish's Essay on Muscular Motions (London, 1733). His mechanical approach to 
physiology follows the contemporary trend of reviving aetherial ideas, with the 
presumed relationship to fire, light, and electricity. See also James Parsons's 
Philosophical Observations on the Analogy between the Propagation of Animals and 
Vegetables (London: C.Davis, 1752). He rejects mechanism as a solution to biological 
problems. 
237 Bichat's physiological theory is mentioned in relation to Shelley's historical context 
by Marilyn Butler. See Introduction to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. The 1818 Text. 
(1969), pp.xix, xxxix. 
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1. Secret Unveiled 
Not only did Enlightenment thought encourage the immense progress of science, but it 
also redirected the form of knowledge towards that which can be openly viewed. As 
David Knight's study reveals, it was, therefore, an exciting period for scientific 
experimentation and discovery to be explained to a wider public: 
Lectures in London, Glasgow, and Paris attracted enormous audiences to their 
orations and demonstration experiments. The chemical philosopher was 
expected to develop and discuss a world-view; his science seemed the key to 
the nature of matter, and he was in a position to throw light upon such 
questions as the truth of materialism or the role of mechanistic explanations in 
psychology and biology.238 
In the early nineteenth century, major scientists and physiologists such as Humphry 
Davy, Giovani Aldini and Andrew Dre had given lectures or performed experiments. 
There is no proof that Mary Shelley attended any of these dazzling demonstrations in 
London, but we cannot deny that the advance in science especially in the field of life 
science was witnessed by a large number of people or read about in magazines. Erasmus 
Darwin's experiments on life, though carried out in an earlier period, are mentioned in 
Mary Shelley's Introduction to the 1831 text: 
They [Lord Byron and Shelley] talked of experiments of Dr Darwin (I speak 
not of what the Doctor really did, or said that he did, but, as more to my 
purpose, of what was then spoken of as having been done by him), who 
preserved a piece of vermicelli239 in a glass case, till by some extraordinary 
238 David M. Knight, Natural Science Books in English 1600-1900. (London, 1972), 
p.128. 
239 In The Temple of Nature, Darwin describes vorticellae, microscopic animals which 
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means it began to move with voluntary motion.24o Not thus, after all, would 
life be given. Perhaps a corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given 
token of such things: perhaps the component parts of a creature might be 
manufactured, brought together, and endued with vital wannth. (Frankenstein 
1831,8) 
Already in the eighteenth century this kind of experiment was referred to even III 
politico-theological writings, such as Paine's The Age of Reason (1794). Paine IS 
however mindfully sober about these experiments, and leaves the "unlmown" cause to 
God. Because many scientific experiments at the tum of the century successfully proved 
things that would have been impossible in previous times, "extracting flames or sparks 
of fire from the human body" or "restoring persons to life who are to appearance dead" 
were no longer "miracles" (AR 64). This statement is strongly echoed by Victor 
Frankenstein's mentor, M.Waldman: "They [the modem masters], whose hands seem 
only made to dabble in dirt, and their eyes to pore over the microscope or crucible, have 
indeed perfonned miracles" (Frankenstein 30). 
David Hume has defined "miracle" as a violation of the laws of nature.241 
Likewise, Paine believes that scientific experiments cannot go beyond the operation of 
certain laws which he calls "nature." For example, one can restore persons to life only 
when "animation is not extinct." What Victor does is to go further. Erasmus Darwin's 
after being dried up for several months, leaving them apparently dead, can be revived 
by putting them in water. It is possible that Percy mentioned vorticellae and Mary 
misheard it as vermicelli, or Percy himself could have been mistaken. 
240 Darwin has touched upon some experiments of making a paste of flour and water, 
which "has been suffered to become acescent, the animalcules called eels." These 
"animalcules" which are at first as minute as other microscopic animalcules, become 
large animals by frequent reproduction. 
241 David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the 
Principles of Morals (1777) Revised by P.H.Nidditch (Oxford: Open University Press, 
1975), p.ll5. 
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suggestion that "even the organic particles of dead animals may, when exposed to a due 
degree of warmth and moisture, regain some degree of vitality" (TN Additional Notes 7) 
does foreshadow a form of intervention by human science, which is typified by Victor's 
experiment. Darwin's The Temple of Nature may have served as a catalyst to culturally 
connect Mother Nature, as that which represents the workings of nature from the 
fonnation of the earth, to the evolution of life. In his Preface, he states his intention of 
"bringing distinctly to the imagination the beautiful and sublime images of the 
operations of Nature ... " (TN Preface). Thus with reverential phrases did Darwin build a 
"gorgeous temple" of "majestic Nature." Nature here is personified by Urania who 
hides behind the "mystic veil" (TN Canto I, pp.14,15, 11.163-168). Here one is instantly 
reminded of M.Waldman's phraseology, that modem masters "penetrate into the 
recesses of nature, and shew [sic] how she works in her hiding places" (Frankenstein 
30). Paine does not accept, what most Enlightenment thinkers may have dreamed; the 
animation of a person who is really dead. He thinks we are better off than if we had 
been let into the "secret": "that part of the operation that we do not know, and which, if 
we did, we could not perfonn, the Creator takes upon himself and perfonns it for us" 
(AR 61). 
The passage where the Enlightenment theme is most acutely expressed in the 
novel is when Victor states, "Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds which I should 
first break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world" (Frankenstein 36). 
For Darwin, it is the "chemic changes" that have the power to breach the barrier 
between the condition of living and that of death: "Organic fonns with chemic changes 
strive, ILive but to die, and die but to reivive!" (TN Canto II, p.46, 11.41, 42) The line 
that separates life and death was also a vital issue for Xavier Bichat. In his 
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Physiological Researches Upon Life and Death (1809), to reveal the workings of "vital 
laws" Bichat suggests questioning what "that intermediate state between health and 
death" is: "all the functions experience so remarkable a change, a change, which, 
infinitely varied, produces such innumerable varieties of disease." (PR 136). This 
approach is also taken by Victor: "To examine the causes of life, we must first have 
recourse to death" (Frankenstein 33). While Bichat's Enlightenment rhetoric prefigures 
Victor's scientific ambition, Bichat is as circumspect as Paine with regard to how he 
perceives the "limit": 
What physician is there who can, according to the actual data of his art, pierce 
the thick veil which here hides from his view the operations of nature? What 
judgment is there that would dare on this head to go beyond the limits of strict 
observation? (PR 136) 
Bichat is less optimistic about discovering how nature operates, but this passage throws 
a light on the rhetorical aspect of the "veil." The term becomes even more equivocal 
when accompanied with an adjective "thick," for it can mean the metaphysical veil that 
limits our knowledge about life, and also the physical layers of the body, including the 
skin that hides the minute operations inside the body. 
In scientific and medical discourses, truth or knowledge was often personified 
as "she" or "nature," into which the scientific gaze penetrates. Victor in retrospect calls 
the working of nature "so astonishing a secret" (Frankentstein 34) or the "tremendous 
secret" (Frankenstein 36) of the human frame. While unveiling a secret had a positive 
value because it solved a "mystery" (Frankenstein 33) in the Enlightenment context, 
secrecy was associated with something inaccessible, dangerous and quite frequently 
sexual. Darwin's depiction of Nature is more sexual than perilous, attributing to Nature 
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the erotic feminine traits such as "breasts" and "her fine waist." What Darwin describes 
is Nature's "Beauty" with her "stately limbs" and "goddess-form" (TN Canto I, pp.12,13, 
11.129-144). Like Bichat's "veil" Victor's rhetOlic works on both levels, metaphysical 
and physical. Therefore, it is natural for him to pay attention to the image of "beauty" in 
selecting the parts of his creature, although the outcome betrays his heightened 
expectation. 
As Iwan Phys Morns's extensive study of nineteenth-century experiments has 
clearly shown, the philosophy of each scientific experimenter was different and his 
social role equivoca1.242 Since the practice of experimental science during this period 
was not a straightforward enterprise with clear-cut boundaries and protocols, scientists 
had to approach the philosophy of "life" with their own assumptions as to whether it is 
an integral part of the material universe, or an immaterial spirit infused in the body. 
Unlike many materialists, Paine is outspoken about human ignorance concerning the 
"invisible" agency that gives us life and sustains it. 
The man who proportions the several parts of a mill, uses the same scientific 
principles as if he had the power of constructing a universe; but as he cannot 
give to matter that invisible agency by which all the component parts of the 
immense machine of the universe have influence upon each other, and act in 
motional unison together, without any apparent contact, and to which man has 
given the name of attraction, gravitation, and repulsion, he supplies the place of 
that agency by the humble imitation of teeth and cogs. (AR 40, Italics added) 
He doubts that man is capable of applying mechanical theory to gain knowledge about 
242 Iwan Rhys Morus, Frankenstein's Children: Electricity, Exhibition. and Experiment 
in Early-Nineteenth-Century London (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), p.4. 
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that invisible agency which would enable a man to create life. It is crucial to define the 
line, as Paine did, between the facts that were scientifically solid and what was merely 
hopeful at the time, for only that will allow us accurately to analyse Shelley's interests 
in thematising animation, but the fact that this line was already blurred makes her theme 
even more controversial. In order to analyse Shelley's scientific interests, the first step 
which I should take is to describe the scientific and medical education that Victor 
obtains, thereby finding clues about the symbolic aspect of the outcome of his 
experiment. 
If . . . my father had taken the pains to explain to me, that the principles of 
Agrippa had been entirely exploded, and that a modern system of science had 
been introduced, which possessed much greater powers than the ancient, 
because the powers of the latter were chimerical, while those of the former 
were real and practical; under such circumstances, I should certainly have 
thrown Agrippa aside, and, with my imagination warmed as it was, should 
probably have applied myself to the more rational theory of chemistry which 
has resulted from modern discoveries. (Frankenstein 23) 
In the novel, Victor Frankenstein, rather than directing his attention to "modern" science, 
initially takes interest in the "ancient" system of science when he accidentally finds a 
volume of works written by Cornelius Agrippa. Victor's enthusiasm about the ancient 
authors' search for the "philosopher's stone" is at this time deeply implanted in his 
curiosity, which persists even after he cultivates his understanding of modern science. 
The turning point for his self-education takes place when he encounters the spectacular 
phenomenon of "thunder and lightening." "Electricity" (Frankenstein 24) opens up his 
eyes to a more "real and practical" or "modern" science (Frankenstein 23). This perhaps 
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refers to the expeliments carried out by Darwin and his friend Benjamin Franklin. 
At his university of Ingolstadt, despite M.Krempe's advice to relinquish the 
study of the ancient authors, he still had "a contempt for the uses of modem natural 
philosophy" (Frankenstein 29). It was his mentor, M.Waldman, who led Victor to see 
the virtues in both kinds of science, ancient and modem. Victor learns that modem 
natural philosophers have "ascend[ ed] into the heavens; they have discovered how the 
blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe" and "even mock the invisible 
world with its own shadows" (Frankenstein 31). Through his instruction, Victor is 
introduced into the world of chemistry which was still an alien concept to him. M. 
Waldman celebrates chemistry as "that branch of natural philosophy in which the 
greatest improvements have been and may be made" (Frankenstein 31). Except for the 
mention of "chemistry," Shelley is not articulate about what constitutes the "modem" 
system of science that makes it possible for Victor finally to unveil the "secret" of life. 
William Cullen celebrates the "new modes of philosophizing," signifying the 
new mathematical or mechanical ways of drawing conclusions about the human body 
(FL ix-xi). Like Cheyne, he acknowledges the "immaterial power" which is "connected 
with our organized or material part," but leaves out discussion of it as irrelevant. What 
Cheyne had called the "sentient principle" is dismissed altogether from the scene. 
. . . for if contraction or irritation necessarily follows perception, and 
perception is an equally necessary consequence of impression, we have no 
more occasion to take notice of a sentient principle in a system of physic, than 
if it was a mechanical cause; so we shall enquire no further into the one or the 
other (CL 12). 
"Mechanical philosophy" and "Chemical Pathology," he maintains, promised a much 
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better explanation than ancient philosophy, which came to "prevail very much till the 
end of the late century; and has indeed continued to have a great share in our systems 
down to the present time" (FL ix-xi). Cullen's realistic treatment of the "sentient 
principle" is described as a chief charactelistic of modem science in the novel. While 
"[t]he ancient teachers of this science," said M.Waldman, "promised impossibilities, and 
performed nothing ... [t]he modem masters promise very little" (Frankenstein 30). 
One of the most well known contemporaries of Mary Shelley was no doubt 
Humphry Davy. His chemical science attempted to reveal the "profound secrets" of both 
nature and man. He insisted that chemical processes not only explain the workings of 
natural phenomena but are actually required for the nourishment and growth of 
"organized beings,,:243 
the phenomena of combustion, of the solution of different substances in water, 
of the agencies of fire; the production of rain, hail, and snow, and the 
conversion of dead matter into living matter by vegetable organs, all belong to 
chemistry. (Discourse 5,6) 
It is not my intention to question the importance of Davy's chemical studies nor the 
benefit Shelley may have gained from his theory, but to illustrate the genealogy of 
chemical science and how Shelley'S materialism is linked to the earlier ideas. "Secrets" 
in chemical phenomena were explored by a number of eighteenth-century scholars who 
were already familiar with what they called "chemical affinities" (Zool1omia i 499) 
within an organic entity. Davy's enthusiasm about 'Romantic Science,244 is certainly 
243 Sir Humphry Davy, A Discourse .. Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry 
(London: J.Johnson, 1802), p.8. Hereafter cited as Discourse with page numbers in 
parenthethes. 
244 Maurice Hindle, Mary Shelley: Frankenstein (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1994), p.35. 
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observable from Victor's initial statement at Ingolstadt: "natural philosophy, and 
paIiicularly chemistlY in the most comprehensive sense of the term, became nearly my 
sole occupation"(Frankenstein 30, italics added). Yet Davy's chemical science is not so 
useful in understanding the nineteenth-century scientific context, as illustrating the 
whole trajectory of eighteenth-century physiology, which sought to pin down the nature 
of matter by using "analogy." For these physiologists the use of analogy was more 
rhetorical than scientific, for chemical reactions could not have been "visible" even with 
the best microscopes. 
2. The Paradox of the Laws of Nature 
In a sense chemistry, which straddles physical (mechanical) and life sciences, became a 
useful tool in understanding the operation of the body by means of analogy. The 
scientific methodology adopted by Erasmus Darwin was largely predicated upon 
"analogy." "The great CREATOR of all things," he argues, "has infinitely diversified 
the works of his hands," but he is certain that God "has at the same time stamped a 
certain similitude on the features of nature" (Zoonomia i 1). This is why he believes that 
finding the "similitude" or making "rational analogy" leads to "many and important 
discoveries. " 
He supported his scientific argument by companng two or more natural 
phenomena with chemical experiments. He compares, for instance, electric fluid with 
heat: "The analogy between the phenomena of the electric fluid and of heat furnishes 
another argument in support of the existence of heat as a gravitating fluid." To illustrate 
the power of analogy, he explicates similarities, such as the means of accumulation (by 
friction on the excited body), the conducting tools of propagation (metals), or their 
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capacity to be "electrized" if they are mechanically extended.245 Darwin elevates this 
analogy to explain the immaterial agent through the powers of heat, electlicity or 
gravitation: 
Some philosophers have divided all created beings into material and 
immaterial: the former including all that part of being, which obeys the 
mechanic laws of action and reaction, but which can begin no motion of itself; 
the other is the cause of all motion, and is either termed the power of gravity, or 
of specific attraction, or the spirit of animation. This immaterial agent is 
supposed to exist in or with matter, but to be quite distinct from it, and to be 
equally capable of existence, after the matter, which now possesses it, is 
decomposed. 
Nor is this theory ill supported by analogy, since heat, electricity, and 
magnetism, can be given to or taken from a piece of iron; and must therefore 
exist, whether separated from the metal, or combined with it. From a parity of 
reasoning, the spirit of animation would appear to be capable of existing as 
well separately from the body as with it. (Zoonomia i 109) 
By comparing the immaterial agent to "heat, electricity and magnetism," Darwin is 
making the material/immaterial controversy redundant. Analogy means that he will not 
"dispute about words." To him, the power of electricity is synonymous with that of 
gravity, specific attraction, magnetism, and "even the spirit of animation." By so doing, 
he evades the religious question altogether. It was in all probability this style that Paine 
had critiqued. Paine rejected the idea that "man has given the name of attraction, 
245 Erasmus Darwin, The Botam·c Garden. Part 1. The Economy of Vegetation (1791) 
(London: Scolar Press, 1973), Additional Notes pp.15, 16. 
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gravitation, and repulsion" to an immaterial agent. It is of great interest to me to study 
the language, for it is precisely this kind of analogy, or transgression, that incited the 
image of the human body, particularly the dead body, as a mere material object into 
which the spirit or soul could be infused or from which it could be taken out. 
Yet what is fundamentally innovative about Darwin's medical theory is not the 
method of analogy, but his organic theory which revolutionalised the whole concept of 
the body as a machine. Despite much reliance on "analogy" in providing rational 
confidence, Darwin disregards medical theorists who "idly ingenious, busied 
themselves in attempting to explain the laws of life by those of mechanism and 
chemistry" instead of "comparing the properties belonging to animated nature with each 
other" (Zoonomia i 1). Priestley's downright materialism runs deep in Darwin's theory, 
in that the latter identifies the spirit of animation246 with "matter of a finer kind" 
(Zoonomia i 109), but Darwin was not a simple scientist. He believes identity exists in 
"every fibre of the corporeal part of our system" (Zoonomia i 133), and, unlike in 
Priestley, mechanistic allusions are minimal in his medical treatise. The mind is no 
longer the workings of immaterial spirits, for animal spirits have become part of the 
corporeal system: 'Some philosopher, I believe it is Des Cartes, has said, "I think, 
therefore, I exist." But this is not right reasoning, because thinking is a mode of 
existence; and it is thence only saying, "I exist, therefore I exist'" (ibid.). What makes 
Darwin's theory distinctive is therefore his career as a physician and his medical 
knowledge. Living beings are those entities which do not react solely in a mechanical 
246 By the words spirit of animation or sensorial power, he means "only that animal life, 
which mankind possesses in common with brutes, and in some degree even with 
vegetables," and, just as Cullen had done, leaves "the consideration of the immortal 
part of us, which is the object ofreligion, to those who treat of revelation" (ibid.). 
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mmmer to environmental inputs, but possesses an inherent responsiveness of their own 
(Zoonomia ii 148, Italics added). 
Chemistry as the principal branch of science is emphasized in Frankenstein, 
but only as that which paves the way to understanding "physiology." 
One of the phaenomena [sic] which had peculiarly attracted my attention was 
the structure of the human frame, and, indeed, any animal endued with life. 
Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle of life proceed? It was a bold 
question, and one which has ever been considered as a mystery; yet with how 
many things are we upon the brink of becoming acquainted, if cowardice or 
carelessness did not restrain our inquiries. I revolved these circumstances in my 
mind, and determined thenceforth to apply myself more particularly to those 
branches of natural philosophy which relate to physiology. (Frankenstein 33, 
Italics added) 
This passage is profoundly meaningful in terms of its cultural context, for it could be 
histOlically interpreted as the move away from the mechanical to the organic operation 
of the body, such as was effected by the vitalist approach of John Brown and the organic 
theory of Erasmus Darwin, Xavier Bichat and William Lawrence. There is clearly a 
shift in what gives rise to bodily sensations or feelings: from the external conditions to 
the "organs of sense" themselves. 
The implication is that the workings of the physiological body are not as 
predictable and mechanistic as the earlier natural philosophers had anticipated. Instead 
these physiologists explicitly refer to the physiological power as the "power of 
contraction" and not that of "attraction": 
The fibres, which constitute the muscles and organs of sense, possess a power 
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of contraction. The circumstances attending the exertion of this power of 
CONTRACTION constitute the laws of animal motion, as the circumstances 
attending the exertion of the power of ATTRACTION constitute the laws of 
motion of inanimate matter. (Zoonomia i 30) 
Darwin replaces mechanical jargon with physiological terms that explicate the 
movement of the organic parts. William Lawrence follows Bichat in that he 
charactelises the essential quality of "living beings" as having "organic textures" which 
produce phenomena such as sensation and contraction, and their operation is constantly 
modified by "the vital powers" (Lectures 71). Life, he argues, presupposes organisation 
not merely in the external arrangement of the whole, but in each pati, and in all the 
details of each. In short, he concludes, "life is the result of the mutual actions and 
reactions of all parts" (Lectures 93). The ultimate paradox is that the more one gains 
knowledge about the "secret" of nature, gradually understanding the intricacy of the 
make-up of the body, the more he or she is made aware of the uncontrollable quality of 
the body, which ironically diminishes the "confidence" which Enlightenment thinkers 
looked forward to securing. 
We have so far examined the complex ideas which evolved in medical 
discourse between the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Darwin's materialism 
is ambiguous in that he grants power to matter itself, while analogising the power (the 
spirit of animation) to heat and electricity. Victor's materialism is not entirely 
straightforward either. On the one hand, he calls the corpses he collected "materials" 
(Frankenstein 35, 36) to prepare the "frame" for the "reception" of animation 
(Frankenstein 35), implying the passivity of the matter. He even calls it the "lifeless 
thing" (Frankenstein 38). Nevertheless his hypothesis is undeniably based on the 
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assumption that corpses can be reanimated, because the power of contractibility belongs 
to each organ, or else, he would not have designed the intricate construction of the body. 
Bichat's hypothesis perhaps comes closest to Victor's experiment, and it almost 
prefigures the monstrous creation. He conceives an imaginary experiment to prove that 
what sustains life is not just the contractibility in the muscles but "the cause which 
creates its exercise" meaning "the cerebral action." 
If it were possible to compose a man, partly with the organs of the senses and 
the brain of an old man, and partly with the muscles of a youth, the voluntary 
motions of such a man would be scarcely more developed, because it does not 
suffice that a muscle can contract itself, it is necessary its power of doing so 
should be put in action; now what cause is there to produce the action in this 
instance? (PR 129) 
This is at the same time suggesting that if the organs of senses are not worn out as in an 
old man, the experiment may be a realistic one. What I believe deserves a closer 
attention is not the suggestion of a monstrous creation, but his indifference to building 
one coherent identity or self: he does not prioritise either the organs of sense or the 
muscles. Both are equally necessary for the continuation of life. For Bichat, the 
existence of the rational mind or soul is not an issue any more than whether the creator 
of man is God. Where physiology is concerned, the matter, or organs themselves, are 
what keep the vital powers in motion, and not the immaterial spirit that regulates and 
monitors the body. 
Interestingly, one of the most difficult tasks for Victor is to re-create the 
physiological body with "all its intricacies of fibres, muscles, and veins" (Frankenstein 
35), reflecting the Darwinian scheme that does not allow a machine to be reanimated. 
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The focus is here on the fibrous body, and not the soul. He could have attempted the 
creation of a being like himself or one of simpler organization, but, unsatisfied with the 
materials within his command, Victor again collects bones from charnel houses 
(Frankenstein 36), and patches up these materials. The minuteness of the work involved 
is implied by Victor's change of plans in his creature's size: "As the minuteness of the 
parts formed a great hindrance to my speed, I resolved, contrary to my first intention, to 
make the being of a gigantic stature" (Frankenstein 35, 36). This is a realistic picture 
considering the medical knowledge of the time. What differentiates the vitalist theory of 
Darwin, Bichat and Lawrence from Priestley's mechanical theory is their determination 
to uphold the complex and changing nature of "physiology." Bichat argues that the 
animal body is necessarily an "organized" being whose 
proper life of each organ is composed of the different modifications that vital 
sensibility and mobility undergo in each, modifications which depend 
inevitably on circulation and the temperature of the organ. Each one in their 
several sensibility, mobility, temperature, and circulation has a particular mode 
of feeling, and of moving, a heat independent of that of the body, and a 
capillary circulation which, subtracted from the empire of the heart, only 
receives the influence of the tonic action of the part. But let us pass over this 
point of physiology, which has been so often and so learnedly discussed by 
other authors. (PR 92) 
William Lawrence similarly considers it important to differentiate the workings of 
physiology from other scientific operations. He follows Bichat in asserting that the 
component particles are "continually changing" through "absorption, assimilation, 
exhalation, generation, and growth" (Lectures 94). The essential element of the natural 
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laws, Lawrence argues, is "by its very nature, fluctuating and indeterminate." It is 
therefore ironic that "laws" which should give a regulatory explanation about life can 
only show its "uncertainty" (Lectures 71). Above all "uncertainty" and change are the 
key concepts in capturing the mind of organic theorists who cast piercing eyes on 
nature's secret movement. Even after death, matter survives in different shapes: 
"Immortal matter braves the transient storm, IMounts from the wreck, unchanging but 
in form.-" (TN Canto II, p.46, 11.43, 44). Darwin describes this as "the perpetual 
mutability of the forms of matter" refen-ing to the system of transmigration introduced 
by Pythagoras. 247 It is the mutability of an organism that makes it inherently 
unpredictable. Victor's experiment proved that he was successful in literally "unveiling" 
the operation of nature, however what he has created is an organic being that symbolises 
uncertainty. The grotesque object previously hidden is at last exposed. Victor perceives 
the creature as not only "ugly," but, "when those muscles and joints [of the monster] 
were rendered capable of motion, [that] became a thing such as even Dante could not 
have conceived" (Frankenstein 40). What is most horrific therefore is not the ugliness 
itself, but the voluntary movement of these "muscles and joints" that were originally 
"inanimate." In other words, Victor fears the "spontaneous" and "uncontrollable" nature 
of the creature, less than its appearance. 
Frankenstein is not just about a scientific failure that accidentally creates a 
monster. The novel presents the idealism of a medical student, followed by his great 
disappointment. Darwin had recourse to Newtonian confidence that certain movements 
or phenomena are based on a regulatory pattern ofthe "laws of nature" (analogy), but at 
the same time avowed the changeful nature of an organic being. There is clearly a 
247 ibid. Italics added. 
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paradox between having confidence in the analytical method of observing similar 
"features of nature" which are everywhere stamped, and denying the existence of such 
laws because of the fluctuating nature of organic matter. Furtheremore, the beautiful 
Temple of Nature which Victor had so ardently sought was nowhere to be found. 
3. Ethereal Fires 
Bichat had followed the Brunonian idea that there was a "sum" of excitability or vital 
energy in a life time: "These two orders (animal and organic) may be compared to two 
lights burning at the same time, and which have only a certain quantity of matter to feed 
them" (PR 131). In other words, if so-called "Life" or "excitability" is not used up or 
"expended" by the fire, one may survive the toughest condition, if only life or the 
"spirit" does not escape. Mary Shelley employs Brunonian ideas in her short story, 
'Roger Dodsworth: the Reanimated Englishman.' It is about a man who was supposedly 
preserved in suspended animation after the 1654 avalanche, and was allegedly 
reanimated in Shelley'S time. The fact that she took this story from a newspaper report 
of 1826 clearly shows her philosophical engagement with the question of life, and her 
scrupulous description using physiological ideas is worth citing in fulL 
Animation (1 believe physiologists agree) can as easily be suspended for an 
hundred or two years, as for as many seconds. A body hermetically sealed up 
by the frost, is of necessity preserved in its pristine entireness. That which is 
totally secluded from the action of external agency, can neither have any thing 
added to nor taken away from it: no decay can take place, for something can 
never become nothing; under the influence of that state of being which we call 
death, change but not annihilation removes from our sight the corporeal atoma; 
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the earth receives sustenance from them, the air is fed by them, each element 
takes its own, thus seizing forcible repayment of what it had lent.248 
In this frame of reference, Darwin's notion of Galvanic electricity as a stimulus III 
reviving a dead body could be more easily comprehended. 
"Galvanism's method" generally meant that "the muscles and the nerves were 
the source of electric action" whilst "Volta's artifice," meant that "the dissimilar metals 
[Voltanic pile] constituted the electric source. ,,249 Darwin seems at first sceptical of 
Galvanic "animal electricity," and rejects the "similitude between the spirit of animation, 
which contracts the muscular fibres, and the electric fluid" (Zoonomia i 66), and is 
unwilling to accept the notion that the experiments with electricity do not supply us 
with a "new quantity of the spirit of life" (ibid). He did not therefore entirely believe in 
his own theory of analogy. However, in the case of the paralytic patient, for example, 
Darwin believed "repeated and strong shocks of electricity to have been of great 
advantage" (Zoonomia i 39), remarking positively on the therapeutic effects. He is even 
hopeful about its function as "vital ether." 
If nevertheless this theory [that electricity shocks produce an additional 
quantity of the spirit of life] should ever become established, a stimulus must 
be called an eductor of vital ether ... and by drawing off the charges of vital 
fluid may occasion the contraction or motions of the muscular fibres, and 
organs of sense. (ibid.) 
He cautiously evades a definite conclusion, but, considering that he had employed the 
248 Mary Shelley, 'Roger Dodsworth: The Reanimated Englishman' (1826) in Mary 
Shelley: Collected Tales and Stories ed. Charles E. Robinson. (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p.44. Italics added. 
249 William Sturgeon, A Course of Twelve Elementary Lectures on Galvanism (London, 
1843), p.18. 
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means of electricity to treat his own patients, it is probable that he had hoped for the 
therapeutic effect of electricity or even animation. The fundamental difference between 
Voltaic electricity and Galvanic (animal) electricity, therefore, closely parallels the 
mechanistic and organic systems of the body. The former requires constant exertion on 
the part of an external agent whether it be "Voltaic electricity," immaterial spirit or 
"God," while the latter does not require such an agent once it is put in motion, for 
matter has its "ethereal fires" or its own power of "contractibility" and "sensibility." 
This dispute reminds us of the Hunter-Lawrence controversy. While John Hunter, a 
vehement anti-materialist, invokes the immaterial "living principle" to explain nearly all 
animal and vegetable physiological phenomena, William Lawrence assigns them to the 
organic nature of the body. When we onsider the Volta-Galvani debate with this in mind, 
we are made to see a certain correspondence, the question of whether the active agent is 
an integral part of the body or not. Darwin's influence on Shelley's imagination is 
evident in their shared interests in the possibility of resuscitating a dead organic being, 
and also their belief in the vital quality of matter. 
The monster is a collection of inanimate bodies, but when Victor infuses a 
"spark" of being into this lifeless thing, it "breathed hard, and a convulsive motion 
agitated its limbs" (Frankenstein 38, 9). Like Darwin, Humphry Davy had touched upon 
the electrical device which stimulates the "organs of sensation." He gave a series of 
lectures in 1812, and the Monthly Magazine describes his experiment as follows: 
The identity of Voltaic and common electricity is demonstrated by the spark, 
employed for exhibiting electrical phenomena, as electrometers, the electrical 
battery, and on the organs of sensation. When bodies are similarly electrified 
by Voltaic as by common electricity, they repel each other; but when 
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dissimilarly, they attract each other. The electrical battery was charged, and 
produced a spark by a single contact from the Voltaic instrument.250 
Many intellectuals who put on performances were interested in demonstrating the 
responsiveness of the body or the "organs of sensation" by means of electricity.25I 
When Giovani Aldini, Galvani's nephew, visited London and performed before the 
Royal Society, he utilized the heads of freshly slaughtered Oxen and dissected frogs to 
produce the galvanic fluid. Galvanism, according to Iwan Rhys Morus, is a way of 
representing the human body as a machine which operates with the force of 
electricity.252 This is perhaps true if the force of electricity is capable of controlling the 
mechanised body. However, Galvanism gives us a valuable insight into the organic body 
that has its own life energy. Once the electrical stimulus is exerted, the body takes on its 
control over "sensation" and "feelings." This is precisely what the monster stands for. 
The term "monster" was often employed to signify an uneducated and often 
violent mob. Shelley's representation of the mob in 'The Swiss Peasant' closely mirrors 
Wollstonecraft's in A Historical and Moral View. The heroine of the story, Fanny, is 
caught in between her lover Louis Chaumont whose family had been oppressed and 
reduced to poverty, and Henry Marville, the son of her benefactress. In the midst of 
political turmoil, between the peasants and the aristocrats, Fanny and the Marvilles 
encounter Louis with his peasant band who are "violent in gesture and menace." What 
Madame de Marville says to the mob excites them: 
The word was electric. The fierce passions of the mob, excited by the mischief 
250 The Monthly Magazine: or British Register Vol. XXXIII (London, 1812), p.262. 
251 In the 1818 edition of Frankenstein there is a passage explicitly referring to 
electricity as a 'fluid' and this suggests that the protagonist's understanding of the 
universe relates to the life-energy that shares the same immaterial substance with 
electricity. 
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they were about to perpetrate, now burst like a stream into this new channel. 
With violent execrations they rushed upon the unfortunate woman: they would 
have tom her from the car, but already her son had sprung from his 
hiding-place, and striking a violent blow at the foremost assailant, checked for 
a moment their brutal outrages.253 
Louis, having heard that Fanny is now the wife of Henry, tries to pacify the mob. "Yet, 
it was no easy task, even for him, to stem the awakened passions of the blood-thirsty 
mob." To "control the violence to which he had given rise seemed impossible." The 
metaphor of "electricity" is again crucial, especially in depicting the uncontrollable 
nature of the mob, as if it were an animated monster. 
Mrs.Gaskell's misreading of Mary Shelley's monster in MalY Barton (1848) 
has caught the attention of some commentators, for she not only misnamed the monster 
in the novel Frankenstein, but called him a soulless and inarticulate being. 
No education had given him wisdom; and without wisdom, even love, with all 
its effects, too often works but harm ... The actions of the uneducated seem to 
be typified in those of Frankenstein, that monster of many human qualities, 
ungifted with a soul, a knowledge of the difference between good and evil.254 
Chris Baldick argues that this is Mrs Gaskell's "creative misreading" of the stage 
adaptation by Richard Brinsley Peake,255 because Shelley's original Frankenstein gives 
252 Iwan Rhys Morus (1998), pp.130, 13I. 
253 Mary Shelley, 'The Swiss Peasant' in Mary Shelley: Collected Tales and Stories ed. 
Charles E, Robinson (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 
p.148. 
254 Elizabeth Gaskell, Mazy Bal"ton (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1996), p.170. 
Confounding the name of the scientist with the monster is a common error made even 
today. 
255 Chris Baldick, In Frankenstein s Shadow: Myth Monstrosity; and 
Nineteenth-century Writing(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.87. 
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an entirely different depiction of the monster, who is neither inarticulate nor soulless. 
Conversely, what this "misreading" does show is that an educated mind and the 
judgment of moral standards were perceived to be the primary qualifications of the 
"soul" in the early nineteenth century. In this sense, the monster in the novel undeniably 
possesses a soul, for not only does the monster acknowledge the distinction between 
good and evil, he is a rational creature, or perhaps too rational, justifying his own 
immoral conduct with impressive eloquence. The monster is not evil, nor is he 
uneducated. He is, like Wollstonecraft's heroine, Mary, self-educated. 
His passion is described as both "uncontrollable" (Frankenstein 187) and 
"insatiable" (Frankenstein 188). However, he repents his conduct after his creator's 
death: "I, who irretrievably destroyed thee by destroying all thou lovedst" (Frankenstein 
187). Although the monster is given the denomination of "a rational creature" by Victor, 
the monster cannot escape his fate, to be what he is created to be, namely, a product of 
scientific materialism in the most literal sense. There is dissimilarity between Darwin's 
theory of contractibility and Godwin's inclination towards the necessitarian belief that 
man is necessarily a product of environment. The question is merely a matter of 
emphasis: Is the moral decision of the monster determined by his surrounding 
environment, or rather, by the bodily sensations or feelings produced by his own 
responsiveness? 
4. Imprisonment of the Soul 
One of the most prominent features of the novel is that not only do many characters die, 
but the protagonists, Victor and the monster, both hasten to face death towards the end 
of the noveL Victor, in his deathbed, says "this hour, when I momentarily expect my 
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release, is the only happy one which I have enjoyed for several years" (Frankenstein 
186), and the monster also cannot wait to "find rest" in death: "I shall die" 
(Frankenstein 190). The monster is glad that he "shall no longer feel the agonies which 
now consume [him], or be the prey of feelings unsatisfied, yet unquenched" (ibid.). This 
is curiously reminiscent of Edward Young's negative apprehension of being alive on 
earth. As Janet Todd maintains, the poet "trumpeted his joy in the sensation of the 
universe", but at the same time "he felt a Christian apprehension of earth as transient 
and negative. God was both excitingly vast and vastly distant from humanity.,,256 
Young's world picture shows disaster, discomfort, pain and sorrow. Most of "this 
terraqueous Globe" for him is "a Waste, Rocks, Deserts, frozen Seas, and burning 
Sands; I Wild haunts of Monsters, Poison, Stings and Death.,,257 
Samuel Johnson's The HistOlY of Rasselas (1759), which Shelley read in July, 
1817, thematises the "choice of life" by giving glimpses of various forms of life 
including the European life of "know ledge," 258 shepherds' "pastoral 
simplicity"(Rasselas 82) and "private recesses of domestick peace" (Rasselas 89). 1mlac, 
the mentor of the prince and princess of Abissinia, admonishes them that there is not 
one who does not "dread the moment when solitude should deliver him to the tyranny of 
reflection" even if he seems happy on the surface, for happiness is a "pleasing delusion" 
(Rasselas 76). Johnson's portraiture of solitary men represents the emerging cult of 
reflection, also observed in Young's Night Thoughts. Imlac is pessimistic about the 
"choice of life" for "[v ]ery few . . . live by choice." Frankenstein's monster is the 
256 Janet Todd (1986), p.52. 
257 Edward Young, Mght Thoughts ed. Stephen Cornford (Cambrige: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), Night 1.285-87. 
258 Samuel Johnson, The HistoryofRasselas, Prince ofAbissinia ed. D.J.Enright 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1976), p.65. Hereafter cited as Rasselaswith page 
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embodiment of the melancholic and reflective subject. He was from the start deprived 
of parents, food, money or an amiable appearance that may win him the sympathy of a 
stranger. The monster's narrative is filled with the "pain of reflection" (Frankenstein 
116) and he indulges himself in self-pity. 
Victor, on the other hand, is "busy" (Rasselas 149) like Rasselas and Imlac in 
the choice of life. Domestic happiness is a recurrent theme of that "happy valley" which 
is the "seat of tranquility" (Rasselas 42), or more appropriately "tasteless tranquility" 
(Rasselas 72), from which Rasselas and his sister, Nekayah, escape. Similarly Victor is 
not content with his tranquil life with his family: he "ardently desired the acquisition of 
knowledge" and "thought it hard to remain [at home] during my youth cooped up in one 
place, and had longed to enter the world" (Frankenstein 28). 
Why is it that Victor, who ardently sought "immortality and power" 
(Frankenstein 29), after accomplishing his goal, can no longer bear to live in this 
world? The structure of the novel has a striking resemblance with that of Rasselas. 
Imlac and the prince of Abissinia set out on a joumry in pursuit of the "Truth" about 
what choice they should make to be happy in the world. Victor's ideal vision of 
happiness is that 
A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and 
excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the 
gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs 
(Frankenstein 36). 
Just like Rasselas who is determined to find which mode of life would conduct him to 
happiness, Victor never doubts that the attainment of knowledge would enable him to 
numbers in parentheses. 
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realise his dream, which he believes to be everyone's choice of life. Mummifying the 
body in ancient Egypt, according to Imlac, teaches a lesson from which one can learn 
the futility of "eluding death": "it is commonly supposed that the Egypytians believed 
the soul to live as long as the body continued undissolved, and therefore tried this 
method of eluding death" (Rasselas 146). Victor's scientific pursuit, in one sense, 
parodies the desperate human effort to cling to the corpse for the sustenance of life. 
When Walton, an explorer, encounters the creature for the first time, he "cannot find 
words to describe" him except by comparing his features to those of a "mummy" 
(Frankenstein 187). In his expression there is a melancholic tone that expresses the 
monster's helplessness at being both dead and alive at the same time. 
When we tum our attention to Shelley's Sh0l1 stories, there are passages which 
show her scepticism or even repugnance towards subverting mortality. In 'The Mortal 
Immortal' (1833), Shelley has her protagonist, Winzy, become a pupil of an alchemist, 
Cornelius Agrippa, who succeeds in creating the "Elixir of Immortality." Even after 
consuming the elixir, Winzy is not convinced of his master's account that the liquid will 
endow him with immortal life, and thinks that 
[Agrippa] was a wise philosopher, but had no acquaintance with any spirits but 
those clad in flesh and blood. His science was simply human and human 
science, I soon persuaded myself, could never conquer nature's laws so far as 
to imprison the soul forever within its carnal habitation.259 
The rhetoric is dominantly theological, which consequently eclipses the scientific and 
philosophical ramifications. This is not exactly a reiteration of Godwin's critical 
259 Mary Shelley, 'The Mortal Immortal' (1833) in Mary Shelley: Collected Tales and 
Stories ed. Charles E, Robinson (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), p.224. Italics added. Hereafter cited as Mortalwith page numbers in 
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reference to materialism, which, he says, "clogs" the body to the necessitarian system 
(P J 362). Rather, it comes nearer Wollstonecraft's sentimental notions of death as an 
escape from the body: "But an immOlial soul, not restrained by mechanical laws and 
struggling to free itself from the shackles of matter, contributes to, instead of disturbing, 
the order of creation" (VRW 116). This is what Joseph Priestley had inveighed against, 
the metaphysical notion that the "body is necessarily a clog, and an impediment to the 
soul" (Disquisitions 44). It is ironic that the body "imprison[ s]" the soul forever in "The 
Mortal Immortal," and also the same body is compared to the "cage" of the soul in her 
other short story, 'Transformation' (1830),260 for it was "immortality" and not the 
"imprisonment" of the soul that the early scientists had pursued in searching for the 
philosopher's stone. Victor's creation can be best apprehended as a specific response not 
just to the scientific controversy over whether a dead body or matter can be animated, 
but to the theological question that accuses the body of being the fetters or "receptacle" 
of an otherwise free spirit. In other words, by setting a scientific experiment that infuses 
life into an inanimate body, Shelley was able to address a highly problematical yet 
controversial issue: What makes it worth while to live, what is the "choice of life"? 
If "animating" the dead body only represents the "imprisonment" of the 
immortal and immaterial soul, what is the meaning of the monster's revived life and his 
moral education? The Enlightenment context provided a new angle for thinking about 
life. For some, life was no longer a testing ground for Judgment which becomes a 
gateway to heaven. Darwin, for example, adopts the Lockean sensational psychology in 
elaborating on the origin of good and evil, arguing that "all animals have a similar 
parentheses. 
260 Mary Shelley, 'Transformation' in Mary Shelley: Colleted Tales and Stories ed. 
Charles E. Robinson (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 
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origin, viz, from a single filament; that the difference of their forms and qualities has 
arisen only pom the different irritabilities and sensibilities ... of this original living 
filament" (Zool1omia i 498, Italics added). 
Andrew Baxter, an eighteenth-century theologian had argued that matter is evil 
while the spirit is good presents a sharp contrast with Darwin's materialism, and 
Pliestley refuted Baxter's immaterial system." For both Darwin and Priestley, there is 
no logical explanation as to how an "unembodied spirit" can animate the body in the 
first place if the body is already evil. Priestley finds a contradiction in Baxter's 
argument, for if the soul has to be "subject to such a confinement" as the latter has 
suggested, great is "the risk that the immaterial soul runs by its union with this gross 
material body." For Preistley, there is nothing more pessimistic about life than such a 
tenet that considers the body as the "fetters," and his censuring the idea of the body 
being a "dreadful contagion of flesh and blood" (Disquisitions 47) certainly reminds us 
of Winzy's soliloquy. Like Godwin's St. Leon, Winzy's beautiful and youthful form is 
retained throughout. While Winzy's retains eternal youth, the beauty of his wife Bertha 
is gradually lost in time. Just as the monster in Frankenstein is abhorred and detested by 
others, Winzy was "regarded with horror and detestation," (Mortal 227) which makes 
him call his eternal youth a "disease" (Mortal 229). It is hence not the trepidation of 
death but that of life that makes him abhor the "imprisonment" of the soul in his body: 
"Am I immortal? I return to my first question. In the first place, is it not more probable 
that the beverage of the a1chymist was fraught rather with longevity than eternal life? 
Such is my hope" (ibid.). 
Shelley's negative depiction of the soul forcibly confined III the body IS 
p.129. 
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dramatised or perhaps caricatured by the monstrous creation. The monster's cry is a plea 
for mortality, "Why did I live? Why, in that instant, did I not extinguish the spark of 
existence which you had so wantonly bestowed?" (Frankenstein 110). The question is, 
from a mere spark how was it possible for the monster to intellectually rise above the 
level of the brutes. Shelley's version of the monster is far from being irrational. He is an 
embodiment of an "organized being" whose organic parts have their own logic, but at 
the same time, his narrative demonstrates his capacity to reason and to make sense of 
his being. 
There is also a profound irony in contradicting the cultural representation of the 
uncontrollable and uneducated "monster," because it is not lack of knowledge or 
language but the acquirement of these things required of human beings that brought 
about rage and violence in the creature, and made him a monster. The story that the 
monster tells is a miniature or compressed version of natural history describing the 
anthropological development from animals to human beings. At first, the monster could 
only perceive "light, hunger, thirst and darkness," and he only wept from physical pain 
like an animal. Thus, just as 1mlac contemplates the simple life of the "goats," the 
monster recollects his initial stage of being. His sense of self was not even formed until 
he acquired "ideas" through his senses of vision and hearing, for "[n]o distinct ideas 
occupied [his] mind; all was confused" (Frankenstein 80). 1mlac compares himself with 
a beast and says, "I am, like him, pained with want, but am not, like him, satisfied with 
fullness [of being fed]" (Rasselas 43). Likewise, the primitive sensations of the monster 
are directed towards the "clear stream that supplied me with drink, and the trees that 
shaded me with the foliage" and he was "delighted when [he] first discovered a pleasant 
sound" of the little winged animals "who had often intercepted the light from my eyes" 
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(Frankenstein 81). So long as there are no specific ideas, there is no reason for the 
monster to despair. This logic, that insatiable passions are born from increasing ideas 
and the linguistic capacity to categorise these ideas, follows that of the sensational 
theOlists such as Hartley and La Mettrie, and also Rousseau's theory in Discourse. 
Gradually he understands psychological pain through observing the De Lacy family 
express pain, and through hearing them speak the words that produced pleasure or pain, 
smiles or sadness in the minds and countenances of the hearers (Frankenstein 88). 
Paradoxically, the monster uses logic to explain why he became impulsive. 
Culturally "monsters" are supposed to be dominated by irrational rage and passions, but 
in fact, rational judgment and irrational feeling coexist in this particular monster, which 
in actuality makes him most humane. Only through his narrative does he communicate 
these humane qualities to the reader. He is virtually tom between his fibrous body which, 
he claims, gives rise to "perceptions and passions" (Frankenstein 114), and his rational 
judgment. The creature is no less human than his creator is, for Victor's fierce passion 
for his intellectual pursuit is never extinguished until the toil is finally over. Similarly, 
the monster cannot overrule his "sentiment of hatred" (Frankenstein 114), "burning 
passion" (Frankenstein 118), or the "sensations" of "horror and hatred" (Frankenstein 
121). Yet the monster rationally appeals to his creator in order to persuade him to create 
a female monster: 
I am content to reason with you. I am malicious because I am miserable; am I 
not shunned and hated by all mankind? You, my creator, would tear me to 
pieces, and triumph; remember that, and tell me why I should pity man more 
than he pities me? (Frankenstein 119) 
He claims that he was at first "benevolent" and "mild" but his nature turned into 
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"bitterness" when he grew capable of understanding both emotionally and socially that 
he was shamed by his creator and next by the De Lacy family who were closest to his 
existence. Human beings are not born with reason, knowledge or language. They 
develop with ilTitabilities and sensibilities, for they are inevitably linked with "thought 
and feeling." The persecution became unbearable only because he learns to decipher the 
linguistic signs of others. He justifies the murder of Victor's brother, William, by loss of 
his emotional control: "I was the slave, not the master of an impulse" (Frankenstein 
188). But more immediately, it was the words, "epithets," that carried despair to the 
heart of the monster, triggering him to murder William (Frankenstein 117). 
Of what a strange nature is knowledge! It clings to the mind, when it has once 
seized on it, like a lichen on the rock. I wished sometimes to shake off all 
thought and feeling; but I learned that there was but one means to overcome the 
sensation of pain, and that was death-a state which I feared yet did not 
understand. (Frankenstein 96) 
Only by death can he sever the sensations that he has accumulated. In other words, he 
knows that the only thing that will stop the "pain of reflection" is death. As knowledge 
increases, he is induced to confront his own situation, which points to the fact that he 
possesses "no money, no friends, no kind of property" (Frankenstein 96). 
Unlike the ancient Egyptians, Darwin celebrates death as much as he does life, 
for the parents' improvements are materially bequeathed to posterity, as he claims, 
"Where climate is favourable, and salubrious food plentiful, there is reason to believe, 
that the races of animals perpetually improve by reproduction" (TN Additional Notes 
37). If, on the contrary, the soul is immaterial and the body material, "neither the 
generation nor the destruction of the body can have any effect with respect to it" 
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(Disquisitions 41), implying that there will be no improvements of mind or moral 
standards. Like the organic theorists, Priestley's notion of an organic being is defined as 
that which "grow[s], ripen[s] and decay[s] together" (Disquisitions 49). He asserts that, 
since "all the faculties of the mind, separately taken, appear to be mortal, the substance, 
or principle in which they exist must be pronounced to be mortal too," in other words, 
corporeal (Disquisitions 36). When the brain ceases to function, one ceases to think or 
feel. This is what the monster anticipates when he collects his "funeral pile" so as not to 
create "this miserable and unhallowed wretch, who would create such another as I have 
been." But at the same time he "shall no longer see the sun or stars, or feel the winds 
play on [his] cheeks" (Frankenstein 190). While he anxiously seeks peace of mind in 
death, the following passage presents ambivalence: "Polluted by crimes, and tom by the 
bitterest remorse, where can I find rest but in death?" (ibid.) This most probably 
signifies that he CAN find rest in death, but it can also suggest that (knowing he cannot 
rest after death) he is still seeking a place where he can rest forever. He hopes that what 
he now feels will no longer be felt and "[s]oon these burning miseries will be extinct" 
(Frankenstein 191), but there still remains a question mark: "My spirit will sleep in 
peace; or if it thinks, it will not surely think thus" (ibid.). After all, even Darwin's idea 
of the animal spirit is equivocal in that he acknowledges that it is capable of "existing 
separately from the body as with it." The monster's life is a celebration of primitive 
sensations that give birth to "pleasure" and "warmth" and at the same time profound 
grief of feeling "pain" and "cold." When Shelley has the monster think "on the choice 
of eternity" (Rasselas 149), like Nekayah, Shelley perhaps has in mind her mother's 
image of the afterlife, that the soul is elevated to become purer. 
In her short story, "Valerius: The Reanimated Roman" (1826), Shelley explores 
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the possibility of an existence after death. It is a tale about a Roman knight who is 
reanimated in "modem times," but the nan-ator concludes that he belongs to "the dead." 
In a sense, there is a structural resemblance with 'Roger Dodsworth' in that both 
thematise animated life. Unlike Roger Dodsworth, there is no specific depiction of how 
and why Valerius was resuscitated, but interestingly, Shelley highlights the problem of 
what "links" one to "our world" and what "snaps" the link.261 Valerius is devastated by 
the transformation of Rome. He wants to "judge if, after the great fluctuation in human 
affairs, man is nearer perfection than in my days" before he dies again (Valerius 341). 
Godwinian perfectibility is questioned, and is utterly denied in the nan-ative. The 
nan-ator of this tale wishes in vain that he could revive the hope of Valerius. The only 
feeling which "animates the soul" he believes is a "strong sympathy with beauty" 
(Valerius 342). He asks himself "Did Valerius sympathize with me?" Shelley is 
suggesting that the feeling of sympathy is the only thing that "links" one's spirit (or 
ghost) to the world of the living (Valerius 343). Frankenstein demonstrates a case that 
one cannot bear to live in the world if there is no link or sympathy. 
261 Mary Shelley, 'Valerius: The Reanimated Roman' (1826) in Mary Shelley: Collected 
Tales and Stories ed. Charles E. Robinson. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), pp.340-343. Hereafter cited as Valerius with page numbers in 
parentheses. 
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8 
'Sex in souls or not': 
Physiognomy and Voice 
The issue of whether the faculties of the mind are independent from the operation of the 
corporeal body was problematised in the representation of Shelley's monster as I have 
discussed in the previous chapter. Both Godwin and Wollstonecraft had set out 
theoretically and demonstratively to prove that the rational mind or soul can 
independently affect the operation of the body. Yet they were both aware of the 
contradictory notions inscribed in Lockean philosophy and medical writings, for the 
sensibility of the body affects the malleable nature of one's identity. It was precisely this 
paradox that puzzled Shelley's imagination and possibly diminished her confidence in 
the power of the mind. Would rationality always have the upperhand over the body? If 
not, would it submit to the reign of passions with possibly negative consequences? 
These questions probably stirred Shelley's mind when conceiving the story of 
Frankenstein. 
As I have already mentioned in the earlier chapter, Rousseau is sceptical of the 
operation of the soul as that which controls the body. He talks of the soul as something 
external to him. He "knows it exists" but says he has "nothing to do with producing or 
annihilating [it]" (Emile 270). Interestingly, Shelley follows Rousseau, rather than 
Wollstonecraft, in depicting the soul. The soul, Shelley believes, cannot be controlled by 
reason. In the 1831 edition, the soul is seen as something alien by the protagonist Victor 
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Frankenstein. 262 When Victor's intellectual curiosity IS stimulated by the lecture 
delivered by M.Waldman, he feels as if his "soul were grappling with a palpable 
enemy," namely the "secrets of nature." Shelley personifies the soul, and inserts her 
indirect speech; the soul of Frankenstein exclaimed "So much has been done.,,263 He 
calls the soul "my internal being which was then in a state of insurrection and turmoil," 
and there is a sense of resignation in the way Victor deals with this disorder; "I felt that 
order would thence arise, but I had no power to produce it" (Frankenstein 1831, 47). 
This gives an impression that Shelley presents an opposite picture of subjectivity from 
Wollstonecraft, who insists on the existence of the rational soul, and endorses the power 
of the mind. Shelley equates the "soul" with immoderate passion that takes over the 
mind, as she makes her protagonist say, "I was easily led ... to give utterance to the 
burning ardour of my soul" (Frankenstein 1831, 27). Even though they take opposite 
positions on the issues of the rational soul, Shelley and Wollstonecraft actually display 
the same anxiety about the body being a constrictive factor. 
While Frankenstein bears the same paradox that the rational mind does not 
necessarily rule over the body, we are also made aware of the imperatives of the body 
from Shelley's journal. She reflects on her mother's character while commenting on 
sexual difference: 
My Mother had more energy of character-still she had not sufficient fire of 
imagination-In short my belief is-whether there be sex in souls or not-that 
the sex of our [female] material mechanism makes us quite different 
262 It is difficult to know why the passage about the soul was added to the text in the 
1831 edition and was not mentioned in the 1818 edition. 
263 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus. 1831 ed. Maurice Hindle. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), p.47. To distinguish with the 1818 edition, 
this edition will be cited as Frankenstein 1831 with page numbers in parentheses. 
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creatures-better though weaker but wanting III the higher grades of 
intellect. 264 
The emphasis is clearly on the body, and the material facts of sex, which is hence 
different from her mother's doctrine. Wollstonecraft puts emphasis on the development 
of intellect rather than on physical difference, for the intellectual capacity can be 
modified by the "education of the body." While she politicized the concept of soul to be 
a gender-free entity, her daughter considers the physiological make-up of the body, and 
therefore sexual difference, as the determinant of the soul. Compared with 
Wollstonecraft's educationist stance, Shelley's statement therefore seems much less 
engaged in the process of changing "things as they are." Shelley's approach to politics 
fundamentally differs from her mother, for she does not vindicate the "equal" rights of 
women, but believes in their "different" quality. The heroines ofWollstonecraft's novels 
are female geniuses, whereas the protagonist of her daughter's Frankenstein is a male 
overreacher.265 Moreover, the female characters such as Caroline, Elizabeth and Justine 
in the novel represent the feminine sphere of domesticity, as many critics have pointed 
out. Unable to piece together such a puzzle, some critics have made Safie, a minor 
character with a "masculine energy," the "incarnation of Mary Wollstonecraft,,,266 so as 
to locate the mother's influence in Shelley'S work. However the question remains: Is the 
264 Letter addressed to Maria Gisborne on 11 June 1835. Selected Letters of Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelleyed. Betty T. Bennett (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), p.257. 
265 The protagonists of her major works such as The Last Man, Valperga, Lodore and 
Falkner (except, of course, Mathilda) are also male. 
266 Anne K. Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Lik Her Fiction, Her Monsters (New York & 
London: Methuen, 1988), p.1l8. Johanna Smith also argues that Safie is reminiscent of 
Wollstonecraft in that she, unlike Elizabeth and Justine, learns from her mother "to 
aspire to higher powers of intellect and an independence of spirit." See Johanna M. 
Smith's '''Cooped Up": Feminine Domesticity in Frankenstein'In Mary Shelley: 
Frankenstein (Bedford: Books of St. Martin's Press, 1992), p.283. 
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depiction of a masculine woman the only legacy of Wollstonecraft traceable in her 
daughter's novel? In this chapter, I would like to draw attention to two branches of 
medical studies, physiognomy and phrenology, that were current in their time. By 
analysing 'The Cave of Fancy' and Frankenstein, I will try to show how these two 
medical approaches help explain the fundamental differences between Wollstonecraft 
and Shelley in putting forward their gender issues. 
1. Lavater's Physiognomy 
Both physiognomy and phrenology are sciences267 that provide clues to understanding 
a person's character by examining physical appearances. In other words, they both give 
specific guidelines to understanding the moral and intellectual features of a person by 
judging the shape of his or her face (or head). Johann Casper Lavater's Essays on 
Physiognom/68 was a tremendous success in the continent as well as in Britain.269 His 
physiognomical study is not merely based on an abstract theory of the human 
countenance, but also on a concrete analysis of people in the flesh, in engravings and in 
silhouettes. For this purpose, Lavater obtained help from many artists, and amongst 
267 Although Lavater's physiognomy was often derided as a "pseudo-science" by his 
reviewers, he has called his physiognomical system "science" in his Essays on 
Physiognomy. This is made clear in the author's preface which is attached to Henry 
Hunter's edition: "The whole science of Physiognomy, taken in the most extensive; as 
well as in the most restricted sense, rests, beyond contradiction, on these universal and 
incontestable principles." See Essays on Physiognomy 3 vols. Trans. Henry Hunter 
(London 1810), p.18. 
268 All citations are to Essays on Physiognomy; for the Promotion of the Knowledge and 
Love of Mankind trans. by Thomas Holcroft (London: G.G.J. & J.Robinson, 1789). 
Hereafter cited as EPwith page numbers in parentheses. 
269 Mter its initial success in German (five publications in the 1770s, four in the 1780s), 
the French translation of the 1780s introduced it to a still wider audience. This was 
followed by the two English editions in the 1780s including the most complete Henry 
Hunter translation. By the 1790s no fewer than twelve English versions in five 
different translations were published. See John Graham's 'Lavater's Physiognomy in 
England'in Journal of the History of Ideas VoLXXILNo.4, (1961), p.562. 
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them Henry Fuseli was one of the most renowned. During the l760s and 1770s, Fuseli 
kept in constant touch with Lavater, and contributed engravings to the French and 
English editions. He was also a close friend of Wollstonecraft and Joseph Johnson's 
circle.270 Physiognomy's extraordinary popularity at the end of the eighteenth century 
can be confirmed by a number of reviews which appeared between the 1780s and the 
1800S.271 British periodicals such as The Monthly Review, The European Magazine and 
The Gentleman's Magazine gave substantial details of Lavater's method in their 
reviews.272 Therefore the peak of Lavater's popularity coincided with the period when 
Wollstonecraft was actively involved in the contemporary political debate and writing 
her literary works. She was greatly influenced by Lavater's Essays, and she even 
attempted a translation. This attempt however was held back by Thomas Holcroft's 
earlier release of his translation.273 
If physiognomy is the study of the human face and countenance, phrenology is 
the study of the shape of the human head. The distinction is difficult to maintain, 
however, for these branches of science have a common feature. Both tried to understand 
270 Wollstonecraft actually met Lavater in person through Fuseli. Fuseli, a Swiss artist, 
came to settle in London in 1764 and remained in England for the rest of his life. See 
William St Clair (1989), p.262. 
271 Although it is easy to understand why Lavater is identified as the inventor of 
physiognomy seeing his great reputation, the origin of this science is difficult to pin 
down. As Graeme Tytler has argued, physiognomy had probably been an integral part 
of most cultures long before it became a formal branch of study. See Graeme Tytler's 
Physiognomy in the European Novel: Faces and Fortunes (N ew Jersey: Princeton UP, 
1982), p.35. 
272 John Graham (1961), pp.564-5. The review in The Gentleman's Magazine connected 
physiognomy with the medical and philosophical traditions of the western world. See 
The Gentleman's Magazine Vol.LXXX (1799), p.948. 
273 The popularity of Lavater's theory can be observed from contemporary novels such 
as The Mysteries of Udolpho and Desmond. Charlotte Smith has her heroine, 
Geraldine, say that she "contend[s] for Lavater's sytem" and has her use Desmond's 
countenance in support of her argument: "His was the most open, ingenuous 
countenance I had ever seen; and his manners, as well as all I could then know of his 
heart and his temper, were exactly such as that countenance indicated" (Desmond 160, 
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the interior features of a person by analysing the exterior. Like Lavater who gathered 
numerous pictures or engravings of people's faces, Gall collected "casts of individuals 
remarkable for any quality, whether talent or moral sentiment" (Outlines 53). Though 
methodologically Lavater and Gall conducted the same kind of research, namely 
accumulating specimens in support of their theories, the fonner studied the 
two-dimensional faces of the literary masters, but Gall examined the three-dimensional 
"busts" of individuals who excelled in the same skills (ibid.). Even with these 
differences, the designations are confusing. Francois-Joseph Gall's phrenological study 
is often labelled "physiognomy.,,274 Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, the student of Gall, has 
entitled his theory as the "physiognomical system" and C.W.Hufeland's book on Gall's 
theory is called Dr Gall's New TheOlY of Physiognomy. 275 Having said this, when it 
comes to the discussion of how the soul and the body are linked to each other, there is a 
great disparity between Lavater's theory and that of Gall and Spurzheim. To elaborate, 
while Lavater tended to perceive physical appearances as the "signs" or traces of the 
spiritual self, Gall tended to see them as the cause.276 
For Lavater, the physical features of a man are the manifestation or 
materialisation of the spirit, so he searches for the signs of his or her power of mind and 
161). 
274 See for example the title of Outlines. See also Johann Casper Spurzheim's 
Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim; Founded on an Anatomical and 
Physiological Examination of the Nervous System in General: and the Brain in 
Particular (London: Baldwin, 1815). 
275 C.W.Hufeland, Dr Gall's New Theory of Physiognomy Founded upon the Anatomy 
and Physiology of the Brain, and the form of the Skull (London, 1807). Hereafter cited 
as New Theorywith page numbers in parentheses. 
276For the sake of clarity, I will call the former (Lavater's theory) "physiognomy" and 
the latter (Gall's theory) "phrenology." I consider physiognomy to be more spiritual or 
religious than phrenology, and phrenology more materialistic. Of course, it would be 
inaccurate to characterise Gall's theory as purely materialistic, for his theory too has 
spiritual elements, especially in his later works. It is because I wish to crystalise the 
implication of these two approaches that I draw a rather schematic picture of them. 
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character in his or her features. 
The question will stand simply thus: Whether it be possible to explain the 
undeniable striking differences which exist between human faces and fom1s, 
not by obscure and confused conceptions, but by certain characters, signs, and 
expressions? Whether these signs can communicate the strength and weakness, 
health and sickness of the body; the folly and wisdom, the magnanimity and 
meanness, the virtue and vice of the mind? (EP 2, italics added) 
He has thus tried to draw a concrete explanation of how the moral character of a person 
is manifest in his or her face and form. Although both Godwin and Wollstonecraft are 
against the idea that the physical structure of the body wholly determines the intellectual 
capacity of the mind, they may have shared a similar curiosity with Lavater in 
contriving a method of reading a person's power of mind from outside. 
2. Wollstonecraft and Physiognomy 
In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft has criticised the "sexual 
characteristics" of women such as "dependence," "weak elegancy of mind" and 
"exquisite sensibility" (VRW 175). She encourages women to "unfold their faculties" 
because she considers them to be "rational creatures" who are no different from men 
(VRW 74, 75). Insofar as the word "masculine" connotes the imitation of manly virtues 
or the attainment of those talents and virtues, she wishes that women would everyday 
grow more and more masculine (VRW 74). It is therefore not surprising that her 
rationalist ideal has been understood by her critics as a project towards the 
masculinisation of the mind. 277 As I have argued in Chapter 5, the soul for 
277 Keith Michael Baker, 'Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: 
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Wollstonecraft signifies the mind or intellectual properties, and it is the "dignity" of the 
female soul that is at stake in a COlTUpt civilized society. By detaching the soul from the 
enervated female body, she hies to picture a whole new body in which reason and 
understanding could be cultivated. I have also argued that this approach contradicted her 
progressive ideas that had their base in Lockean associationism and Hartley's 
materialism. She acknowledges the tenaciousness of the associations impressed on the 
body with "mechanical exactness," and also admits that they can seldom be 
"disentangled by reason" (VRW 186). The implication is that the "vicious association" 
has to be overcome by the interaction of the mind and body. 
Despite this paradox, she was persistent in her position as an anti-materialist. 
She was hopeful that an "immortal soul, not restrained by mechanical laws" would free 
itself from the shackles of matter (VRW 116). This image is reminiscent of Baxter's 
dualist view of the body and soul which I discussed in the previous chapter. Lavater, as 
Tytler has argued, put forward his physiognomical theories by blending theology and 
science.278 His religious sentiment can be observed from the following passage. 
How spiritual, how incorporeal soever his internal essence may be, still is he 
only visible and conceivable from the harmony of his constituent parts. From 
these he is inseparable. He exists and moves in the body he inhabits, as in his 
element. (EP 23, italics added) 
The idea that the spiritual part and the "visible" or "constituent" parts are "inseparable" 
seems to confirm his materialist view that the soul is attached to the body. However, 
Variations on a Theme by Habermas' In Habermas and the Public Sphere Ed. Craig 
Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1992), p.205. See also Mary Poovey (1984) and 
Mary Jacobus's 'The Difference of View' in Women Writing and Writing about Women 
ed. Mary Jacobus (London: Croom Helm, 1979). 
278 Graeme Tytler (1982), p.54. 
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"his internal essence" and the pronoun "he" indicates the existence of an independent 
entity that "inhabits" the body. In this respect Wollstonecraft's ambivalence in some 
ways reflects Lavater's notion of selfhood and its spirituality. 
It is difficult to judge to what extent WOllstonecraft's ontological thinking is an 
echo of Lavater's system, but the analytical method must have proven appealing in 
writing her moralistic works. This is suggested in her unfinished story, "The Cave of 
Fancy." The sage called Sagestus is portrayed as a person acquainted with a certain 
knowledge that allows him to understand or read "the shape of the solid structure, how 
far the spirit could range" (CF 194). This is clearly a reverberation of Lavater's theory, 
and the narrator's statement that Sagestus "was perfectly acquainted with the 
construction of the human body" is also a confirmation of this. When he encounters the 
dead bodies which were washed ashore by a shipwreck, he begins to examine them as if 
he were a medical expert or a physiogonomist: "he ... walked leisurely among the dead, 
and narrowly observed their pallid features" (ibid.). 
After giving analyses of a several dead bodies whose features indicate 
"melancholy," "the quick senses which conveyed intelligence," "timid[ity]" or 
"indolence" (CF 194, 195), he finds a dead man who appears to have died saving an 
orphan girl, Sagesta. This male body is described as "inanimate clay" which lately had 
been the "dwelling of a most benevolent spirit" (CF 196). The head of this man is 
"square, though the features were not very prominent; but there was a great harmony in 
every part, and the tum of the nostrils and lips evinced, that the soul must have had taste, 
to which they had served as organs" (ibid.). Sagestus concludes from these 
well-propOliioned features that the man was "all heart, full of forbearance, and desirous 
to please every fellow-creature;! but from a nobler motive than a love of admiration; the 
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fumes of vanity never mounted to cloud his brain, or tarnish his beneficence" (ibid). 
The features observable from Sagesta's dead mother are presented as a 
quintessential case of a hyper-delicate woman enervated by "an improper education" 
(CF 197). A delicacy in her form, which is characterised as "truly feminine," according 
to Sagestus's analysis, was aggravated by this wrong kind of education, because it "took 
away all vigour from her faculties." This is affirmed by the fact that "few traces" of 
exertions of the mind appear on her face (ibid.), and this approach in finding "signs" or 
"traces" is deeply evocative of Lavater's view that the physical features mirror the 
development of the souL The foolish person is often compared to an inhuman object or 
a "machine" in Wollstonecraft's works, and Eliza in MaTY is perhaps the most 
representative. This image is recurrent in this story. Sagesta's mother is likened to a 
machine whose "wheels ... [had been] clogged by prejudices" and never turned quite 
round (ibid.). We get a glimpse of Wollstonecraft's caustic criticism through the sage's 
sober view about the death of Sagesta's mother. Sagestus in the end is convinced that 
"the orphan was not very unfortunate in having lost such a mother" (CF 198). 
As I have discussed in Chapter 4, the female spirit in 'The Cave of Fancy' 
occupies an equally significant position in that she is perhaps a major spokesperson for 
Wollstonecraft's philosophy. We must not however forget that this spirit is a 
representation of what seems to be the opposite of the physiognomical study. In chapter 
3 of 'The Cave of Fancy' where the female spirit begins her story, Wollstonecraft turns 
her attention from the "countenance" to the "voice" that speaks truth: 
The mouth, in fact, seems to be the feature where you may trace every kind of 
dissimulation, from the simper of vanity, to the fixed smile of the designing 
villain. Perhaps, the modulations of the voice will still more quickly give a key 
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to the character than even the turns of the mouth, or the words that issue from 
it; often do the tones of un practised dissemblers give the lie to their asseliions. 
(CF 199) 
The locus of the "trace" of one's character is thus shifted from the "mouth" to the 
"voice." The voice is here given more importance than the "turns of the mouth" or the 
"words." By conceiving a fictional story in which a disembodied "spirit" teaches a 
"useful lesson," Wollstonecraft is able to take the reader's eyes away from her 
physiognomical features to her "voice." We are not given any information about the 
spirit's physical appearance, nor are we encouraged to find out the exterior features of 
this subject. We are merely given a story of her life as a dutiful daughter through her 
"voice," though her secret passion for a true lover is disclosed. It is interesting to 
observe that what gives this spirit "identity" is not her countenance or physical form, 
but the "activity of soul" and the "eccentric warmth" (CF 204) of her person. What is at 
issue here is, as Barbara Taylor has hinted, the possibility of women's imaginative 
grandeur. She problematises the fact that women are consigned, like the shipwrecked 
mother in the tale, to the pretty and the petty. The narrative of the female spirit itself 
throws light on the issue about the physical handicap that women carries. It is therefore 
convincing that Taylor presents the "female spirit" as "a proto-feminist whose sublimity 
points to a moral stature rarely accorded women.279 The body should not be a "shackle" 
of the soul, for Wollstonecraft. It is merely a visible quality of self that presents traces of 
its development. 
279 Barbara Taylor (2003), p.64. 
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3. The Misreading of the Monster 
It was Shelley's essentialist view that broadened the philosophical chasm between her 
and her mother. It would not be possible to explain Shelley's materialism wholly in the 
framework of the phrenological system, for it was probably the entire 
eighteenth-century medical and philosophical tradition that helped consolidate her 
views about gender identities. Still I would like to argue that Gall's anatomical analyses 
of the brain or the shape of the head have played a great part in the formation of 
Shelley's philosophical ideas about the body, the female sex, and selfhood. As there is a 
mention of "Mr. Gall" in her journal on September 16, 1814, behind Shelley's 
essentialism lies Gall's theory of the "organology" (Outlines 29) which is firmly set 
against her parents' theory of perfectibility.28o Gall's methodology is strictly based on 
the study of organs. When, for example, he finds any unusual swelling in the head, he 
considers it to be the result of cerebral development (Outlines 50). He also collects 
sample cases to prove that a development of a particular part of the brain is the cause of 
a certain human behaviour. In these two ways, Spurzheim maintains, Gall characterised 
each organ (ibid). Hartley's mechanical associationism may be classed in the same 
materialist philosophy as the doctrine of Gall and Spurzheim, but he has left room for 
ongoing improvement or change in the character of a person. I will cite an interesting 
passage from Hufeland's statement about Gall's theory: 
There is a concluding remark which may indispose those towards Gall's theory, 
who cannot hinder the intrusion of moral feeling into the field of natural 
observation. This doctrine repels the notion of the Perfectibility of Man, by 
280 The Shelleys were acquainted with Louis-Marie Prudhomme who had edited Gall's 
book. 
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which I mean his indefinite improveablility: for the bounds seem to be fixed in 
his physical organisation. (New TheOlY 35) 
As Hufeland has argued, the perfectible nature of man would be deterred by the material 
facts of the body, if they are "fixed" from birth as in the case of Gall's phrenology. 
Contrary to Godwin and Wollstonecraft, Spurzheim censures the opinion that considers 
education to be a cause of the faculties of the mind. He maintains that "[ c ]hildren 
sometimes show particular dispositions and faculties before they have received any kind 
of instruction" (Outlines 267). The "[o]rganic theory" (New TheOlY 24) has attacked the 
empilicist view which maintains "men are born not only without character, but also 
absolutely indifferent to all character, without any tendency or disposition of any kind 
whatever" (New TheOlY 20). 
It is understandable that Godwin was sceptical of phrenological theory which 
was far too deterministic for his philosophy. For him it would take away one's "free 
will." 281 In fact there is an anecdote of Godwin specifically linking him with 
physiognomical interest. Godwin asked his neighbour to conduct a physiognomical 
analysis of Mary Shelley in 1797, then only a newborn infant. "Mr Nicholson," a 
physiognomist, described and analysed Shelley's face and head.282 In his biography of 
Mary Shelley, Christopher Small summarises the analysis of Nicholson in the following 
passage: 
He saw III the new-born child SIgnS of "considerable memory and 
intelligence," "quick sensibility, irritable, scarcely irascible and surely not 
281 Graham argues that the reason why Godwin could not accept Gall's phrenological 
thinking, while celebrating Lavater's physiognomy, was because the former does not 
permit "free will." See John Graham (1961), p.567. 
282 Mary Shelley, The Joul71als of Mary Shelley eds. Paula R. Feldman and Diana 
Scott-Kilvert (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p.26 
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given to rage"; not much evidence of persistence in "investigation"-"I think 
her powers, of themselves, would lead to speedy combination, rather than 
continued research." He could not say very much on the shape of Mary's 
mouth, it being "too much employed to be well observed"-the baby was 
evidently crying-but, remarking that "she was displeased," noted in her 
expression "more of resigned vexation than either scorn or rage." His 
conclusion was that "her manner may be petulant in resistance, but cannot be 
sullen. ,,183 
But this episode is rather perplexing, for Godwin, a believer in the Lockean notion of 
the tabula rasa, would not have conceded the idea that a human being is born with a 
character. Examining the face of a newborn child would mean that his or her moral and 
intellectual capacities are in one way or another set before birth, and this view is at odds 
with his perfectible view. 
In taking issue with the philosophy of Helvetius 284 and Hartley and in 
sympathising with Gall's organic theory, Hufeland introduces Helvetius's famous story 
about "a boy who used to be left alone in a room with a great clock, and afterwards 
became a great mechanic" (New Theory 21). He is however aware that Gall's doctrine is 
"no less repulsive" than the notion introduced by Helvetius or Hartley to the common 
reader of his time (New TheOlY 23). It is this theory which gives preeminence to the 
material organs that drives Victor to the artificial creation of a man. Victor's intention 
was to produce a perfect being with carefully selected parts or organs, but his creature 
283 Christopher Small, Ariel Like a Happy: Shelley, Mary and Frankenstein (London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1972), pp.30, 3l. 
284 Although I am aware of the importance of Helvetius's influence on the idea of the 
"indefinite improvement" of man, I have not treated his works in this thesis. I am 
merely mentioning his empiricist theory in passing as a French counterpart to 
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does not tum out to be the embodiment of beauty, let alone of perfection. Instead the 
finished work only excites feeling of horror and disgust in those who lay eyes on him. 
This characterisation of the monster alerts the reader to the extremist approach of 
organology. Shelley may well have thought that a person may be bom with a set of 
moral attributes, but must have condemned the abuse of such a theory through a 
scientific experiment. 
According to Victor, one of the phenomena which attracted his attention was 
"the structure of the human frame" (Frankenstein 33). The word "frame" implies the 
brain structure, the physical organisation or the bone structure that fonns the head. This 
"frame" therefore could be an allusion to phrenology, craniology or cranioscopy, and 
indicate that Victor is well-versed in these sciences. To unveil the secret of life, he 
"collected bones from chamel-houses; and disturbed, with profane fingers, the 
tremendous secrets of the human frame" (Frankenstein 36). There is a mockery of 
physiognomical study in the way Victor selects the body parts for his creation, for 
Shelley has him say that "His limbs were in proportion and I had selected his features as 
beautiful" (Frankenstein 39). The accomplishment of his toil, however, is depicted thus: 
Beautiful!-Great Godl His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles 
and alieries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of 
pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only fonned a more horrid contrast 
with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white 
sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled compexion and straight black 
lips. (Frankenstein 39) 
The total effect produced by the extravagant use of "beautiful" parts IS a "horrid 
Hartley's mechanical theory. 
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contrast." Even the monster himself is "terrified" to see his own reflection in a 
transparent pool: "when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I 
am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification" 
(Frankenstien 90). 
Let us now observe how the physiognomical interest of Shelley's parents is 
reflected in the representation of the monster. The monster's appeal that he "was 
benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend" instantly reminds us of the Godwinian 
belief that man is naturally good. The same injustice that the monster experiences in 
Shelley's fiction was shown in the predicament of Caleb Williams. Laura's contempt for 
Caleb, caused by reading a fictional story of his villainous act, was expressed by her 
words: "You are a monster, and not a man" (CW 300). However, Caleb's face or 
countenance that expresses goodness is always justly interpreted. Brightwel, for 
example, is convinced of Caleb's innocence not simply because of his persuasive 
eloquence, but because of "a frequent observation" that Brightwel makes of him in his 
"most unguarded moments" (CW 192). When his character is misinterpreted, it is 
mostly because of the prejudice against his social rank. Shelley'S monster and his 
character, on the other hand, are assessed solely on the basis of his appearance. 
Wollstonecraft also had faith in the physiognomical reading of people's faces, 
as is observable in her 'The Cave of Fancy'; so if Shelley had followed her mother's 
philosophy, she would have allowed someone to recognise the "benevolent" nature of 
the monster. Sagestus may likely have detected the true nature of the monster, but all the 
characters in Frankenstein including Victor and Walton "misinterpret" his character. 
The De Lacey family do not even know he exists, until he presents himself to the old De 
Lacey. However, Felix runs up to him, and mercilessly strikes him with a stick before he 
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can deliver his side of the story (Frankenstein 110). The only two people, besides Victor, 
who are able to listen to the monster's narrative with composure are Walton and the old 
man. Walton is told of Victor's experiment prior to his encounter with the monster. As to 
the old man, he is blind and unable to see the deformity of the monster with his own 
eyes, but this is the only reason why he does justice to the monster's character: "I am 
blind, and cannot judge of your countenance, but there is something in your words 
which persuades me that you are sincere" (Frankenstein 109). Even Walton cannot 
dissipate his suspicion about the monster's demonic nature. Although he is at first 
"touched by the expressions of the [monster's] misery," when he remembers what 
Victor said about the monster's powers of eloquence and persuasion, his "indignation is 
rekindled" (Frankenstein 188). Shelley illustrates the futility of trying to read the mind 
from physical appearances. 
The monster is constantly persecuted because of his deformity, but this is in 
fact pointing to Shelley's objective view about physiognomy. The physical appearances 
of the monster are "fixed" from the moment of his birth, which belies the logic that the 
exterior features are a reflection of the development of the inner self. Victor's creature is 
thus bounded by the material body that ironically preserves his life. Paul Youngquist 
argues that the monster, "rational and compassionate as he is, finds himself trapped in a 
body that inspires disgust," and draws a conclusion that "For Shelley, body is fate.,,285 
Youngquist notes that Shelley lacks her mother's confidence that the fate of sex can be 
overcome, but I would argue that the imperatives of the body haunted them both. 
285 Paul Youngquist, 'FTankenstein: The Mother, the Daughter and the Monster' in 
Philological QuaTteTlyvo1.70. (1991), p.342-344. 
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4. The Organ of Parental and Filial Love 
Wollstonecraft too felt the inevitable fate of women whose bodies can be an obstacle to 
the cultivation of the mind. It is just that Shelley is less pessimistic about feminine traits. 
Although Elizabeth Lavenza, Victor's cousin, appears to be "the most fragile creature in 
the world," she is portrayed as a "lively and animated" creature, and had "strong and 
deep" feelings (Frankenstein 20).286 Elizabeth's traits are completely dissimilar from 
Victor's, but the difference is said to produce "harmony" (Frankenstein 21) rather than 
antagonism. Furthermore, in the 1831 edition, this harmony is accentuated: 
Harmony was the soul of our companionship, and the diversity and contrast 
that subsisted in our characters drew us nearer together. Elizabeth was of a 
calmer and more concentrated disposition; but, with all my ardour, I was 
capable of a more intense application, and was more deeply smitten with the 
thirst for knowledge. (Frankenstein 1831, 36) 
The stress on gender difference seems to present not so much Wollstonecraft's liberal 
feminism as the essentialist ideas of Gall and Spurzheim. Seeing that the "propensity to 
take care of the young" is stronger in women than in men, Spurzheim had attributed this 
characteristic to the so-called "organ of philoprogenitive ness" (Outlines 113). 
When we tum our attention to the principal female characters in Frankenstein, 
they are all depicted as "tender" (Frankenstein 19) and when caring for others, they are 
most expressive of anxiety (Frankenstein 48) and of affection (Frankenstein 26, 47). 
Victor's mother, Caroline Beaufort, is an incarnation of feminine affection. Caroline's 
picture is hung on the mantelpiece, representing her in an agony of despair, kneeling by 
286 In the 1831 edition, Elizabeth is described as an orphan who was a daughter of a 
Milanese nobleman. Victor's mother was attracted by Elizabeth's appearance that 
strikes her as of "a being-heaven-sent, and bearing a celestial stamp in all her features" 
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the coffin of her dead father: "Her garb was mstic, and her cheek pale; but there was an 
air of dignity and beauty, that hardly permitted the sentiment of pity" (Frankenstein 58). 
Justine Moritz, an inmate of the Frankenstein family, takes over the maternal role after 
Caroline is deceased. She imitates Caroline in every aspect, and so much resembles 
Caroline that she reminds Elizabeth of her aunt. 
Barbara Johnson has described these three characters as "beautiful, gentle, 
selfless, boring nurturers,,,}87 but did Shelley mean to censure the "nurturing" role of 
women? When Elizabeth catches scarlet fever, Caroline cannot "debar herself from ... 
enter[ing] her chamber long before the danger of infection was past" (Frankenstein 
26).288 Justine, who is wrongly accused of William's murder, is found guilty. But in the 
face of death, she is thinking of William whom she has taken care of in place of 
Caroline. "Dear William!" she exclaims, "dearest blessed child! I soon shall see you 
again in heaven, where we shall all be happy; and that consoles me, going as I am to 
suffer ignominy and death" (Frankenstein 66). This maternal care and attention are 
significantly portrayed as a heroic act. 
In comparison to these female characters, Victor, the "mother" of the monster, 
has surrendered all duties as a parent. Gall and Spurzheim have argued that those who 
"are endowed with a great deal of parental love" have a more developed organ that 
controls paternal feeling. According to Spurzheim, they have examined the shape of the 
head in twenty-nine women who were infanticides, and twenty-five of them had the 
organ of philoprogenitive ness very small (Outlines 114). Hufeland has named this organ 
(Frankenstein 1831,34). This makes a sharp contrast with the monster's features. 
287 Barbara Johnson, "My MonsterlMy Self' in Frankenstein, Ed. Paul Hunter, 
(W.W.Norton & Co., 1996), p.248. 
288 In the 1831 edition, Caroline does more than "enter" the chamber. She attends 
Elizabeth's sickbed, and her "watchful attentions" actually contribute to saving her life. 
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"the organ of parental and filial love," and states that it is found in that part called the 
"os occipitis" where the "lambdoideae" and the "protuberantia occipitalis extema" 
adjoin. Gall remarks that on this point of the skull, not only in women but in the female 
of many animals, a very striking swelling is found (New The01Y 85). From these 
findings Gall conjectures that 
this pari of the brain [is] the seat of some sort of sensibility which may be 
more peculiarly the attribute of the female; but afterwards, considering 
sensibility as a quality common to all organs, he was led to attribute to this 
conformation, a characteristic feature of the female sex, the love of their 
children .... (ibid.) 
Gall's doctrine, Hufeland argues, points out how far it is limited by certain 
pre-determined tendencies to good or evil (New The01Y 173). This view fixes the moral 
tendency of a person to the given body that would otherwise have been "improvable." 
At Spandau, Gall is said to have examined the skull of a woman who had allegedly 
murdered her new born infant seven times successively, and in her he "found the organ 
[of parental and filial love] wanting" (New The01Y 89). The materialist view that the 
propensity to kill one's own child is predetermined is "repulsive," as Hufeland has said, 
but it is highly probable that this kind of materialism gave Shelley reason to believe 
certain things about the "female material mechanism." 
What is relevant here is the monster's justification for his conduct. He defends 
his position by relating his pitiable situation which has driven him to extreme misery, 
but it must be remembered that what provoked him to murder William was the 
knowledge that this boy whom he tried to befriend was Victor's brother. Then, his 
reason deserts him and the feeling of anger overcomes him. The monster is no less 
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wanting in "filial love" than Victor is lacking paternal love towards his creature. 
Justine is a significant character: she is the victim of the same parental neglect, 
and yet develops both filial love towards her mother and maternal feeling as a surrogate 
parent. Justine's mother "through a strange perversity" treated her ill, and this was the 
reason why Caroline invited her into her family in the first place. 289 When her mother 
was at last repentant of her ill treatment, Justine is called back. Her mother's repentance 
however was "vacillating," and she often accused her of having caused the deaths of her 
brothers and sister (Frankenstein 47). Not only was she hated by her mother, but also 
misjudged and condemned by the court, and called a "monster" (Frankenstein 66). In 
that Justine is constantly misjudged like the monster, we could say she is his double. 
Are bodily features and the underdeveloped organ the absolute fate for 
Shelley? To this question I will come back to the monster's physical appearances. His 
form does not change from the beginning to the end, and this is confirmed by Walton's 
description: "Never did I behold a vision so horrible as his face, of such loathsome, yet 
appalling hideousness" (Frankenstein 187). The spirit that was disembodied by 
Wollstonecraft in "The Cave of Fancy" is re-embodied by her daughter in the form of 
the monster. But that body not only repulses the perceiver, but also presents such 
ugliness that it becomes the obstacle to any kind of analysis. Therefore his narrative, 
which alone could compensate for his exterior form, is ineffectuaL The representation of 
the monster is complicated by the multilayered narratives of Walton, Victor and the 
monster, and his loathsome appearance is stubbornly fixed, as if to defy Sagestus's 
physiognomical analysis. 
289 In the 1831 edition, it is explained that the reason why Justine's mother treated her 
very ill is because she "could not endure her" (Frankenstein 1831, 63). 
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Wollstonecraft's progressive philosophy is projected onto Victor's distorted idealism, 
but it is understandably eclipsed by his failure to show parental love for his creature. 
The theme of maternal affection penneates the novel, and this was represented by the 
monster's double, Justine. The feminine characteristics are foreground ed, and this 
makes the deficiency of Victor and the monster remarkably conspicuous. The correct 
reading of the monster's character from the outward "signs" is not possible, for his body 
was completed before the character could be developed. Shelley has represented the 
monster not as a typical sample of a physiognomical study, but as the emblem of 
misreading. The only way to prevent the misreading of the monster is to deprive his 
viewer of sight, as in the case of the blind man. One is enabled to judge him justly when 
one perceives him only through his voice. Was it not the voice that was featured in the 
spiritual subject in 'The Cave of Fancy'? If the method of extracting the truth of the 
character is the disembodiment for Wollstonecraft, for Shelley it is perhaps to take away 
sight. The monster was confident that he could get his message across with his voice: 
"My voice, although harsh, had nothing terrible in it; I thought, therefore, that is, in the 
absence of his children, I could gain the good-will and mediation of the old De Lacy, I 
might by his means, be tolerated by my younger protectors" (Frankenstein 107). 
What I have shown through the analysis of Shelley's monster is the importance 
of voices or narratives. Both Godwin and Wollstonecraft tried to show that truth stands 
on one's ability to communicate truth to the public. Three authors, however, shared 
certain insecurity about self-representation. As I have discussed in much detail in 
Chapter 1, this had much bearing upon eighteenth-century medical and philosoophical 
discourses which inquired the body-mind relationship. The concept of passions and how 
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self is moulded was pivotal in asking moral questions, such as what evil is and how it 
arises. How self is perceived from outside was Shelley'S another crucial theme. 
Shelley's Frankenstein does now allow its reader to make a simple judgement on 
whether or not the monster was "evil," because she casts doubt on the security of 
selfhood itself. 
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